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 Historians today continue to explore the maintenance of the U.S. Empire in the 
Third World. Some argue that coercion was the driving force. Others suggest that consent 
played a role. Settling this debate is difficult given the unbalanced state of the 
historiography, which is overloaded with analyses of interventions.  
 Analyzing U.S.-Ecuadorian relations offers an instructive addition to the 
literature. Negotiation and compromise, not coercion, were central to these interactions. 
The Ecuadorians who shaped these relations the most typically shared some core 
assumptions with their U.S. counterparts. Policymakers in Washington therefore 
developed educational exchange programs to expand this pool of pro-U.S. Latin 
Americans. Using documents from archives in the United States and Ecuador, this study 
explores how policymakers used diplomacy and education to maintain the U.S. Empire in 
the Third World from 1933 to 1963. 
 This process began with the Roosevelt Administration‘s Good Neighbor Policy. 
Ecuadorian threats to nationalize U.S. businesses operating in Ecuador, however, 
challenged the rhetoric of cooperation championed by Roosevelt. The Japanese attack on 
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Pearl Harbor halted these challenges. Two days after the attack, policymakers in 
Washington accepted Ecuadorian offers to establish bases in Ecuador. This marked the 
solidification of hemispheric solidarity, and a more robust U.S. hegemony in Latin 
America. 
 A growing number of Ecuadorian students and intellectuals studying in the United 
States under scholarships awarded by their government strengthened this solidarity. The 
U.S. government soon began funding both these exchanges as well as American Schools 
throughout Latin America in the hopes of maintaining this unity in the future.  
 Beginning in 1950, disputes over fisheries threatened the wartime cohesion. 
Ecuador attempted to force Washington to accept a 200-mile limit on territorial waters. 
Negotiations failed to resolve the issue. The discontent evident throughout Latin America 
continued to build, until, in 1962, President John F. Kennedy discovered that the 
government of Ecuador would not support his administration‘s plan to exclude Cuba 
from the Organization of American States. Despite these setbacks, policymakers 
continued to promote educational exchange through the Foreign Leader Program and the 
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 On 12 December 1941, thirty-five U.S. Marines arrived in Ecuador to establish 
military bases on Seymour Island in the Galápagos and in the coastal town of Salinas.
1
 
Japan had recently bombed Pearl Harbor, and policymakers in Washington wanted these 
bases to defend the Panama Canal from Japanese attack. This was not the first time that 
the U.S. military had landed on foreign shores in the name of security. In Latin America 
alone, such invasions had occurred in Cuba, Mexico, Guatemala, and Honduras, to name 
a few, as far back as the 1890s. The arrival of the Marines on Ecuadorian territory in 
1941, however, was different. Unlike previous episodes when the Marines were used to 
enforce the will of Washington and protect the interests of Wall Street, this time the U.S. 
soldiers had been invited by the democratically elected president of Ecuador, Alberto 
Arroyo del Rio. This was the era of the Good Neighbor Policy when the United States 
promised to cooperate with the nations of Latin America instead of interfering in their 
domestic affairs. The success of this new model of inter-American solidarity depended on 
the support of pro-U.S. elites in Ecuador and elsewhere. 
 One of these elites, Galo Plaza Lasso, had a long history of supporting the United 
States. After studying at the University of Maryland, Berkeley, and Georgetown, Galo 
Plaza served as an assistant at the Ecuadorian embassy in Washington during the late 
1920s, and later as the Ecuadorian ambassador to Washington. Two years before the 
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 Jorge W. Villacres Moscoso, Historia Diplomatica de la Republica del Ecuador, tercer tomo (Guayaquil, 
Ecuador: EQ. Editorial, 1989), 269. 
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attack on Pearl Harbor, Galo Plaza, who was then Minister of National Defense, offered 
the use of the Galápagos to President Franklin Roosevelt because he recognized the 
strategic value of the islands, and he wanted to help the United States protect shipping 
approaches to the Panama Canal. As president of Ecuador from 1948 to 1952, Galo Plaza 
also strengthened U.S.-Ecuadorian economic relations by opening national territory to 
banana production by the United Fruit Company. Throughout his political career, Galo 
Plaza evinced a pro-U.S. attitude that helped him maintain strong U.S.-Ecuadorian 
relations. 
 Yet despite his pro-U.S. credentials, toward the end of his administration Galo 
Plaza reformed Ecuadorian fishing regulations in ways that led directly to the detaining 
and fining of U.S. fishing vessels operating off the coast of Ecuador. These actions, 
especially the shooting of a U.S. fisherman by an Ecuadorian serviceman, sparked 
outrage among California fishing companies. Company owners urged their union leaders 
to pressure their congressmen to force the State Department to intervene. The strength of 
U.S.-Ecuadorian relations seemed to be at risk, in part due to the Presidential Decrees of 
Galo Plaza. 
 What had happened? Had Galo Plaza and other pro-U.S. elites within his 
administration stopped supporting the United States? Were the tensions in U.S.-
Ecuadorian relations over territorial waters an isolated episode, or was there a broader, 
global context? Put simply, no, Galo Plaza had not suddenly turned against the United 
States; nor was the debate over fishing and territorial waters an isolated episode limited to 
bilateral relations between the United States and Ecuador. Instead, the invitation to 
3 
 
establish U.S. military bases on Ecuadorian territory, the dispute over territorial waters, 
and other episodes in U.S.-Ecuadorian relations explored in this dissertation, reflect in 
microcosm the ever-shifting nature of the U.S. Empire in the Third World
2
—an empire 
maintained less through coercion and intervention, and more through cooperation with 
local elites. 
 This project rests on Antonio Gramsci‘s concept of consensual hegemony, and the 
application of that concept to the field of International Relations Theory by scholars such 
as political scientist Robert W. Cox.
3
 A hegemonic state, according to Gramsci, maintains 
dominance through coercion when needed, but also through the consent of the population 
to its leaders. In such cases, the ruling elites (represented in this dissertation by the 
political, economic and military leaders who were most influential in shaping U.S.-
Ecuadorian relations) preserve their position of dominance by propagating a common 
culture through education, the press, and other institutions of civil society. In order for a 
nation to establish and maintain hegemony within the international system, according to 
Cox, that state would have to promote a world-order which most other states found 
compatible with their own interests—to do otherwise would risk overextension through 
                                                 
2
 The term ―Third World‖ is problematic. Created during the Cold War to describe those nations that were 
not aligned with either the United States (the First World) or the Soviet Union (the Second World), the term 
soon took on several broader meanings. Third-World nations have been described as undeveloped, or 
underdeveloped, or least developed, among other labels. The unifying feature of each of these labels is the 
implication that Third World nations lag behind their modern counterparts in the first and second worlds. 
While this assumption raises several problems, the label ―Third World‖ has survived in the literature on 
U.S. foreign relations and with the policymakers who are the subjects of this literature. Therefore, in this 
dissertation ―Third World‖ will be used primarily for convenience sake, while keeping in mind all of the 
caveats mentioned above. 
3
See especially, Robert W. Cox, ―Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method,‖ 
Millennium Journal of International Studies 12, no. 2 (Summer 1983):162-175. Also, David Forgacs (ed.), 




endless military engagements to quell rebellions.
4
 This international hegemony would 
necessarily reflect the domestic hegemony of the elites within the hegemon, since they 
are the ones who are most responsible for formulating and implementing the foreign 
policies of their government. This ordering of the international system, therefore, would 
necessarily rest on a specific economic system that supported elites within the hegemonic 
nation. 
 As the present dissertation will show, policymakers established U.S. hegemony 
established by the end of World War Two, and maintained it throughout the Cold War, 
by promoting a world-capitalist system. This system was based on, and designed to 
protect, a U.S. model of capitalism that advocated free trade and open access to markets. 
Through diplomatic negotiations over economic and security concerns affecting 
participating nations, and the exchange of ideas, techniques, and methods needed to 
operate in this system facilitated by U.S.-government financed educational exchange 
programs, U.S. elites and pro-U.S. elites throughout the world established a common 
culture of U.S.-styled capitalism that served to maintain U.S. hegemony. 
 Recently there has been a revival of studies of the U.S. Empire, especially with 
regard to U.S.-Third World relations. Questions concerning the nature of the relationship 
between the United States and the nations of the world lie at the heart of this debate. Was 
the United States an imperial power, or a hegemon?
5
 Scholars on both sides of the debate 
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 Cox, 171. 
5
 See for example: Alan Knight, ―Empire, Hegemony and Globalization in the Americas,‖ NACLA Report 
on the Americas, 39, no. 2 (Sep./Oct. 2005): 8-44.; Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the 
United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2006) 
Grandin‘s opening excerpt from Mary Shelley‘s Frankenstein meant to imply a direct comparison between 
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agree that since the end of World War Two, the United States has exercised dominance 
on the international stage. Explanations for how the U.S. government maintained this 
dominance, however, continue to divide historians. Those scholars who argue that the 
United States created an empire insist that U.S. officials have more often than not relied 
on coercion and force, since through violence and intervention imperial states impose 
their dominance on colonial states. Maintaining that dominance requires continued 
coercion.
6
 While scholars who describe U.S. dominance as hegemonic rather than 
imperial do not deny that U.S. officials have used coercion, they argue that consent to 
U.S. policies has also played a significant role in maintaining U.S. influence.
7
 As 
historian Michael Hunt explains, a hegemon maintains its power through ―the broad and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Dr. Frankenstein‘s monster and U.S. foreign policy clearly reveals his position in the debate over empire. 
For a more nuanced discussion of the role of dissent in U.S.-Latin American relations see, Fred Rosen, ed., 
Empire and Dissent: The United States and Latin America, (Duke: Duke, U.P., 2008). For a recent 
discussion from the U.S. as hegemon camp, see Michael Hunt, The American Ascendancy: How the United 
States Gained and Wielded Global Dominance (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007) 
which in turn sparked a lively online debate over the nature of U.S. dominance which can be found at, H-
Diplo Rountable Review of Michael H. Hunt, The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained 
and Wielded Global Dominance, by Thomas Maddux, Andrew Bacevich, Alfred E. Eckes, Stephen Rabe, 
and Thomas Zeiler. Volume VIII, No. 17 (2007), published 10 December 2007. http://www.h-
net.org/~diplo/roundtables/#8.17. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the popular press has also 
focused renewed attention on the issue of U.S. Empire. See for example, Michael Ignatieff, ―The American 
Empire; The Burden,‖ The New York Times Magazine, January 5, 2003, 22. Or, more recently, Parag 
Khanna, ―Waving Goodbye to Hegemony,‖ New York Times Magazine, January 27, 2008, 34. 
6
 See for example: Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War, (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2004); or, Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. 
Policy Toward Latin America, (Cambridge: Harvard U.P., 1998). For a recent discussion of the 
characteristics of the differences between empire and hegemony see: Michael Hunt, ―Empire, Hegemony, 
and the U.S. Policy Mess,‖ posted to HNN, 21 May 2007 (available at 
http://www.hnn.us/articles/37486.html). 
7
 In addition to Michael Hunt‘s recent work referenced above, see: Thomas J. McCormick, America’s Half-
Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins U.P., 
1995); also, Thomas J. McCormick, ―‗Every System Needs a Center Sometime‘ An Essay on Hegemony 
and Modern American Foreign Policy,‖ in Redefinig the Past: Essays in Diplomatic History in Honor of 
William Appleman Williams, Lloyd C. Gardner (ed.), (Corvalis: Oregon State U.P., 1986), 197-254; and, 
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 
(Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1986).  
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subtle penetration of economic and cultural practices and products across entire regions,‖ 
a process that is aided by the ―self-conscious promotion of trans-national norms and 
institutions rather then [sic] the creation of specific subordinate colonial or client 
regimes.‖
8
 Following the lead of Hunt and others, the present study argues that through 
hegemony policymakers maintained the U.S. Empire in the Third World.  
 This project does not focus on distinctions between ―empire‖ and ―hegemony‖ as 
endpoints. Instead, the following chapters detail the processes through which 
policymakers established and maintained U.S. influence in the Third World. The 
maintenance of U.S. dominance in Ecuador was hegemonic. Never did the United States 
employ the level of coercion ascribed above to empires when seeking to protect U.S. 
interests in Ecuador. Policymakers relied instead on negotiations and educational 
exchange programs to promote the adoption of the ―trans-national norms‖ of free-market 
capitalism. This dissertation also suggests that current scholarship on the U.S. Empire has 
obscured our understanding of the U.S. relationship to the nations of the world, 
particularly those of the Third World, by focusing primarily on exceptional cases. 
Especially in studies of U.S.-Latin American relations, scholars have focused more on 
interventions, coups, and military dictatorships than on cases where negotiation and 
compromise have helped to limit such actions. In order to understand the complex nature 
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of the U.S. Empire, scholars need to examine more closely the routine relations that 
theoretically constitute the majority of U.S. foreign relations.
9
  
 Relations between Ecuador and the United States from 1933 to 1963 provide an 
illustrative example of routine relations. While elites in both countries did not always 
agree, never did the United States use the interventions that mark a breakdown in 
diplomacy, and that have attracted the greatest attention from scholars. Only by 
expanding our historical inquiries to include routine relations can we discover whether 
the consensual hegemony that defined U.S.-Ecuadorian relations was also characteristic 
of relations between the United States and other nations of the Third World. 
 This project explores key episodes of diplomacy when policymakers from 
Ecuador and the United States negotiated strategic and economic policies designed to 
maintain the world capitalist system supporting the U.S. Empire. As architects of their 
nation‘s foreign policies, policymakers from the United States and Ecuador represented 
the interests of a variety of elites—economic, political, and military leaders—from their 
own countries. While this study therefore focuses almost solely on policymakers and 
their actions, throughout the negotiations explored herein, officials from the Department 
of State and the Foreign Ministry often brought in elites from outside the government as 
advisers. At times these elites even participated in diplomatic negotiations as special 
envoys of their government. Yet throughout this project, the use of ―Ecuadorian elites‖ 
                                                 
9
 Political scientist Abraham Lowenthal used the phrase ―routine relations‖ in a 1974 report to the Murphy 
Commission to differentiate between what he said diplomats actually did ―most of the time,‖ and the 
exceptional cases that tended to attract most of the attention. Abraham F. Lowenthal, ―The Making of U.S. 
Policies Toward Latin America: The Conduct of ‗Routine‘ Relations,‖ in Appendices, vol. 3 of Commission 
on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1975), 203-204. 
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and ―U.S. elites‖ does not suggest that there was always unity within either of these 
groups. Elites in Ecuador, for example, have been historically divided geographically 
between the coast (Guayaquil), and the highlands (Quito). Elites from the highlands have 
traditionally controlled the national government, while those from the coast have 
generally exerted the most economic influence. Disagreements between these two groups 
often affected the formation of Ecuadorian foreign policy. In the United States, 
disagreements among congressional representatives, State Department officials, and 
business elites have similarly shaped policymaking.  
 The diplomacy chapters illuminate the coercion and consent involved in these 
diplomatic negotiations. Galo Plaza was not the only influential pro-U.S. elite in Ecuador. 
Rather, he was part of a heterogeneous collection of influential Ecuadorians who believed 
in many of the core economic and strategic values that underlay much of U.S. foreign 
policy with the nations of the Third World. This means neither that he and other pro-U.S. 
Ecuadorians always agreed with their Washington counterparts, nor that they were 
always successful in using their pro-U.S. stance to the advantage of Ecuador. But, simply 
put, those Ecuadorian elites who supported the United States were generally more 
successful in securing gains for Ecuador than were their anti-U.S. compatriots—whether 
that meant bringing in U.S. businesses, investments and experts, or limiting these 
influences.  
 The existing scholarship has gone a long way in explaining the coercion used at 
times to maintain the U.S. Empire. This study presents a significant addition to the 
literature by examining consent. In so doing, this dissertation moves beyond diplomacy to 
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explore the role of educational exchange programs in supporting the U.S. Empire. These 
exchange programs operated as one significant site among many of cultural interactions 
between citizens of the United States and the peoples of the world.
10
 
 The connection between education and diplomacy detailed in this dissertation 
builds on the work of Mark T. Berger, especially his Under Northern Eyes: Latin 
American Studies and U.S. Hegemony in the Americas, 1898-1990.
11
 Berger links the 
knowledge-power discourse evident in the development of the academic field of Latin 
American Studies in the United States with the establishment of U.S. dominance in Latin 
America. He reveals how the assumptions of influential scholars, particularly their belief 
in the positive, modernizing effects of the U.S. system and way of life, were used by 
officials in Washington to justify the exploitation of Latin American governments and 
peoples. Berger‘s analysis serves as a jumping off point for the present study, which 
illuminates similar linkages between education and diplomacy while arguing that U.S. 
dominance after World War Two was maintained more through consensual hegemony 
than, as Berger implies, through coercion.  
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 Educational exchange programs were part of a broader collection of cultural programs labeled by 
historian Kenneth Osgood and others as ―cultural diplomacy.‖ In his analysis of the use of cultural 
diplomacy by officials within the Eisenhower Administration, Osgood argues that cultural diplomacy 
differed from propaganda and psychological warfare as it was ―less involved in the favorable ‗spinning‘ of 
contemporary affairs than in fostering long-term intellectual and attitudinal developments that would 
enhance U.S. influence and prestige while creating a positive climate for the implementation of U.S. 
foreign policies.‖ This description neatly summarizes the fundamental goal of the educational exchange 
programs examined in this dissertation. Kenneth A. Osgood, ―Words and Deeds: Race, Colonialism, and 
Eisenhower‘s Propaganda War in the Third World,‖ in The Eisenhower Administration, The Third World, 
and the Globalization of the Cold War, eds. Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns (Lanham: Rowman 
and Littlefield Publishers, INC., 2006), 16. 
11
 Mark T. Berger, Under Northern Eyes: Latin American Studies and U.S. Hegemony in the Americas, 
1898-1990, (Bloomington: Indiana U.P., 1995). See also, Mark T. Berger, ―Managing Latin America: U.S. 
Power, North American Knowledge and the Cold War,‖ http://www.ailasa.org/jilas/articles/berger.pdf. 
10 
 
 This dissertation also relies on the work of scholar Christina Klein, particularly 
her concept of sentimental education developed in Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the 
Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961.
12
 Through her examination of formal and informal 
modes of education, Klein shows how U.S. officials prepared U.S. citizens to operate in 
the bipolar world of the Cold War. The present study extends Klein‘s argument by 
showing how policymakers brought Ecuadorians to the United States in the hopes of 
generating and exporting a similar consensus concerning the bipolar worldviews 
promoted by Washington—first the anti-fascism of World War Two, and then the anti-
communism of the Cold War. 
 Developers of the U.S. government-sponsored educational exchange programs 
between the United States and Ecuador had one central goal; to expand the consent of 
influential Ecuadorians and their children, who were the future leaders of Ecuador, to 
U.S. policies. By offering them education and training in U.S. and U.S.-styled 
institutions, policymakers hoped to enable select Ecuadorians to operate more fully 
within the global economic system promoted by Washington, while simultaneously 
generating consent to this system. Of course they rarely stated this goal overtly. 
Policymakers instead used less propagandistic language, such as ―mutual understanding‖ 
or ―intellectual cooperation,‖ when discussing the goals of these programs. Analyzing the 
actions beyond the rhetoric reveals that a common component of all of the exchange 
programs was the desire to generate greater consent to U.S. policies. These stories of 
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 Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism; Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003). 
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diplomacy and education operated in tandem as elites in Washington and Quito adjusted 
to a world that changed significantly from 1933 to 1963. 
 Early scholarship on U.S.-Latin American relations written during the 1920s and 
1930s rested on the assumption of a compatibility of interests between the nations of the 
hemisphere.
13
 Historians such as Samuel Flagg Bemis and Dexter Perkins portrayed U.S. 
intervention in Latin America as unquestionably beneficial to Latin Americans. Their 
scholarship reflected U.S.-centric and exceptionalist points of view, and thus on the rare 
occasions when they referred to the United States as an empire, orthodox historians 
typically described that empire as benevolent or benign. How could it be otherwise if the 
nations of the Western Hemisphere shared common interests? This is not to argue that 
Bemis, Perkins and other early scholars of U.S.-Latin American relations were entirely 
wrong in assuming that the peoples of the Americas shared common interests. Suggesting 
otherwise, in fact, creates an artificial dichotomy between ―American‖ and ―Latin 
American‖ that can be equally damaging to our understanding of U.S.-Latin American 
relations. What is problematic is the assumption of these early scholars that the United 
States—including the ideas, institutions, and practices developed therein—was the 
natural and inherently benevolent leader of the Americas. A new wave of Revisionist 
scholars soon targeted these assumptions in their writings. 
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 For the orthodox perspective on U.S.-Latin American relations see: Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin-
American Policy of the United States, (New York: Norton, 1943); William Spence Robertson‘s Hispanic-
American Relations With the United States, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1923); Dexter Perkins, 
The Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1826, (Cambridge: Harvard U.P., 1927), Perkins The Monroe Doctrine, 1867-
1907, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1937). 
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 Following World War Two, policymakers in the United States drew on the 
lessons that they had learned formulating U.S.-Latin American policies as they began to 
establish diplomatic relations with newly independent Third World nations in Africa, 
Asia, and the Middle East. As policymakers expanded their scope to include these 
regions outside of the Western Hemisphere, so too did historians who, beginning in the 
late 1950s, began to revise the arguments of previous scholars. Following the lead of 
William Appleman Williams, historians worked to expose the contradictions, or 
tragedies, of American foreign policies that orthodox historians had ignored. Not 
surprisingly, much of this scholarship focused on relations between the United States and 
the nations of the Third World, where these contradictions were the most glaring since 
few of these nations could generate the military or economic challenges that orthodox 
historians argued were driving U.S. foreign policy.
14
 Revisionists argued above all else 
that U.S. policymakers worked to protect and promote specific domestic interests—
particularly economic interests.
15
 They revealed, for example, how interest groups within 
the United States could shape foreign policies in ways that furthered their own economic 
success.
16
 Illuminating the connections between domestic economic concerns and U.S. 
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 In the present study, then, ―U.S.-Third World relations‖ and ―U.S. Empire in the Third World‖ are used 
interchangeably since most scholarship written after the orthodox phase tends to take for granted that the 
U.S., following 1947 at least, had established an Empire throughout most of the Third World. 
15
 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 
1959) provides the best starting point for any examination of the revisionist perspective on U.S. diplomatic 
history. For the revisionist literature on U.S.-Third World relations see: Gabriel Kolko Confronting the 
Third World: United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1980, (New York, 1988); For the literature on U.S.-Latin 
American relations, see David Green The Containment of Latin America, A History of the Myths and 
Realities of the Good Neighbor Policy, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971);  
16
 Historian David Green‘s, The Containment of Latin America: A History of the Myths and Realities of the 
Good Neighbor Policy, for example, revealed how President Roosevelt used U.S. tariff levels as a 
13 
 
foreign policy, revisionist scholars left an indelible mark on the historiography of U.S.-
Third World relations. Their depiction of a predatory capitalism orchestrated by elites in 
Washington reinvigorated discussions of the United States as imperial.
17
 Yet just as 
revisionist historians built their careers on challenging the assumptions of orthodox 




 Suggesting that the revisionists had strayed too close to economic determinism in 
their analyses, historians began to combine the orthodox and revisionist focus on security 
and economics, while also revealing the ways in which other factors, such as domestic 
                                                                                                                                                 
bargaining tool when negotiating with Latin American officials in order to ensure that economic 
development in the region followed the model championed by the United States. 
17
 In the field of U.S.-Latin American relations, this trend was marked by the growth of dependency 
literature as scholars from Latin America attempted to explain the relationship between their nations and 
the United States with regards to the world capitalist system. See for example, Fernando Hernrique Cardoso 
and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1979); José M. Aybar de Soto, Dependency and Intervention: The Case of Guatemala in 1954, 
(Boulder, Colorado, 1978); Susanne Bodenheimer, ―Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin 
American Underdevelopment,‖ Politics and Society, I (1971); Richard R. Fagen, ―Studying Latin American 
Politics: Some Implications of a Dependence Approach,‖ Latin American Research Review, XII (1977), 3-
26; and, Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of 
Chile and Brazil, (1967; reprint, New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009). 
18
 Post-revisionist scholarship covers a lot of ground, with some historians exploring economics, some 
strategy and some culture. For post-revisionist studies of U.S. -Latin American relations see: Elizabeth A. 
Cobbs, The Rich Neighbor Policy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); A highly influential work 
that attempts to blend the economic with the cultural in analyzing U.S.-Latin American relations is, Emily 
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politics and bureaucratic structures, influenced policymakers. Post-revisionists have 
explored the variety of ways beyond military force and economic might that the United 
States projected power. In so doing they have challenged revisionist portrayals of the 
United States as an imperial power simply imposing its will on others.
19
 Often, as these 
scholars have shown us, foreign elites invite the United States in. In a more recent 
cultural turn in the literature, historians of U.S.-Third World relations have borrowed 
from the field of critical theory to illuminate the seemingly countless ways in which 
cultural ideas, and material representations of these ideas, have influenced the 
interactions among the peoples of the world.
20
 This scholarship challenges historians to 
analyze critically the broader context within which policymakers operate; to look beyond 
the elites who formulated policy to the people whose lives it most affected.
21
  
 As a whole, the scholarship on U.S.-Third World relations has deepened our 
understanding of the official and extra-official interactions among these nations. 
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Ultimately, however, scholars have marked this historiography with two general 
tendencies that have obscured our understanding of these relations, thus leaving room for 
further analysis. First, there has been an over-emphasis on exceptional cases. Scholars 
have revealed a number of instances when officials in the United States used 
interventions—whether covert or overt, diplomatic, military, economic or cultural—to 
protect the interests of influential, though relatively small, segments of U.S. society.
22
 
Historians have also detailed the U.S. support of nefarious dictators throughout the Third 
World who promised to promote U.S. interests within their countries in return for this 
support.
23
 Taken together, this literature has taught readers valuable lessons about the 
contradictions of U.S. foreign policies by presenting a number of cautionary tales 
concerning the destructive and violent lengths to which U.S. policymakers have gone. 
This is especially true in the case of U.S.-Third World relations where the majority of 
these interventions have occurred.
24
 
 Despite these critical observations, however, this literature tends to obscure our 
understanding of the nature of the U.S. Empire in the Third World by ignoring the many 
cases where diplomacy and negotiations have managed to avoid such extreme and 
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destructive actions. Since, as historian Louis Pérez has argued, ―military action typically 
denotes the breakdown of the hegemonial edifice,‖ only by analyzing the more routine 
work involved in the maintenance of the U.S. Empire can we understand the complexities 
of the hegemonic process that supported this empire.
25
 By focusing instead on 
exceptional cases, historians have tended to exaggerate the coercive power and will of the 
United States.
26
 This is not to deny that U.S. policymakers have used coercion in 
irresponsible ways that destroyed lives and undermined the basic principles that the 
United States claims to promote, or that cruel and corrupt dictators have relied on U.S. 
support to maintain their power. But as scholars we should question whether or not these 
cases represent the norm, or whether they are exceptional—a difficult question to answer 
given the current state of the literature. As Abraham Lowenthal has argued, in order to 
understand the development and implementation of U.S. policy, scholars need to explore, 
―what most U.S. government officials actually do most of the time.‖
27
 Shifting our focus 
from the dramatic cases of interventions, coups, and dictatorships illuminates the daily 
operations that maintained the U.S. Empire. 
 Second, historians of the U.S. Empire in the Third World have paid too little 
attention to the actions of non-U.S. policymakers.
28
 This tendency derives at least in part 
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from the consistent focus on exceptional cases discussed above. Scholars who focus on 
these cases tend to portray elites in the Third World as having only two alternatives from 
which to choose as they negotiate with U.S. policymakers; either ―radical revolution‖ 
against the capitalist system, or ―abject capitulation‖ to that system.
29
 This simplification 
ignores the influence of U.S. ideologies that appeal to foreign elites and populations 
whose own beliefs fall somewhere within the spectrum bounded by revolution against the 
capitalist system on one end, and surrender to that system on the other end. By focusing 
their attention almost exclusively on exceptional cases, historians have effectively 
diminished the active roles played by foreign elites in consenting to, and at times shaping, 
U.S. policies. We know a good deal about the dramatic, radical revolutions of Third 
World actors, yet simply assuming that those who have not resisted have instead 
surrendered denies these individuals the same agency that scholars attribute to the 
radicals and their acts. One way to correct this oversight is to analyze the decision 
making of Third World elites as they, through bilateral and multilateral negotiations with 
policymakers from the United States and the nations of the world, attempted to maximize 
benefits for their own country.  
 Since the 1980s, historians have begun to use documents from foreign archives to 
show how foreign elites have shaped U.S. policies. Geir Lundestad‘s essay ―Empire by 
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Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1992‖ is an early, and 
influential, example of this trend in the literature.
30
 Lundestad revealed the degree to 
which decision makers from Western Europe influenced the formation of U.S. foreign 
policies.
31
 He carefully pointed out that the imbalance of power between the U.S. and 
European governments following the end of World War Two meant that the Europeans in 
no way forced policy makers in Washington to do things that they did not want to do. 
European elites instead, Lundestad argued, ―helped shape developments in 
Washington‖—especially concerning programs to rebuild the economies and ensure the 
security of Western Europe.
32
 Scholars of U.S.-Third World relations have begun to 
follow Lundestad‘s lead, particularly his observation that foreign elites could shape U.S. 
policies without necessarily forcing wholesale changes in those policies.
33
 These studies 
have complicated our understanding of the U.S. Empire in the Third World by revealing 
the influence that foreign elites have had on the formation of U.S. foreign policy. Yet the 
preponderance of exceptional cases remains, and as a result, we still know comparatively 
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little about the actions of democratically-elected Third World elites who believed in the 
basic tenets of the capitalist system that supported the U.S. Empire.  
 Perhaps unsurprising given the current state of the literature detailed above, the 
historiography of U.S.-Ecuadorian relations is underdeveloped. Until recently, the few 
historians who have written on the subject tended to take a regional approach, and to rely 
primarily on U.S. documents and secondary sources.
34
 Historian Ronn Pineo‘s Ecuador 
and the United States: Useful Strangers is a notable, recent exception to this rule.
35
 Pineo 
skillfully traces the history of U.S.-Ecuadorian relations from the 1830s through the 
1980s, as he analyzes several episodes when Ecuadorian elites successfully shaped U.S. 
policy. Yet while Pineo spends considerable time exploring the actions of pro-U.S. elites 
in Ecuador, he focuses less on how these elites came to support the United States in the 
first place. By analyzing educational exchange programs in addition to diplomacy, this 
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dissertation complicates the picture of U.S.-Ecuadorian relations presented by Pineo. To 
the Ecuadorian masses, as Pineo shows, U.S. citizens generally remained strangers, and 
vice versa. This is not true, however, for the participants in the exchange programs 
explored in this dissertation. These leaders were the most useful in supporting the U.S. 
Empire.  
 Pineo and others who have explored the history of the relations between Ecuador 
and the United States all seem to agree that these relations have generally been close and 
cordial. This closeness has not shielded Ecuador from the inconsistencies of U.S. foreign 
policies, or from regional trends that have prompted harsh reactions from Washington. As 
in Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil, Ecuadorian presidents have at times nationalized industries 
dominated by U.S. companies, faced domestic instability that challenged their ability to 
lead, and lost their office to military coups.
36
 The history of Ecuador is thus 
representative of the history of Latin American nations in general. As one of the more 
prolific scholars on Ecuadorian history, John Martz, has argued, Ecuador can be 
considered a, ―microcosm for a wide variety of problems, questions, and issues‖ that have 
been relevant to the nations of Latin America.
37
 Martz‘s assertion holds true as well in 
terms of U.S.-Ecuadorian relations. As they did with nations throughout the region, 
policymakers in Washington closely monitored events in Ecuador whenever these 
seemed to challenge U.S. interests. Threats by the Ecuadorian government to nationalize 
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the operations of the South American Development Company in the 1930s, the fining of 
U.S. fishing vessels in the 1950s, and the overthrow of Velasco Ibarra in 1961, reflected 
broader regional trends of the time. Each episode prompted reactions from U.S. officials. 
Yet these reactions never reached the level of alarm that led to U.S. interventions in other 
nations of the region. And since studies of U.S. interventions, both covert and otherwise, 
have stolen much of the scholarly spotlight, historians have generally overlooked 
Ecuador when explaining U.S.-Latin American relations. But it is precisely because U.S.-
Ecuadorian relations have traditionally been strong and stable that they deserve deeper 
study. If we want to understand the day to day operations involved in maintaining the 
U.S. Empire over time, we need to look beyond the dramatic to the routine. We need to 
explore what happens not only when negotiations fail, but also when they succeed.
38
 
 By analyzing the history of U.S.-Ecuadorian relations from 1933 to 1963, we can 
more fully understand the establishment and maintenance of the U.S. Empire in the Third 
World. Maintaining this dominance required the support of influential Ecuadorian elites 
who essentially agreed with U.S. ideologies and methods—especially regarding global 
capitalism and security. The growing number of educational exchange programs between 
the United States and Ecuador (as well as other nations) represented one significant way 
that elites in both countries worked to increase the number of pro-U.S. elites worldwide. 
By creating and funding the American School of Quito, the Foreign Leader Program, and 
the Fulbright Program, policymakers hoped to provide opportunities for Ecuadorian 
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leaders working in the fields of politics, security, information and business, as well as 
Ecuadorian students, who were the future leaders of these fields, to study and train in the 
United States, or in U.S.-styled institutions in Ecuador. Proponents of these programs 
believed that upon return, exchange participants would pass on to other Ecuadorians the 
methods and ideas that they had learned in the United States. This process would then 
deepen the impact of U.S. culture and ideas in Ecuador, and further the continuation of 
strong U.S.-Ecuadorian relations. Officials from the United States and Ecuador tested 
these relations periodically from 1933 to 1963 as they attempted to maximize benefits for 
their nations in a rapidly changing world. Documents from the Foreign Ministry Archive 
in Quito—many of which are used for the first time here—and the National Archive in 
Washington, D.C., reveal the decision making of these elites.
39
 Analyzing the 
negotiations between policymakers from both Quito and Washington illuminates the 
hegemonic process at work. Combining that analysis with a study of education programs 
deepens our understanding of that process. 
 I have separated this study into four chronological sections—1933 to 1939, 1940 
to 1948, 1949 to 1957, and 1958 to 1963. The start date and the end date for each section 
coincide with significant events in both the United States and Ecuador that affected U.S.-
Ecuadorian relations. I have then divided each section into one chapter on diplomacy and 
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one chapter on education. This is not to suggest that the diplomacy and education 
chapters represent independent storylines. In fact, developments in one do not make 
complete sense without reference to the other. The diplomacy chapters reveal the 
hegemonic process as it was—a series of bilateral and multilateral negotiations between 
U.S. and Ecuadorian officials involving both coercion and consent that seldom resulted in 
complete victory for either side. The chapters on education detail the efforts of officials 
to ensure the continued success of this hegemonic process by expanding the number of 
Ecuadorians who consented to U.S. policies. The bulk of the analysis focuses on the 
years from 1940 to 1957, when U.S. hegemony in Latin America was firmly established, 
and then expanded to the rest of the Third World. Developments during the first section, 
1933 to 1939, set the stage for this era, while those from 1958 to 1963 signaled a shift in 
U.S. hegemony in Latin America. 
 The diplomatic chapter in section one (1933 to 1939) examines the establishment 
of the Good Neighbor Policy, and the attempts to confront increased interference by the 
government of Ecuador in the affairs of U.S. businesses operating in Ecuador such as the 
South American Development Company and the All American Cables Corporation. 
Threats to nationalize the operations of both companies challenged the rhetoric of 
nonintervention that was the hallmark of Roosevelt‘s Good Neighbor Policy. In terms of 
education, a growing number of Ecuadorian students and intellectual elites continued 
their studies in the United States during this era thanks to scholarships and grants 
awarded by the government of Ecuador, and by private institutions in the United States. 
The U.S. government did not play a direct role in these exchanges at this point, but that 
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changed with the entrance of the United States into World War Two, which brought a 
push to rid the hemisphere of all fascist influences. 
 In the second section (1940 to 1948) we explore the establishment and eventual 
return of U.S. military bases on Ecuadorian territory. Following the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, officials in Washington accepted the offer of Ecuadorian officials to establish 
bases on Seymour Island in the Galápagos and in the coastal town of Salinas in order to 
guard against a Japanese attack on the Panama Canal. As the war wound down, 
negotiations for the return of these bases stretched on until 1948, when U.S. policymakers 
finally turned the bases over to the Ecuadorian government. This era marked the 
diplomatic solidification of hemispheric solidarity, and a more robust U.S. hegemony in 
Latin America. Culturally, these years witnessed the establishment by Ecuadorian elites 
of the American School of Quito, and the creation of a network of exchange programs 
funded by the U.S. government. The American school and the exchange programs were 
all part of an effort by U.S. and pro-U.S. elites to expand the number of Ecuadorians who 
could participate in the world-system created and promoted by Washington following the 
end of the war, and thus to encourage consent to this system. 
 Section three (1949 to 1957) deals first with challenges to U.S. hegemony 
represented by disputes over territorial waters, and the rights of Ecuador and other 
nations to control the natural resources found in these waters. Officials from Ecuador, 
Peru, and Chile attempted to force U.S. officials to abandon the traditional three-mile 
limit on territorial waters and accept instead a limit of 200 miles. To enforce its position, 
the government of Ecuador authorized its Navy to arrest and fine U.S.-flag fishing 
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vessels operating within the 200-mile zone. Despite several rounds of negotiations, 
policymakers never resolved this issue, and all sides failed to achieve their stated 
objectives. This section concludes with an examination of the Foreign Leader Program. A 
direct descendant of the exchange programs begun during World War Two, this program 
targeted leaders from specific segments of society who were considered to be the most 
influential in convincing Ecuadorians of the soundness of the U.S.-led system. 
 Section four (1958 to 1963) examines efforts by the administration of John F. 
Kennedy at the Inter-American Conference in Punta del Este, Uruguay, to convince the 
American nations to first exclude Cuba from the Organization of American States, and 
then to sever all diplomatic ties with Communist Cuba. Six nations, including Ecuador, 
resisted U.S. entreaties for a period, but finally relented. This section concludes with an 
exploration of the Fulbright Program, and the renewed emphasis on Latin American 
students in all U.S. exchange programs following Vice President Richard Nixon‘s tour of 
South America when he faced violent student protests in several of the countries he 
















1. Economic Nationalism 
 In his 1933 inaugural address, President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced the 
new Latin American policy for his administration; the Good Neighbor Policy. In his 
speech, Roosevelt renounced U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of Latin American 
states. The history of U.S.-Latin American relations up until this point was marked with 
cases when Washington had intervened in the internal affairs of the nations of Latin 
America in order to protect U.S. economic interests. On the surface, the Good Neighbor 
Policy was Roosevelt‘s attempt to right this history. In so doing, the president hoped to 
encourage greater cooperation between the nations of Latin America and the United 
States, as all worked together for common goals. Yet the financial chaos of the Great 
Depression tested the abilities of the Roosevelt Administration to abandon older 
interventionist practices. Despite Roosevelt‘s rhetoric of cooperation, by 1937 the 
government of Ecuador, as well as other governments in the region, attempted to secure 
greater percentages of the profits of foreign companies operating within their national 
borders. This economic nationalism challenged directly the non-interventionism of the 
Good Neighbor Policy. 
 The 1930s were a chaotic time in Ecuadorian political history. During what 
historian Augustín Cueva describes as ―the long crisis of hegemony,‖ the Ecuadorian 
government was presided over by seventeen different heads of state, with five in 1932 
alone, as the previous liberal hegemony dissolved.
1
 Underlying this chaos was an 
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Ecuadorian economy that was showing serious signs of trouble, recording in 1929, for 
example, a record deficit in balance of payments.
2
 The political crisis began in 1931 with 
the overthrow of President Isidro Ayora by the Ecuadorian military, which since the July 
1925 Revolution had periodically inserted itself into national politics as an institutional 
power.
3
 Economically, the Great Depression in Ecuador effectively ended a boom in 
cacao exports that had begun to decline as early as 1920, a reality which challenged the 
existing political and economic relations in the country.
4
 As happened in countries 
around the world, people began questioning the basic tenets of capitalism as championed 
by the United States beginning in 1929. Throughout Latin America, the Great Depression 
brought a general collapse of the existing political arrangements.
5
 Within the first three 
years of the Depression, the volume of international trade was cut in half—a development 
with disastrous implications for Latin American economies that depended on exports.
6
 
The answer for many Latin American governments was to exert increased control over 
their national economy. In countries with significant internal markets, governments 
turned to import-substitution policies to try to balance their trade deficits.
7
 For countries 
such as Ecuador, which had a considerably smaller internal market, the contraction of 
foreign trade was hard to overcome. One immediate result was the proliferation of 
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internal political chaos as the presidency cycled from populist to dictator to military 
regime and back again.  
 On the international stage, this was an era of increased multilateral cooperation 
for both Ecuador and the United States. In 1934, during the first administration of José 
Maria Velasco Ibarra, Ecuador joined the League of Nations. Some Ecuadorians, 
including Velasco Ibarra, pushed for the ratification of the League charter because they 
wanted to participate in an international forum where they could air their grievances, 
particularly those concerning the border dispute between Ecuador and Peru.
8
 Taking note 
of the economic and political chaos experienced by Ecuador and other nations in the 
hemisphere, the United States for its part worked more closely than ever with the various 
inter-American associations as the Roosevelt Administration solidified U.S. hegemony in 
the hemisphere. These efforts took on an increasing urgency with the outbreak of World 
War Two when U.S. officials began to worry about fascist penetration in the Americas. 
 Beginning with the Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, held in Buenos 
Aires in 1936, Washington adopted a multilateral approach to secure its role as hegemon. 
The Consultative Pact agreed to at Buenos Aires pledged the member nations to enter 
into dialogue if an outside force threatened any one nation. Under the Buenos Aires 
Convention, the ratifying nations committed to developing cultural exchange programs 
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that designed to increase mutual awareness throughout the hemisphere, and that served to 
solidify U.S. hegemony. In 1938, delegates followed the Buenos Aires conference with 
the Eighth International Conference of American States held in Lima, Peru, which added 
military elements to the 1936 Convention. Thus, even before the United States had 
formally entered World War Two, members of the Roosevelt Administration, particularly 
Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles and Laurence Duggan from the Coordinator‘s 
Office, worked to solidify U.S. hegemony in Latin America. The actions of the 
government of Ecuador during this time regarding key U.S. business interests within the 
country served as a broader, regional challenge to this hegemony. 
 Relations between the United States and Ecuador have historically been close, and 
the early 1930s were no different. In 1931, the U.S. ambassador to Quito, William 
Dawson, declared that ―the attitude of Ecuadoran officials, press and public towards the 
United States is, it is believed, more friendly at the present moment than at any time 
during the past twenty years.‖
9
 This did not mean that Ecuadorian foreign relations were 
limited only to those with the United States. As Dawson pointed out, there were a number 
of ―well established German commercial houses‖ in Ecuador. The Italians also directed a 
military mission that was ―notably successful both in its technical work and its relations 
with Ecuadoran officers, officials, and society.‖ In 1931, State Department officials 
considered the presence of established German and Italian communities and operations as 
something to monitor. With the advent of World War Two, however, these relations took 
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on a more ominous connotation in the minds of U.S. officials. In addition to bringing the 
United States into World War Two, the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor also 
intensified the efforts of U.S. elites and their pro-U.S. allies in Latin America to rid the 
hemisphere of fascist influences. Still monitoring the German and Italian communities in 
Latin America, U.S. officials now also paid close attention to the efforts of the Japanese 
to increase diplomatic and trade relations with the nations of Latin America.
10
  
 Throughout the 1930s, officials in Washington and their appointees in the capital 
cities of Latin America closely followed the activities of Germans, Italians and Japanese 
living in the region. While in 1937 the U.S. Chargé de‘Affaires in Quito, Gerhard Gade, 
described the activities of the Germans and Italians living in Ecuador as ―negligible,‖ he 
nonetheless carefully detailed the influence of these populations.
11
 According to Gade, 
there were 400 Germans living in Guayaquil who were divided into four main 
categories—old Germans, Nazi Party members, half-Jews, and Jews.
12
 The German 
community in Quito was said to be ―much smaller,‖ with the majority being Jews and 
half-Jews. Unlike the Germans, the Italians living in Guayaquil were, according to Gade, 
―very efficiently and completely organized.‖ In Quito, the Italians confined their 
activities to propaganda work carried out by the Italian Military Mission, the members of 
which were reportedly attempting to mold the Ecuadorian army along lines similar to 
those of Fascist Italy.
13
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 Gade reported that both the Fascist and the Nazi parties attempted to control their 
countrymen living in Ecuador—with the Fascists having more success than the Nazis. 
This influence was not merely ideological. In 1935, for example, Germany and Ecuador 
concluded a commercial treaty under which Germany ―conceded the unlimited 
importation of Ecuadorean raw materials, excepting cacao.‖
14
 Even before the United 
States entered World War Two, securing raw materials for U.S. manufacturing was an 
important goal of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. This goal only grew in 
significance following the attack on Pearl Harbor.  
 In 1937, the governments of Germany and Ecuador followed this commercial 
agreement with a second one that secured a German Police Commission to ―reorganize‖ 
the Ecuadorian police force.
15
 In both cases, economic conditions in Ecuador seemed to 
Gade to be driving these agreements—the first guaranteed German markets for 
Ecuadorian exports, and the second provided police training at a price that was said to be 
―much lower‖ than what the United States would charge.
16
 As for the Japanese, in 1934, 
the Ecuadorian ambassador to Washington, Colón Eloy Alfaro, wrote to his Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Manuel Sotomayor y Luna, recommending that the government make a 
careful study of a Japanese proposal for a commercial treaty between Ecuador and 
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 Alfaro cautioned that whatever officials in Quito decided to do, they should be 
careful not to damage U.S.-Ecuadorian relations.  
 Eventually officials came to consider the relations between the nations of Latin 
America and Britain and France to be more important as the United States moved to 
solidify its hegemony in Latin America. In the early 1930s, however, this concern was 
still a few years away. For now, Dawson simply remarked on the ―attraction which Paris 
has always had for wealthy Ecuadorans,‖ and he noted the presence of British 
investments in Ecuadorian oil fields.
18
 Of course, U.S. businesses also operated in 
Ecuador, and U.S. concerns enjoyed monopolies in shipping (Grace Shipping Company), 
passenger and mail airlines (Pan American Grace Airways, or, PANAGRA) and 
telecommunications (All American Cables.)
19
 This dominance in these growing and 
profitable industries generated some resentment among Ecuadorians; resentment which 
only grew as the global economic depression deepened.  
 Dawson suggested a number of improvements designed to strengthen U.S.-
Ecuadorian relations before this antipathy developed into anti-Americanism. The first, 
and perhaps most important in terms of the present chapter, concerned the ―protection of 
American interests‖ since, according to Dawson, the Ecuadorian concept of contracts 
differed ―materially‖ from the U.S. concept. Ecuadorian officials, as well as elites 
throughout Latin America, at times forced companies such as All American Cables and 
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the South American Development Corporation to renegotiate the terms of their contracts 
with the national government. Such actions sometimes appeared to be arbitrary by the 
executives running these companies, and the resulting negotiations did not always go 
smoothly. But even before President Roosevelt announced his Good Neighbor Policy, 
Dawson suggested that ―the burden of protecting their interests should, it seems, fall in 
the first instance on the American concerns involved,‖ and that ―formal representations 
[by the U.S. government] should, it is believed, be resorted to only in extreme cases and 
where there is reason to believe that they will prove effective.‖
20
 Even before the rhetoric 
of cooperation enshrined in the Good Neighbor Policy, Dawson recognized the futility of 
involving Washington in negotiations between U.S. companies and Latin American 
governments in cases that were less than ―extreme.‖ The announcement of the Good 
Neighbor Policy seemed to imply that non-interventionism was the new policy of the 
U.S. government. With the outbreak of war, governments throughout Latin America 
began to test this policy by expropriating U.S. concerns that were crucial for the Allied 
war effort.  
 Beginning in 1932, reports of trouble between the government of Ecuador and the 
South American Development Company—a mining company that operated a gold mine 
in Ecuador—began to reach officials at the Department of State. In December, 
Communist and Conservative Senators in Ecuador began publicly accusing the company 
of tax evasion, bribery, and a ―monopolistic tendency.‖
21
 That same year, Ernest 
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Cummings, the Vice President of All American cables, which was a U.S. 
communications company operating throughout Latin America, traveled to Quito to try 
and convince the Ecuadorian government to refrain from charging the company transit 
charges on cable messages—a charge that had earlier been legislated but never 
enforced.
22
 By the end of 1932, the Ecuadorian congress had passed a bill ―disapproving‖ 
the government‘s contract with the South American Development Company. The bill also 
stipulated that any future contract must contain ―certain stipulated advantages‖ for the 
government, as well as guarantee the right for ―the taking over of the mines by the State 
if the Company should suspend operations as it has intimated might be done if the 
contract were revoked.‖
23
 This dissolution of the existing contract, which the company 
and the government had signed in 1923, foreshadowed future tensions between the 
governments of the United States and Ecuador.
24
 
 By 6 May 1933, representatives of the South American Development Company 
and the government of Ecuador had signed a new contract.
25
 If approved by Congress, the 
contract extended, for almost thirty years, all of the rights acquired by the company under 
previous contracts.
26
 In exchange, the company would provide the government with four 
percent of the gross value of the ore removed from the mine, as well as income tax in 
gold bullion, and tax on all sales at the company‘s stores. The contract also required the 
company to make an additional onetime payment to the government equivalent to three 
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percent of the gross product for 1932. Yet once submitted to Congress, the terms of the 
contract continued to change. By December, reports from Guayaquil indicated that the 
government now expected six percent of the value of the gross product instead of the 
earlier agreed upon four percent.
27
  
 At this early point in the negotiations, the General Manager of the company, A. 
Mellick Tweedy, felt that the changes were not ―confiscatory in trend, and that, although 
the percentage is higher than the company had been prepared to pay, it would be possible 
to operate with profit under the contract as revised.‖
28
 Despite this acknowledgement, the 
lawyer for the South American Development Company in Guayaquil urged Tweedy to 
fight the decision, arguing that the Ecuadorian Senate was not happy with the new 
revision. Senators appeared worried that the South American Development Company 
board of directors would not approve the new version.
29
 According to Tweedy, 
―references in closed session of the Senate were most cordial to the company‖ because 
the Senators knew that the company was one of the biggest U.S. operations in Ecuador, 
and they felt that ―the company has shown a most willing spirit of compromise and a 
desire to cooperate.‖
30
 The company lawyer therefore urged Tweedy and the board to 
exploit this division among Ecuadorian elites in order to secure favorable terms for the 
South American Development Company. 
 In addition to the communications and mining ventures describe above, the 1930s 
also marked the beginning of greater interest by U.S. companies in exporting Ecuadorian 
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bananas. By the early 1950s, Ecuador was the world‘s leading exporter of bananas. Much 
of this process began during the era under study in this chapter as various U.S. companies 
and individuals competed for access to Ecuador‘s fledgling banana industry. In December 
1932, Clarence Chester, the Vice President of the Pacific Fruit Company, arrived in 
Ecuador in order to try and secure concessions to export bananas. That same month, H.A. 
Agnew, a representative from the United Fruit Company, arrived in pursuit of the same 
goal.
31
 By February 1933, negotiations between Pacific Fruit and the Ecuadorian 
government were reportedly going well, and the company hoped to begin shipping 
bananas in May. Talks dragged on for several months, however, and Chester eventually 
broke with Pacific Fruit and began representing his own concern in Ecuador.
32
  
 Meanwhile, in July 1933, using capital and management tied to the Weinberger 
Banana Company of New Orleans, U.S. businessmen established the Compania Frutera 
Ecuatoriana in Guayaquil.
33
 Despite the competition, United Fruit was moving forward 
with its negotiations, which company representatives shrouded in secrecy. Rumor had it 
that the company was looking to buy land that in order to grow bananas.
34
 An editorial in 
the Guayaquil daily El Telegrafo cautioned that, United Fruit ―should be welcomed but 
that measures must be taken to forestall abuses on its part such as those from which other 
countries have suffered.‖
35
 Going into more detail, the author charged that United Fruit 
had established ―odious monopolies‖ in other Latin American countries, and that the 
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company had also ―ma[de] and unma[de] legislatures and governments and create[d] 
situations in which ‗the United States ke[pt] rais[ing] the sword of intervention.‖
36
 The 
author thus urged caution.  
 By November, Ecuadorian newspapers were reporting that a ―powerful foreign 
company‖ had purchased a large hacienda which had formerly been one of the biggest 
cacao plantations in Ecuador. According to the Chargé de‘Affaires in Guayaquil, Selden 
Chapin, the entire affair was ―shrouded in mystery,‖ and though he suspected that United 
Fruit was the company referred to in the article, he could not yet confirm his suspicion.
37
 
A few months later United Fruit made its actions more public by forming the Compania 
Bananera del Ecuador and purchasing the Tenguel plantation mentioned in the article.
38
 
While bananas would eventually become the leading export crop of Ecuador, for now the 
cautious, and occasionally negative, reactions by Ecuadorians to a growing U.S. presence 
in the field foreshadowed greater tensions to come. 
 In the early 1930s, then, tensions between the South American Development 
Company, All American Cables, United Fruit, and the Ecuadorian Government 
threatened to undermine U.S.-Ecuadorian relations. The rhetoric of the Good Neighbor 
Policy worked to limit the options of officials working in the Roosevelt Administration as 
they sought to address these tensions. The use of gunboats or overt support of U.S. 
companies operating in Ecuador was no longer viable. While at this point no true break in 
relations between the government of Ecuador and the United States occurred, 
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policymakers in each nation continued to eye each other warily as the Depression 
dragged on. 
 In October 1933, an overwhelming majority of Ecuadorians elected José María 
Velasco Ibarra to be their president.
39
 This was the first of five presidential 
administrations headed by Velasco Ibarra (the last was in 1968). Officials in Washington 
never really knew what to expect from a Velasco Ibarra administration. At this point, 
though, President Velasco Ibarra was a young, eager former congressman who had won 
the election thanks to a coalition of conservatives (despite being a professed liberal), and 
his own personal supporters known as Velasquistas.  
 Soon after his victory, Velasco Ibarra met with Russell Luke, the Ecuadorian 
representative for the South American Development Company, and asked him ―as a 
personal friend to accept the changes made in the contract by the bill‖ discussed above.
40
 
The Ecuadorian Congress had also recently passed a bill that would enforce the collection 
of income tax from All American Cables, as well as sales tax, and the formerly repealed 
transit tax.
41
 The passage of this bill was part of a broader showdown between Velasco 
Ibarra and the congressmen, many of whom resented his presidency. Prior to his victory, 
liberal congressmen who questioned Velasco Ibarra‘s coalition of conservatives had 
openly stated that they would never permit Velasco Ibarra to be sworn in should he win 
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 As the months wore on, however, the Liberal Party proved to be highly 
fractured, and thus they could not prevent Velasco Ibarra‘s inauguration in August 1934. 
Despite their, however, liberal congressmen, who were later joined by conservatives wary 
of Velasco Ibarra‘s policies, made governing Ecuador difficult for the young president. 
Within the first year of his term, Velasco Ibarra faced open rebellion as an uncooperative 
Congress worked to push him out.
43
  
 Though reports indicated that the Ecuadorian people generally supported the 
president and his accomplishments, the opposition refused to back down.
44
 On 20 August 
1935 the Senate, where members of the opposition were facing mob violence which 
Velasco Ibarra refused to control with the Army, and which was a response by 
Ecuadorians to the slow pace of reform, resolved that it would attend no further 
sessions.
45
 President Velasco Ibarra responded the next morning by declaring the 
Senate‘s refusal unconstitutional and calling for a new Constitutional Assembly.
46
 Seen 
as an attempt by Velasco Ibarra to establish a dictatorship, the Army moved in and 
arrested the president.
47
 The General Staff of the Army then appointed Antonio Pons, the 
Minister of Government, as Acting President. Stability remained illusory, however, and 
on September 26, Pons and the Army dissolved the Congress when they realized that 
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41 
 
representatives would never pass the constitutional reforms that they desired.
48
 Two days 
later, Pons and his entire cabinet resigned in order to prevent electoral victories by 
Conservative party members. In cooperation with Army officials and liberals, Pons never 
named a successor, thus the Army again chose the next Acting Head of State—Federico 
Páez Chiriboga.
49
 Páez declared that he would only stay in power until officials created, 
and ratified, a new constitution.
50
 Thus began several years of on and off again military 
control of Ecuador. This political chaos would ultimately challenge U.S. interests in 
Ecuador as military leaders sought to maximize government revenues by taxing foreign 
companies such as the South American Development Company and All American 
Cables. 
 As in Ecuador, the era under study here began in the United States with the 
election of a new president—Franklin D. Roosevelt. Following Roosevelt‘s 
announcement of the Good Neighbor Policy, officials in Washington closely monitored 
the reactions of Latin Americans to press reports of the new policy. Writing from 
Ecuador, Selden Chapin commented that, although the local press covered Hull‘s and 
Roosevelt‘s comments about the Good Neighbor policy ―no great interest appear[ed] to 
have been manifested.‖ Chapin noted that ―the little comment to be remarked was in 
general favorable, although isolated comment here and there professed to see a new brand 
of imperialism in the policy of the ‗good neighbor‘.‖
51
 The historic strength of U.S.-
Ecuadorian relations did not erase suspicion from the minds of all Ecuadorians 
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concerning the motives of the Roosevelt Administration. At bottom, Ecuadorians had 
plenty to worry about without concerning themselves too much with pronouncements of a 
new approach in Washington.
52
 These accusations of imperialism continued to appear in 
―sporadic articles…that alleged a new brand of United States imperialism in Ecuador 
through the peaceful penetration of large companies.‖
53
  
 The local press singled out the operations of United Fruit in Ecuador by reporting 
that the company was rapidly buying up land in the banana producing region, while also 
mentioning the activities of U.S. fishermen operating in the waters off of the Galapagos. 
Chapin pointed out that ―while from the point of view of world trade, all these enterprises 
are small, to poverty-stricken Ecuadorans, they bulk exceedingly large in capital, and this 
point should be taken into consideration.‖
54
 Despite his paternalistic language, Chapin 
seemed to be urging officials in Washington not to dismiss Ecuadorian concerns by 
hiding behind the rhetoric of the Good Neighbor Policy. In spite of these sporadic attacks, 
as Ambassador Dawson pointed out, the press ―in general abstained from coupling this 
attitude with any violent denunciations of American governmental policy as might 
formerly have been the case.‖
55
 Perhaps the Roosevelt administration‘s efforts to correct 
some of the errors of past policies that relied more on coercion rather than consent were 
gaining ground.  
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 Meanwhile, negotiations with the South American Development Company 
continued. President Velasco Ibarra took an ―active interest‖ in the proposed settlement 
of the differences between the company and the government.
56
 In addition to the 
communication between Velasco Ibarra and Luke mentioned above, the new president 
held several meetings with the company‘s local representatives. After repeated delays 
while the board members of the South American Development Company discussed the 
revised contract, Ambassador William Dawson announced that representatives from the 
Ecuadorian government and the company signed the new contract on 8 May 1934.
57
 
Dawson noted that the contract drew special attention to Article 153 of the Ecuadorian 
constitution. Clearly a reaction to concerns over foreign imperialism, this article 
stipulated that ―any contract entered into by a foreign concern shall include the implicit 
renunciation of recourse to diplomatic assistance.‖
58
 If problems arose between the 
government of Ecuador and the South American Development Company, or All 
American Cables, United Fruit, or Grace Shipping, it would be unconstitutional under 
Ecuadorian law for these companies to try and use diplomatic pressure to leverage an 
outcome favorable to their interests. Having learned their own lessons from the history of 
U.S. foreign relations in Latin America, some Ecuadorian elites were not yet fully 
prepared to trust their ―good‖ neighbors. These suspicions were in part also products of 
the intensifying battles between Velasco Ibarra and Congress.  
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 The president now found it difficult to accomplish any of the reforms on his 
agenda. This pressure from Congress included renewed attacks against the United States 
as Senators openly levied accusations of imperialistic activities, while also launching 
investigations into the sales of banana lands to the United Fruit Company. The Chamber 
of Deputies was reportedly drafting a new bill that would regulate the purchase by 
foreign concerns of Ecuadorian land.
59
 In their final report, members of the Chamber of 
Deputies argued that ―certain properties‖ belonging to the Canadian-Ecuadorian Cacao 
Company, Ltd., identified as a United Fruit subsidiary, should ―revert to the State as 
falling within the fifty kilometer frontier zone in which the acquisition of land by 
foreigners is prohibited by the Constitution.‖
60
  
 In making their determination, representatives cited the experiences of other Latin 
American nations where, according to them, ―once they develop[ed] their own 
production, banana companies tend[ed] to acquire a monopolistic position and to squeeze 
out independent producers.‖
61
 In order to prevent this from happening in Ecuador, the 
committee responsible for the report submitted a bill that would make it illegal for any 
foreign company to hold land in Ecuador without first gaining the approval of 
Congress.
62
 Combined with the recent reiteration of Article 153 in connection with the 
new South American Development Company‘s contract, this judgment against United 
Fruit signaled the unwillingness of some Ecuadorian elites in Congress to support 
practices by U.S. companies that had worked successfully in the past. In so doing, the 
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congressmen challenged directly the position of elites in Washington whose options were 
limited by the rhetoric of the Good Neighbor Policy. 
 By 2 November 1934, congressional dissatisfaction with the Velasco Ibarra 
Administration‘s actions had grown so acute that a resolution expressing a ―lack of 
confidence in the President‘s conduct of foreign affairs‖ was only narrowly defeated in 
Congress.
63
 According to Dawson, however, it was probably ―a mistake to infer that, in 
defeating the opposition motion, the majority of Congress necessarily endorsed or 
approved the Government‘s handling of foreign affairs.‖
64
 By November 7, in fact, 
Foreign Minister Sotomayor y Luna had resigned.
65
 Foreshadowing events soon to come, 
Dawson commented that ―as usual at such times, the remark is frequently heard that, if 
the government falls, only a dictatorship can save the country,‖ yet the ambassador 
doubted that this would come to pass since the army did not seem dispossessed at this 
time to support a dictatorship.
66
 Within a few years, however, the military would indeed 
be in control of Ecuador.  
 By the end of 1934, despite the actions taken against the South American 
Development Company, All American Cables and United Fruit, just how far 
governmental elites in Ecuador were willing to go to challenge U.S. interests remained 
unclear. In December, for example, a ―substantial majority‖ of the Chamber of Deputies 
defeated the recommendations detailed in the report on United Fruit, as well as the bill 
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asking the government to confiscate the landholdings of the company.
67
 And though the 
bill prohibiting foreign companies from purchasing land within fifty kilometers of the 
Ecuadorian frontier had previously passed the lower house, the Senate was now 
considering the matter. While the Senate did approve the bill on first reading, they took 
no further action.  
 At this point, the instability within the Ecuadorian government made the future of 
U.S. interests in the country unclear. The Ecuadorian government had not abandoned its 
traditional ties with the United States. Ambassador Dawson reported, for example, that 
the government‘s budget allotment for their legation in Washington was ―not only the 
largest allotment made but a sum exceeding the total appropriation for Ecuador‘s 
combined diplomatic representation in Europe.‖ It remained to be seen whether the 
Ecuadorian Congress would continue to test the rhetoric of nonintervention that was the 
hallmark of the Good Neighbor Policy by attempting to force U.S. companies to accept 
changes in their existing contracts.
68
  
 In 1935, the military ousted Velasco Ibarra after the president dissolved the 
legislature and jailed opposition members. Military commanders then installed Federico 
Páez, who established his own dictatorship which lasted until 1937.
69
 While political 
chaos and economic troubles continued to plague Ecuador, officials in Washington were 
working to secure greater hemispheric solidarity. At the Buenos Aires Conference in 
1936, delegates from both Ecuador and the United States sought multilateral solutions to 
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perceived threats from outside forces. U.S. representatives were concerned primarily with 
the influence of fascists in the hemisphere following Italy‘s invasion of Ethiopia, while 




 By October 1937, the Páez Administration was in trouble. The Constituent 
Assembly convened by the president was making little progress, and reports of corruption 
by government officials circulated freely.
71
 Allegedly tired of the position, President Páez 
decided to resign on October 23, at which point the military appointed the Minister of 
National Defense, General G. Alberto Enriquez, as the Supreme Chief.
72
 General 
Enriquez now began enacting legislation that affected foreign companies, including All 
American Cables and the South American Development Company, more directly than 
had previous legislation. On December 13 of that year, Enriquez issued Decree No. 27, 
which required all foreign companies to pay a monthly pension to each of their 
Ecuadorian employees with twenty years or more of service to the company.
73
 While 
U.S. business owners affected by the decree did not protest the awarding of pensions per 
se, the singling out of foreign companies did raise concern in Washington. Writing to 
Gade, Secretary of State Cordell Hull instructed the Chargé to point out to the Ecuadorian 
foreign minister that the decree appeared to ―work an unusual hardship on American 
companies already established in Ecuador,‖ and that it was discriminatory against foreign 
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 The Páez Administration followed this pension decree with a 
second one that eliminated free entry into Ecuador of materials required for the 
operations of foreign companies, especially the South American Development Company. 
Forcing foreign companies to provide pensions to their Ecuadorian employees, and 
charging them import taxes, was only the beginning.
75
  
 In early 1938, communications from Quito indicated that the Enriquez 
Administration was now demanding that the South American Development Company pay 
the government $600,000 and agree to a 100 percent increase in its production tax.
76
 The 
payment would serve as an advance on the production taxes, which would in turn be due 
over a period of fifteen years. Because of these decrees, and in violation of Article 153 of 
the Ecuadorian Constitution, which prohibited direct intervention in matters pertaining to 
companies operating in Ecuador by foreign governments, General Manager Tweedy 
requested assistance from Washington ―to prevent the matter from coming to a head so as 
to obviate more serious difficulties later.‖
77
 State Department intervention, however, 
would seemingly go against the main tenets of the Good Neighbor policy. 
 Of course the government of Ecuador was not alone in attempting to generate 
more revenue from foreign companies operating within its borders. In December 1936, 
the Government of Bolivia created by decree the Bolivian Government Petroleum 
Deposits, and then, in March 1937, nationalized the properties of the Standard Oil 
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 Perhaps more widely known, the government of Mexico had 
nationalized its oil industry in 1938. Unlike those of Bolivia and Mexico, however, the 
Ecuadorian decrees had not formally suggested the expropriation of foreign businesses. 
As U.S. officials weighed their options, they had to keep in mind these regional 
challenges to U.S. hegemony. 
 In the case of Ecuador, the main complaint of Tweedy and the U.S. officials 
handling the situation was that the Ecuadorian government had seemingly broken an 
existing contract between the company and the government of Ecuador that was only four 
years old. As Edward Sparks from the Division of the American Republics put it, the 
―willingness or disposition‖ of the Enriquez Administration to ―disregard and abandon, 
without serious concern or consideration of the consequences, its commitment or 
assurances made at some previous time‖ provided ―ample reason for disquiet to 
American interests and relations in general.‖
79
 The main question for the U.S. elites 
affected by the decrees became, why now? According to Gade, General Enriquez was 
trying to ―divert attention from the weakness of his Government‖ by accusing foreign 
companies of exploiting Ecuador.
80
 Gade and others believed that Enriquez‘s primary 
concern was the border dispute with Peru, which had led the General to purchase 
armaments from Czechoslovakia and to advance Ecuadorian troops to the border.
81
 In 
other words, according to Gade, Enriquez hoped to generate the income needed to pay for 
this military buildup by altering the contracts of foreign companies operating in Ecuador. 
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 As U.S. officials, including Dayle McDonough, the American Consul General at 
Guayaquil, attempted to interpret the implications of these latest decrees, Enriquez 
moved quickly. The general gave the South American Development Company ten days 
from January 13 to comply with the new contract.
82
 If company officials refused to 
cooperate, the General warned that he would send Ecuadorian troops to confiscate 
company property.
83
 Recognizing the seriousness of the situation, the Company sent its 
communications directly to the State Department, bypassing the traditional diplomatic 
route through the consulate in Quito. The local representative of the South American 
Development Company, Russell Luke, argued that ―since these attacks on foreign 
companies are general and of very serious import, we believe they should be brought to 
the attention of the State Department promptly.‖
84
 In trying to decipher Enriquez‘s 
actions, the Chief of the Division of American Republics, Laurence Duggan, suggested to 
Undersecretary of State Welles that the recent decrees were an attempt by Enriquez to 
―assure it [the government] of a larger income.‖
85
  
 In the memo to Enriquez, Duggan and his team planned to ―touch upon the 
relationship of the present financial stringency in Ecuador to the boundary discussions 
and to the purchase of arms by Ecuador.‖
86
 Duggan hoped to use the border dispute 
negotiations that were taking place in Washington, D.C., at the request of the Ecuadorian 
government, in order to try and encourage Enriquez to change his position. According to 
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U.S. analysts, the Enriquez administration had purchased military supplies from 
Czechoslovakia in an attempt to intimidate the government of Peru, and to force a 
Peruvian withdrawal from territory claimed by Ecuador. According to Sparks, the 
economic situation in Ecuador meant that the government would ―seek by any means to 
augment budgetary revenues‖ and that ―the assumption that the company is in a position 
to pay‖ was the ―principal reason why the Government has and will continue to force it to 
modify its concession contract with that end in view.‖
87
 Sparks predicted further that this 
problem would become ―increasingly urgent‖ until the boundary dispute was settled.
88
 
Because the border disagreement with Peru was beyond the control of company officials, 
their only option was to negotiate with the government to try and convince General 
Enriquez to change his mind. 
 Typically during this era, policymakers in the Roosevelt Administration expected 
U.S. companies that experienced trouble with Latin American governments to negotiate 
with the local government directly before attempting to elicit State Department actions. 
As such, officials from the South American Development Company responded to the 
recent actions of General Enriquez by sending him a memo outlining the years of service 
performed by the company for Ecuador and for Ecuadorians.
89
 Ecuadorian employees of 
the company earned the highest wages in Ecuador, and to enjoy standards of living and 
social conditions ―incomparably higher than in any national enterprise.‖
90
 Company 
officials argued that ―the history of the facts occurred, backed by documents of 
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indisputable authenticity, indicates that the Company has proceeded with absolute and 
ample good faith, always being sure that its settlements were celebrated in accordance 
with the resolutions emanating from the highest powers of the State.‖
91
 Closing by 
pointing out that the company and the government had a contract, company officials 
hoped to dissuade General Enriquez from forcing them to ratify a new contract before 
they had time to give it their full consideration.  
 In his response, however, Enriquez insisted that ―the many contracts concluded 
between the Government and the company have been due to incompliance on the latter‘s 
part with the provisions thereof and that the existing contract does not have public 
approval.‖
92
 This position angered company officials who consistently maintained two 
main points throughout their negotiations with the Enriquez Administration. The first was 
to insist on the legitimacy of a contract that the government of Ecuador had ratified in 
1934. Company officials wanted to ensure that future administrations honored their 
contracts so that they would not have to enter into similar negotiations each time a new 
head of state took charge. The second point was to insist that while they understood the 
economic difficulties of Ecuador, they believed that the South American Development 
Company should not be forced to make up for any budgetary shortfalls of the Ecuadorian 
government since it already contributed significantly to the Ecuadorian economy. In 
response to their memo, General Enriquez continued to maintain that the original contract 
was not legitimate, and that it was instead a ―revocable concession‖ that had never been 
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 He also insisted that his recent decrees had nothing to do with any 
budgetary problems of his government. Negotiations appeared to be at a standstill. 
 While officials in Washington were somewhat hesitant to intervene too directly, 
Duggan and Welles did maintain an open line of communication concerning 
developments in Ecuador. On January 24, Duggan sent to Welles the latest analysis by 
Sparks who suggested that the Enriquez administration was not ―particularly strong.‖ 
Sparks argued that while the increased taxes called for by the decree might actually cause 
greater financial problems in the long run when the government attempted to convert tax 
revenues into foreign currency, such a move would in the short term raise additional 
capital without having an ―acute effect on the internal political situation‖ facing the 
administration.
94
 Sparks felt that ultimately Enriquez considered the full acceptance of 
the new contract by company officials as the most desired outcome, but that he probably 
would be satisfied with any ―substantial compromise offer.‖
95
 The problem as Sparks saw 
it, however, was that the company did not appear to be willing to make ―further 
appreciable concessions and contributions to Ecuador.‖
96
 Because company officials held 
firm in their own convictions that the government should honor their existing contract, 
and that the actions proposed by General Enriquez were discriminatory, and ultimately 
confiscatory, they expected State Department support.
97
 Sparks admitted that the 
company should be mindful of the Ecuadorian government‘s economic situation, while 
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also acknowledging the difficult position of company officials who had no way to insure 
that future administrations in Ecuador would not demand further changes.
98
  
 With this information, Welles drafted a memo to Ambassador Alfaro outlining the 
U.S. position, and asserting that ―the Government of the United States does not request or 
expect special or preferential treatment for United States citizens and their interests in 
Ecuador. It does, however, have every confidence that the Government of Ecuador in its 
dealings with them will give full observance to the principles of equity and justice.‖
99
 
The Undersecretary closed by expressing his government‘s ―earnest hope‖ that 
representatives from the company could be given the opportunity to discuss their 
problems ―in a friendly manner‖ with Ecuadorian officials.
100
 
 The following day, January 29, Tweedy met with General Enriquez, but the 
General refused to budge. He gave the company three days to accept the new contract.
101
 
On February 2, however, Enriquez relented and extended the deadline until February 5.
102
 
Despite the extension, Tweedy insisted that the Board of Directors still needed two weeks 
to consider the revised contract fully.
103
 Secretary of State Hull thus instructed Gade to 
―express to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the earnest hope of this Government that the 
President will find it possible to grant the necessary extension of time.‖
104
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 Tweedy‘s latest efforts to delay had little effect. In his response to Gade‘s request 
for more time, Foreign Minister Luis Bossano pointed out that the government had 
already granted the company a number of extensions which had delayed for one month 
any further action against it by the Ecuadorian government.
105
 Speaking for his president, 
Bossano argued that surely this had been ample time for the company to make a decision. 
In addition, Foreign Minister Bossano reminded Gade that Ecuador, ―following the 
doctrine generally accepted by all the countries of the world, and especially by those of 
America, does not recognize resort to diplomatic intervention.‖
106
 In its defense, then, the 
Government of Ecuador contextualized its actions within broader regional norms. 
 Bossano also challenged directly the claim that the recent decrees were an attempt 
by General Enriquez to generate revenue, saying instead that ―the demands of the 
Government from foreign companies are due to just claims under law and the respective 
rights of the parties.‖
107
 Enriquez himself emphasized this point in a conversation with 
Sparks, stating that he had no desire for the South American Development Company to 
―contribute as a favor economic assistance to Ecuador since the Government demands 
only what pertains to it within its legitimate rights without its having ever had to ask a 
favor of anyone to correct its economic situation.‖
108
 In closing, Foreign Minister 
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Bossano acknowledged that the Enriquez administration was willing to grant one more 
extension of ten days, which would expire on February 15.
109
  
 Responding to Bossano‘s memo, Sparks wrote Duggan that he did not feel that 
any actions taken by the State Department or the Legation concerning the case 
constituted ―diplomatic intervention.‖
110
 Instead, he felt that all U.S. officials had done 
was to ―attempt to prevent precipitate action by the Ecuadoran Government which might 
readily give rise to a serious situation.‖
111
 The ―preemptory and unilateral‖ decision of 
General Enriquez to ―set aside a valid contract,‖ approved by a previous Administration 
and Congress, could have, according to Sparks, ―an unfortunate effect‖ on U.S.-
Ecuadorian relations.
112
 Sparks thus argued that these efforts by the Department of State 
to maintain cordial relations between Ecuador and the United States were perfectly 
acceptable, despite the fact that the company‘s contract contained a clause dating back to 
1917 that gave up the right to diplomatic intervention.
113
 At this point, Undersecretary of 




 The controversy did not end here, however. On February 8, the same day that 
Welles informed William Burden from the South American Development Company that 
he could do little more to help the company, news reached Washington that El Comercio 
had published Welles‘s memo from January 28 concerning the case, as well as the 
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counterproposals of the company. The article claimed that the Department of State had 
acted ―officiously in the matter,‖ and that U.S. officials had requested the Government of 
Ecuador to ―accept a settlement with the Company.‖
115
 According to Gade, the 
Ecuadorian government had reprinted in poster form the portion of the article detailing 
Enriquez‘s defense of his actions. They then plastered these posters around Quito.
116
 On 
the posters, the Enriquez Administration reiterated its belief that the United States would 
not want to interfere in Ecuadorian affairs during this era of the Good Neighbor. The 
General also insisted that ―Ecuador is a free and sovereign country and that in no case 
will foreign intervention be permitted, an act which might justifiably lessen the 
confidence which the peoples of America have placed in the new international policy of 
the United States.‖
117
 By questioning the basic tenets of the Good Neighbor Policy, 
General Enriquez tested U.S. hegemony. He next expanded his challenge beyond the 
borders of Ecuador by instructing the Foreign Office to explain his position to the 
Foreign Ministers of all Latin American nations.
118
  
 As the U.S. representatives prepared to meet with their Latin American 
counterparts in Lima for the 1938 Conference of American States, this public display by 
General Enriquez challenged the consensus that U.S. policymakers hoped to achieve. In 
order to blunt any possible damage caused by Enriquez‘s communications with Latin 
American Foreign Ministers, and to shore up a nascent hemispheric solidarity, Welles 
sent a circular to all U.S. diplomatic officers in Latin America that emphasized the 
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―informal and friendly‖ actions of U.S. officials concerning the South American 
Development Company case. Welles argued further that these actions ―have been in 
complete harmony and conformity with the good neighbor policy that seeks, through 
exchanges of views undertaken in the spirit of understanding the mutual confidence, to 
prevent the development of situations which might adversely affect the cordial relations 
among the American Republics.‖
119
 Just as the Ecuadorian government had done, Welles 
justified U.S. policy not in terms of the particular desires of the United States, but in 
terms of broader, regional ideals. The State Department instructed diplomatic officers to 
present the U.S. case to the local foreign minister if it seemed that Ecuadorian officials 
had already contacted the minister concerning the case. In addition, Undersecretary of 
State Welles sent General Enriquez a memo in which he expressed his ―surprise and 
disappointment‖ upon learning of the press release.
120
 Welles and others at the 
Department of State were clearly frustrated with Enriquez‘s public challenge of their 
actions at this moment when they were attempting to solidify hemispheric solidarity.  
 One important element that favored the U.S. position in the negotiations was the 
fact that General Enriquez did not enjoy the support of all Ecuadorian elites. In a 
conversation between Undersecretary of State Welles and Ecuadorian Ambassador Colón 
Eloy Alfaro, Welles emphasized the need for foreign investment in Ecuador. He pointed 
out that if the Ecuadorian government destroyed the confidence of foreign capital ―by the 
abrogation of contractual obligations in a unilateral manner and by the issuance of 
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decrees regarded as excessively onerous and discriminatory by foreign interests now 
operating in the Republic,‖ the government would find it difficult to attract the needed 
capital.
121
 Alfaro agreed completely with this position, and he sent a telegram to his 
government requesting that they grant the South American Development Company a 
―sufficient delay‖ so that Tweedy could discuss the matter with the company‘s board of 
directors in New York.
122
 Meanwhile in Guayaquil, the publication of the State 
Department memo and General Enriquez‘s response seemed to win little favor for the 
government. According to McDonough, few members of the press seemed to support 
Enriquez, and the ―leading people of Guayaquil‖ were, he reported, skeptical of the 
government‘s position regarding the company.
123
 As the engine of the Ecuadorian 
economy, business elites in Guayaquil were perhaps more attuned to the potential long-
term consequences of General Enriquez‘s actions. 
 As the controversy continued, a series of events occurred that ended the 
disagreement between the South American Development Company and the Enriquez 
Administration. First, on 11 February 1938, Ambassador Alfaro delivered to Welles a 
communication from his government expressing continued appreciation for the 
―consistent just procedure‖ on the part of the United States, ―which has invariably been 
inspired in the ample and American policy of the good neighbor.‖
124
 Yet Ecuadorian 
officials seemed less impressed with the representatives of the company, whom they 
suggested had fed the U.S. government ―malicious information‖ by suggesting that the 
                                                 
121
 Welles to Gade, 31 January 1938, Central File 1930-39, Box 5690, RG 59, NACP. 
122
 Memorandum of Conversation, 31 January 1938, FRUS, 1938 V: 546. 
123
 McDonough to Hull, 10 February 1938, Central File 1930-39, Box 5690, RG 59, NACP. 
124
 Welles to Hull, 11 February 1938, FRUS, 1938 V: 550. 
60 
 
government of Ecuador sought increased revenues.
125
 In response, Welles told Hull that, 
while he appreciated Alfaro‘s message, it did not ―remove the grounds for our 




 Then, an unexpected turn of events occurred. Writing to Duggan and Welles, 
Sparks indicated that the original note from Welles to Alfaro from January 28, which the 
Ecuadorian press reprinted, had in fact been mistranslated from English to Spanish. 
Through a number of mistakes, the Spanish version of the note left the impression that 
State Department was working with company officials to try and convince the Enriquez 
government to change its policies.
127
  
 Despite this confusion, an agreement between the Government of Ecuador and the 
South American Development Company seemed close at hand. By a February 18 decree, 
the Government of Ecuador raised the company‘s gross production tax from six percent 
to twelve percent while agreeing that the other terms of the original concession would 
remain unchanged.
128
 This doubling of the production tax prompted a new round of 
negotiations between company representatives and the government that ended with the 
company agreeing to pay 40 percent of its net profits in taxes, but not the production 
tax.
129
 This agreement did not sit well with the Ecuadorian Congress. Congressmen 
quickly convinced General Enriquez that, for political reasons, he should not agree to 
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substitute the 12 percent production tax with the 40 percent tax on profits.
130
 
Accordingly, Enriquez promised Luke and others from the company that if the 
production tax turned out to equal more than 40 percent of the company‘s profits, then he 
would consider modifying the decree.
131
 With that, company officials declared that they 
could take no further action, but they clarified that their compliance did not signify 
acceptance, since the company still protested the changing of the contract by the 
government.
132
 On February 14, Ambassador Alfaro informed Welles that his 
government now considered the matter closed.
133
  
 By the end of March 1938, with the controversy over the South American 
Development Company over, McDonough felt comfortable writing to Welles saying that 
―agitation‖ in Ecuador against foreign capital had ―quieted down considerably.‖ 
Nevertheless, the local press did still carry ―from time to time‖ announcements that the 
Ecuadorian government would revise the contracts of All America Cables and United 
Fruit‘s Compania Bananera del Ecuador.
134
 Thus, on April 26, McDonough cabled 
Secretary of State Hull that General Enriquez had given representatives of All America 
Cables an ultimatum requesting a $354,000 payment to settle alleged back taxes.
135
 If the 
company did not pay within the allotted forty-eight hours, the government threatened to 
cut all communications south of its border.
136
 Obviously this was something that officials 
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in Washington wanted to prevent, since it would could communications between the 
United States and Brazil Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, and Peru, and likely spark 
protests.
137
 As a result, Under Secretary of State Welles met with Ambassador Alfaro the 
next day to suggest to the ambassador that such an action by Ecuador ―was surely not one 
that could be classified as coming within that practical carrying out of the Good Neighbor 
policy for which all of the American republics stood.‖
138
 To be more specific, Welles 
revealed that company officials had informed him that were Ecuador to take such an 
action, then the company would be forced to move their cables outside of Ecuador‘ 
territorial waters, effectively isolating Ecuador from communication with the rest of the 
continent.‖
139
 Initially, U.S. pressure seemed to have little effect. On April 28, the 
Foreign Minister told Gade that ―in spite of his best efforts,‖ General Enriquez would 
only extend the deadline to May 2.
140
 
 As he had done in the case against the South American Development Company, 
Ambassador Alfaro appeared to support the U.S. position.
141
 In his communications with 
Foreign Minister Bossano, Alfaro charged that the Ecuadorian government had been too 
rigid in allowing the company only forty-eight hours to comply with its demands.
142
 The 
ambassador also pointed out the unfortunate timing in making these demands at the 
precise moment when he was trying to convince officials in Washington to help settle the 
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border dispute with Peru.
143
 Alfaro even went so far as to defend U.S. officials, arguing 
that they were not questioning the right of the Ecuadorian government to pass such 
decrees, only the manner in which government officials did so.
144
 Faced with mounting 
pressure from the United States, and from his own Ambassador, General Enriquez began 
showing signs of his willingness to negotiate. On May 5, Alfaro received instructions 
from Bossano to tell Welles that the government was interested in settling the dispute 
with All American Cables, but that the company would not budge concerning the 
government‘s original complaints.
145
 By May 16, the company and the general had 
reached a ―practical agreement‖ on all points under discussion which would continue the 
company‘s contract for eighteen years.
146
  
 From 1933 to 1939, officials in the Roosevelt Administration worked to solidify 
U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. This was a time of political instability and 
economic hardship in Ecuador. Attempts to alter the contracts of U.S. business interests 
operating within Ecuador, whether to maintain political support or to generate revenues, 
tested the rhetoric of the Good Neighbor Policy. Yet the efforts of Ambassador Alfaro 
and Ecuadorian congressmen who supported the United States, and distrusted their 
military leaders, prevented the struggle between the Ecuadorian government and U.S. 
interests from rupturing U.S.-Ecuadorian relations. Any tensions would soon fade, 
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however, following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the entry of the United 
States into the Second World War. 
65 
 
2. The Early Educational Exchange Programs 
 Diplomatic negotiations between the United States and the governments of Latin 
America during the 1930s focused primarily on two issues—relations between U.S. 
companies operating in Latin America and local governments, and hemispheric solidarity 
in the face of growing fascist power in Europe and Japan. Both topics had strong 
ideological underpinnings. The United States attempted to convince its southern 
neighbors that capitalism and democracy were favorable alternatives to the state-led 
societies of the Fascists. In this effort, and for the first time in its history, the U.S. 
government, beginning with the Buenos Aires Convention of 1936, attempted to harness 
the power of education to convince Latin Americans of U.S. sincerity. Up until this point, 
educational exchange programs between the United States and the nations of Latin 
America were small, and run solely by private concerns, such as philanthropies, 
individual universities, and organizations interested in Pan-Americanism. Policymakers 
first tested the programs developed in response to the Buenos Aires Convention in Latin 
America. They then spread these programs to the rest of the world during the Cold War 
through the Foreign Leader Program and the Fulbright Program. These early programs 
helped to solidify U.S. hegemony in Latin America, and later in parts of the Third World. 
 The first inter-American conference, held in Washington, D.C. in 1889, marked 
the beginning of U.S. government interest in cultural relations with the nations of Latin 
America.
1
 Representatives to the conference discussed the peaceful settlement of 
                                                 
1
 J. Manuel Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings of U.S. Cultural Diplomacy, 1936-1948 (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of State Publication), 7. 
66 
 
disputes, and they explored ways to improve economic relations.
2
 Out of that conference 
came the International Bureau of American Republics, later renamed the Pan American 
Union and then eventually the Organization of American States.
3
 Over the next three 
decades, officials in Washington and throughout Latin America developed the structural 
framework for this Pan American system.
4
 From an early point, cultural relations were a 
part of this Pan-Americanism. The fourth inter-American conference, held in Buenos 
Aires in 1910, dealt specifically with issues of education and intellectual relations.
5
 
Conferees developed a plan for establishing an interchange of professors and students 
between the various universities in the hemisphere, with each participating university and 
government agreeing to pay the costs of the visiting scholars.
6
 Officials in Washington, 
however, were not prepared at this early date to fund such a program—that would have to 
wait until 1939.  
 Yet interest in educational exchange programs among the American nations 
continued to grow thanks to the efforts of intellectual elites working through the Pan 
American Union. By 1930, American governments and a variety of private organizations 
had signed over twenty different conventions, treaties and agreements in this effort.
7
 The 
absence of U.S. dollars earmarked for educational exchange did not stop Latin American 
governments, including the government of Ecuador, from providing their students with 
exchange scholarships. 
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 Of course cultural exchanges between the United States and the nations of Latin 
America were going on well before the U.S. government became involved in funding 
these projects. The U.S. missionary movement of the Nineteenth Century was one of the 
most significant early instruments of expanding U.S. ideology in Latin America and 
elsewhere—in this case evangelical Protestantism as opposed to democracy and free-
market capitalism which underlay later efforts.
8
 As part of this movement, missionary 
organizations sponsored the sending of Latin American children to the United States for 
Christian educations, just as during the period under study here Latin American students 
came to the United States to further their educations in a variety of mostly secular 
disciplines.
9
 Later, the experiences of World War One inspired the creation of a number 
of private organizations dedicated to increasing international cultural understanding. U.S. 
educators formed the Society for American Fellowships in French in 1915, for example, 
and in 1918, the Association of American Colleges began funding a program French 
schoolgirls who wanted to study in the United States.
10
 The extreme nationalism 
unleashed by the First World War convinced some intellectual elites that promoting 
cross-cultural understanding could perhaps lessen the likelihood of future wars.  
 Of more direct relevance to the current study, however, was the Institute of 
International Education (IIE). Founded in 1919 by Nicholas Murray Butler (President of 
Columbia, and a founding trustee of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 
Elihu Root (former Secretary of War and of State, as well as a fellow Carnegie trustee), 
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and Stephen P. Duggan (professor of government and international relations at City 
College of New York, and father of Laurence Duggan who was highly influential in U.S.-
Latin American relations throughout the Roosevelt Administration), IIE staff initially 
focused on administering fellowships for foundations and governments. They offered 
their professional services and expertise to organizations engaged in international 
educational activities.
11
 They also provided educational information for U.S. students 
going abroad, and for foreign students coming to the United States. The contacts and 
methods developed by Stephen Duggan and his staff at IIE greatly influenced later 
governmental programs, particularly their abiding faith in the ability of education to 
cultivate ―international mindedness,‖ and to offset the ―irrational nationalism‖ bred by 
programs of national education that, many of the IIE founders felt, had led to war.
12
 For 
Duggan and some of his contemporaries, education was a means of promoting both social 
progress and peaceful change. While this faith in the power of education to improve 
cross-cultural understanding, which in turn would promote global peace, underlay the 
exchange programs developed by the U.S. government explored here, the material 
realities of these programs often trumped this lofty ideology. 
 Developing the framework supporting the exchange programs between the United 
States and the nations of Latin America became the responsibility of the delegates to the 
Conference for the Maintenance of Peace held, in Buenos Aires in December 1936. The 
resulting Buenos Aires Convention marked the beginning of direct involvement by the 
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U.S. government in the educational exchange programs that had been going on for 
decades. Facing the growing power of Axis Forces in Europe, hemispheric discord in the 
form of border disputes between Colombia and Peru, Ecuador and Peru, and Bolivia and 
Paraguay, and growing economic nationalism as explored in the previous chapter, the Pan 
American unity envisioned by some throughout the hemisphere seemed in jeopardy.
13
  
 Compounding this problem, communications from various U.S. diplomatic 
missions in Latin America—including from Ecuador—noted the growing efforts of the 
German, Italian, and Japanese governments to increase their cultural, military, and 
economic presence in the region.
14
 As the title of the conference suggested, delegates to 
the Buenos Aires conference hoped to establish a system to settle international disputes 
peacefully. Due to recent events, such as the failure of the League of Nations to stop the 
Italian invasion of Ethiopia, the architects of the Buenos Aires Convention realized that 
simply establishing international systems charged with the maintenance of peace was not 
enough. Public support to utilize these systems was also necessary. Convincing the 
peoples of the Hemisphere of the necessity for greater cooperation, then, became a 
central goal of the delegates gathered at Buenos Aires. Delegates singled out promoting 
closer cultural relations through educational exchange as one of the most effective ways 
to create this regional consensus. 
 Of the many U.S. proposals for the conference, one, ―Facilitation by Government 
Action of the Exchange of Teachers and Students Between the American Republics,‖ 
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(eventually renamed the ―Convention for the Promotion of Cultural Relations‖) is of 
special importance for the present study.
15
 Working closely with Stephen Duggan at IIE, 
and Dr. Leo S. Rowe, who was the Director General of the Pan American Union, 
Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles and Laurence Duggan from the Division of Latin 
American Affairs developed the proposal.
16
 All involved agreed that the program should 
focus only on recent graduates and teachers because they would be ―the best interpreters 
of the ideals and civilization of the United States.‖
17
 This desire to train current and 
future leaders from Latin America in the ―ideals and civilizations‖ of the United States, 
as well as in more practical matters, remained constant throughout the evolution of the 
educational programs examined in this study. In the majority of these programs, officials 
expected exchangees to use the knowledge that they learned in the United States to 
convince their fellow countrymen of the benefits of the American ―way of life‖ once they 
returned home.  
 The educational exchange programs begun under the Buenos Aires Convention 
represented efforts by elites in Washington, and pro-U.S. elites in Latin America and the 
Third World, to convince peoples outside of the United States of the benefits of the U.S. 
system. By training leading students, workers and government employees, officials 
designed these programs to stimulate greater U.S. investment in the industries and 
organizations in these nations by ―preparing‖ their leaders in the methods used in the 
United States. It would take a full three years before the first exchange programs called 
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for under the Buenos Aires Convention were up and running. Getting to that point 
depended on the efforts of a dedicated group of U.S. officials and their counterparts in 
Latin America, all of whom believed in the potential of educational exchange to increase 
hemispheric solidarity.  
 The impact of education on U.S.-Ecuadorian relations was already visible as early 
as 1931. That year, Ambassador William Dawson argued that ―the most effective cultural 
contact between the two countries is furnished by the increasing number of Ecuadorans 
educated in American schools and universities.‖
18
 Ecuadorians who had received their 
academic or technical education in the United States were said to be working in ―most of 
the Government departments‖ in Ecuador.
19
 Dawson described these men as ―warm 
admirers‖ of the United States, and he concluded that the continued education of 
Ecuadorians in the United States was one of the most significant ―factors of a nature to 
influence friendly relations.‖ Prior to the Buenos Aires Convention of 1936, the majority 
of these Ecuadorians likely either paid for their own education in the United States, or 
they received fellowships, either from the Ecuadorian government, or from the various 
Universities and philanthropic organizations participating in Pan American educational 
exchange. In 1930, for example, Harvard University announced the formation of a trust to 
fund scholarships for Latin American students interested in studying international law at 
the Harvard Law School.
20
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 Developing a consensus on aspects of international law became a growing 
concern for U.S. officials running the exchange programs in their efforts to solidify U.S. 
hegemony in the Third World. In 1932, U.S. policymakers invited governments 
throughout Latin America to send representatives to the Pan American Student 
Conference to at the University of Miami.
21
 The following year, the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace offered their own scholarships for exchange students 
to study International Law during the 1934 to 1935 academic year.
22
 Before 1936, 
however, officials in Washington were more interested in the state of education in Latin 
America than in the funding of exchange programs.  
 In 1930, Ambassador Dawson submitted a report to Secretary of State Henry 
Stimson in which he analyzed the educational system of Ecuador.
23
 The ambassador 
provided details on the number of kindergartens, primary schools, secondary schools and 
institutions of higher education in Ecuador, along with the numbers of students enrolled 
and attending each school. He also pointed out that four Ecuadorian students were 
currently studying abroad on scholarships—two in Germany, one in Belgium, and one in 
the United States. By 1931, this number had jumped to nine students—three in the United 
States, two in Germany, two in France, one in Belgium, and one in Switzerland—each of 
whom had received scholarships from the government of Ecuador. In addition to those 
Ecuadorians studying in the United States with the financial assistance of their 
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government, the two sons of the Ecuadorian Ambassador to the United States, Colon 
Eloy Alfaro, applied for admittance to West Point. A West Point alumnus himself, Alfaro 
hoped that the U.S. Congress would grant his sons entry—permission that Congress 
indeed granted in July 1934.
24
 The number of embassy reports on the state of education in 
Ecuador increased dramatically in 1934 during the first administration of Velasco Ibarra. 
 In September 1934, the Senate called on the new Minister of Education in 
Ecuador, Antonio Parra Velasco, to answer questions about rumors that he, under the 
direction of President Velasco Ibarra, was dismissing officials in his ministry because of 
their ―radical tendencies‖ and replacing them with conservatives.
25
 Officials in the United 
States monitored closely any Velasco Ibarra administration for signs of radical behavior. 
Officials in Washington warmly embraced Dawson‘s report that the new president was 
replacing radicals with conservatives.
26
 Parra also introduced several changes that he and 
Velasco Ibarra hoped to implement, including a proposal for an Ibero-American Congress 
in Quito to discuss common problems in education in Latin America. Parra argued that 
the current educational systems tended to create ―antagonistic nationalities,‖ when they 
should instead focus on preparing ―Ibero-American citizens.‖
27
 U.S. officials were 
therefore not the only ones thinking about regional solidarity during this time of 
economic crisis. Ultimately, however, Duggan, Welles, and others involved in 
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establishing the educational exchange programs would push for hemispheric solidarity. 
This solidarity challenged the regionalism promoted by Velasco Ibarra during several of 
his administrations, a practice that officials in Washington at times interpreted as a 
challenge to U.S. hegemony.  
 While some of the Ecuadorian Senators found Parra‘s proposals ―premature and 
useless,‖ their discontent remained largely contained within the Senate walls.
28
 When 
President Velasco Ibarra and Minister Parra later suggested that Central University in 
Quito—the premiere institution of higher learning in Ecuador—needed to be reformed, 
however, their resistance became more public.
29
 By October 1934, rumors were 
circulating in Quito that the president was preparing to combat ―radical propaganda and 
influence‖ in the national school system, beginning with Central University.
30
 According 
to Dawson, Velasco Ibarra and his education minister felt that propaganda and politics 
dominated the university, and that it lacked a ―serious and scientific educational 
orientation.‖
31
 In response to the rumors, the student council issued a manifesto strongly 
condemning any such move by the government, and declaring Velasco Ibarra an ―enemy 
of the student class.‖
32
 A few weeks later, authorities at the university decided to 
reorganize themselves to avoid direct government intervention.
33
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 Reform was slow in coming, however, and by December Velasco Ibarra and 
Minister Parra had tired of waiting.
34
 The president and his minster faced resistance from 
the university students and faculty, and from the Senate, where an opposition measure 
granting Congress, and not the president, the power to close universities was only 
narrowly defeated. Despite this pressure, both Velasco Ibarra and Parra issued statements 
that they were ready to proceed since the reorganization attempted by the faculty in 
November had only furthered the disorder.
35
 Protesting the forced replacement of the 
university rector, the Socialist Dr. Luis Felipe Chavez Obregon, as well as a number of 
faculty members, a group of students seized the university and held off the police until 
the next day. In response, Velasco Ibarra promptly shut down the university. As for 
opinion outside the university, Ambassador Dawson reported that ―in general, most 
impartial persons appear to feel that the re-organization of the University is to be 
welcomed and will tend to improve educational standards and restore discipline which 
has suffered as a result of the growing influence of radical elements.‖
36
 While officials in 
the United States might not have agreed with the closing of the university by the 
president, they certainly welcomed the news that Ecuadorians in general supported his 
efforts to stamp out student radicalism. 
 Despite these struggles over university reform, Velasco Ibarra continued his push 
to reform the primary schools in Ecuador by issuing Decree 53 on 3 April 1935.
37
 One 
feature of the decree was the proposal for the establishment of an Ibero-American school 
                                                 
34
 Dawson to Hull, 4 December 1934. 
35
 Dawson to Hull, 8 January 1935, Central File 1930-39, Box 5673, RG 59, NACP. 
36
 Dawson to Hull, 8 December 1934. 
37
 Gonzalez to Hull, 29 May 1935, Central File 1930-39, Box 5679, RG 59, NACP. 
76 
 
designed to promote the ―aggrandizement and solidarity‖ of all Lain American 
republics.
38
 Pedagogically, Velasco Ibarra designed his reforms to train students to be 
critical thinkers, and to instill in them a sense of citizenship and social responsibility.
39
 
This was a direct challenge to the traditional approach to education in Ecuador, which, 
according to the president, suffered from an overemphasis on theory, and a lack of 
attention to civic responsibility and Ecuadorian culture.
40
 Students in the newly 
transformed schools would split their learning between courses dealing with ―social 
functions,‖ and ―intellectual‖ courses. Functional classes covered topics such as 
agriculture and manufacturing, with an emphasis on whatever their particular region of 
Ecuador needed the most. Intellectual courses would then cover topics such as civic 
culture, voting, public spirit, and responsible administration, instead of teaching what 
Velasco Ibarra considered the ―accidental details‖ of previous curricula.
41
 Together these 
functional and intellectual courses would create the good citizens envisioned by Velasco 
Ibarra. Thus, just as President Velasco Ibarra oversaw Ecuadorian admission into the 
League of Nations, so too did he think multilaterally when it came to education. This 
mattered little for now, however, as the military moved in to oust Velasco Ibarra. From 
his removal from office to at least 1939, educational issues in Ecuador took a back seat to 
politics and the economy.  
 Back in the United States, officials in Washington prepared for the upcoming 
Inter-American Conference in Buenos Aires. In a memo to the Commissioner of the 
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Department of the Interior J.W. Studebacker, Sumner Welles announced the provisions of 
a convention for the establishment of a professor and student exchange program between 
the nations of Latin America and the United States.
42
 Arguing that strengthening cultural 
relations through educational exchanges was ―highly important,‖ Welles informed 
Studebaker that the Office of Education would be responsible for the technical details of 
the program. Building on the themes of fostering a sense of common identity through 
education, which Latin American elites such as Velasco Ibarra had already raised, the 
proposed convention contained a resolution dealing with the subject of inter-American 
youth education. The goal was to create an inter-American citizenship educational 
section, or a youth friendship laboratory, under the direction of the Pan American 
Union.
43
 The proposed program would operate in connection with the local school system 
of each country, but operate independently of the national curriculum.
44
 Thus, where 
Velasco Ibarra had championed a common Ibero-American identity, creators of the Pan 
American program wanted to create a broader hemispheric identity through education. 
Developing this shared identity was a critical part of the long-term goal of establishing 
U.S. hegemony in Latin America.  
 Fostering greater mutual understanding among the peoples of the Americas 
through the Treaty for the Exchange of Students presented by the United States at Buenos 
Aires marked the beginning of an increased attention to cultural affairs in the conduct of 
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U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. Yet with the deepening political and economic 
crisis in Ecuador, the Ecuadorian Government did not immediately ratify the Buenos 
Aires Convention. Despite this delay, Ecuadorians continued to study in the United States 
thanks to fellowships granted by their government. In 1938, for example, Dr. Gonzalo 
Abad received a three year scholarship to study pedagogy at Columbia University, and 
the Ecuadorian government awarded to Ana Bertina Calderon a two year pension to study 
the development and organization of U.S. Kindergartens.
45
 Thus some educational reform 
in Ecuador continued well after Velasco Ibarra left office. That same year, Francisco 
Duedas Estrada received a Government of Ecuador pension to study engineering at the 
University of Southern California.
46
 As noted by Gade, government officials also 
received fellowships to continue their education in the United States. This was the case 
with Carlos M. Teran, who worked in the Publications Division of the Foreign Ministry. 
Teran received an ―allowance‖ to study pedagogy at the University of California, which 
had offered him a scholarship.
47
 This focus on practical subjects such as engineering and 
education remained constant as the U.S. government-funded educational exchange 
programs expanded.  
 Two Ecuadorian grantees deserve special mention in connection with this focus 
on practical subjects. The first was Luis Eduardo Laso, the Chief of the Statistical Section 
of the Ecuadorian Central Bank.
48
 The government of Ecuador sent Laso to the United 
States so that he could study economics and finance at the University of Southern 
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California. In addition to his ―theoretical studies,‖ Laso hoped to have the opportunity to 
inspect the accounting systems at some of the federal offices located near the university.
49
 
Following a special request from Foreign Minister Tobar Donoso, in which the minister 
indicated that his government had chosen the United States for Laso‘s training because 
―studies of this nature‖ had reached a ―high degree of perfection‖ in U.S. universities, 
Cordell Hull contacted the chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
system to see if Laso could conduct his study at the San Francisco branch.
50
 Ever since 
the Kemerer Missions in Latin America during the early 1920s, U.S. officials had at 
times sought to influence developments in the economies of the nations of Latin 
America.
51
 This tradition continued under the exchange programs as economists and 
officials responsible for the development of national economic policies traveled to the 
United States for further training.  
 As with Laso, officials singled out Carlos Romo Davila, an Ecuadorian professor 
of Education, as an important grantee. Davila was coming to the United States to study 
U.S. educational institutions ―in order to evaluate their practicability for Ecuadorean 
students.‖
52
 Davila pointed out that there had been two German pedagogical missions to 
Ecuador in the past which had established the local normal school, and provided the 
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―policy and ideals now being followed‖ by schools in Ecuador.
53
 Officials in the United 
States, along with pro-U.S. elites in Ecuador, would eventually challenge the German 
schools established by these earlier missions by opening an American School in Quito in 
1940. At this point, though, Davila hoped to address the current mindset in Ecuador that 
considered the U.S. model of education to be inapplicable to the Ecuadorian context.  
 In 1939, officials in Washington were still working on the structural framework 
for the exchange programs called for in the Buenos Aires Convention of 1936. Serving as 
the connecting point for the various organizations involved in this effort, officials at the 
Department of State, and the Office of Education hoped to encourage increased 
participation from the private sector. As the head of the Division of Cultural Relations in 
the Department of State, Dr. Benjamin Cherrington, put it, the success of the exchange 
programs depended on the cooperation of private institutions and individuals already 
engaged in these activities since ―it is not adequate for governments alone to carry on this 
work—it is necessary for the people themselves to participate.‖
54
 Harnessing the 
experience of private institutions that had long been involved in educational exchange 
rather than starting from scratch would help improve efficiency—a growing concern as 
Fascist victories in the war mounted. In addition, the officials in Washington who worked 
on the program were, according to Cherrington, ―convinced of the futility, even the 
absurdity of the export of culture by any government.‖ The State Department therefore 
endeavored to ―stimulate the work of the people themselves and their private 
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 Much like the ideological battles between the United States and the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War, the establishment and maintenance of U.S. hegemony during 
World War Two depended in part on convincing Latin Americans that the ideologies 
underlying U.S. foreign policy were superior to those of the fascist nations.  
 While diplomats negotiated economic policy, those involved in educational 
exchange focused on the broader ideological concerns of anti-fascism. One common 
theme in this effort to discredit Fascism and Communism was to contrast the state-run 
nature of these systems with the independence and liberty ostensibly enjoyed by citizens 
living in democracies. Doing so required the cooperation of organizations operating 
outside of the federal government. Many in the private sector welcomed this approach. 
James Grafton Rogers from Yale, for example, argued that ―the financial resources, if 
things are wisely and quietly conducted, will materialize chiefly…from non-Government 
sources. Government funds are always bound up with political considerations, tagged 
with them, and they are dangerous and disabling.‖
56
 By partnering with private 
organizations, officials in Washington hoped ―quietly‖ to develop and fund programs that 
would champion democracy without appearing to be state-run. 
 Attempting to secure this cooperation, Cherrington met with a number of leaders 
in the field of educational exchange in New York City in 1939.
57
 In meetings with 
directors and representatives from IIE, International House, the Committee on Friendly 
Relations Among Foreign Students, the Spelman Fund, the Rockefeller Foundation, and 
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the Western Newspaper Union, Cherrington surveyed the work done by these private 
institutions, each of which had significant experience in educational exchange. In his 
conversations with Stephen Duggan, Duggan reported that IIE had awarded thirty-five 
scholarships to Latin American students that year. Duggan and the rest of the individuals 
consulted all seemed to agree that expanding exchange programs with the nations of 
Latin America was an important and worthwhile endeavor. They promised to cooperate 
with Washington in increasing their programs under the Buenos Aires Convention.  
 Later that same year, Cherrington, along with leading educators from California—
including one of the pioneers of Latin American Studies, Dr. Herbert Bolton—attended a 
conference at the International House chapter in Berkeley. After discussing the 
partnership between the Department of State and the private organizations, Cherrington 
listened as the intellectual elites gathered at the meeting presented their own views on the 
connections between educational exchange and foreign policy. Unlike the meetings in 
New York, where it seemed obvious to Cherrington that some of the exchange programs 
of the various organizations were in early stages of development, the progress in 
California appeared to be greater. Dr. Bolton, for example, argued that there was no ―lag 
in Hispanic American studies‖ at the University of California, where enrollment in Latin 
American history courses was ―very large.‖
58
 Professor Rudolph Schevill, the Chairman 
of the Department of Spanish at Berkeley, however, expressed some doubt about the 
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usefulness of student exchanges. In his experience ―only the specialists in language have 
sufficient knowledge to make such exchanges useful.‖
59
  
 The issue of language surfaced repeatedly. If Latin American students were to 
make the most of their time in the United States, and vice versa, a strong command of 
English and Spanish was necessary. This was one of the primary reasons for the 
establishment of the American School of Quito in 1940, and for the expansion of English 
language courses offered at various schools and cultural centers throughout Ecuador. To 
offer a Latin American perspective on the issue, Dr. Maame Amanda Labaroa of the 
University of Chile reported that this meeting left her hopeful that greater understanding 
could be achieved. But she also cautioned that a program that simply offered exchange 
grants to all Latin American students might actually discourage applicants because Latin 
America was so large, and the countries so varied.
60
 She suggested instead that it would 
be better to tailor programs for each individual country—a suggestion that would soon be 
followed by policymakers in Washington.  
 In order to start implementing their plans with individual countries, officials at the 
Department of State circulated a memo from Secretary of State Hull to all of the U.S. 
missions in Latin America asking for detailed information about the state of higher 
education in each country.
61
 Ecuador was not the only Latin American country where 
striking students prompted worry in Washington. Policymakers needed to know more 
about Latin American students in order to address this population successfully. Citing an 
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―increasing demand‖ in the United States for this information, policymakers asked 
diplomatic field officers to report on the housing arrangements, the size of the student 




 The report from Ecuador focused on the University of Guayaquil, but American 
Vice Consul Frederick L. Royt argued that the numbers were similar at other Ecuadorian 
universities. Royt pointed out that the three main universities in Ecuador did not provide 
housing; the majority of the students lived in the cities where universities were located 
(Guayaquil, Cuenca and Quito). There were no fulltime professors in Ecuador. Instead, 
―professional men‖ from various fields devoted part of their time to teaching.
63
 As for the 
student body, Royt wrote that for 1938 to 1939, 610 students (499 men and 111 women) 
attended the university in Guayaquil, while from 1939 to 1940, that number dropped to 
534 (434 men and 100 women.)  
 By August 1939, officials at the State Department happily announced that they 
had received congressional appropriations to begin the exchange programs agreed to at 
Buenos Aires three years earlier. A few months later, the Department of Education 
submitted its report on the actions taken up to this point in establishing the program.
64
 
Officials at the department had sent information leaflets to the U.S. embassies and 
consulates in Latin America, explaining the program to 976 colleges, universities and 
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professional schools, as well as to 117 educational associations and organizations.
65
 The 
report indicated that staff had sent out 1,601 information leaflets concerning exchange 
professorships, along with 250 application blanks, as well as 1,833 leaflets and 503 
application blanks concerning student exchange fellowships. By advertising the 
opportunities for study in the United States, Cherrington, Laurence Duggan and others 
hoped to expand participation in their fledgling government-sponsored exchange 
programs. By the end of the year, the State Department had received nineteen 




 That same year, word reached Washington that the Government of Ecuador was 
looking abroad to contract a pedagogical mission to reorganize the normal and rural 
schools of the country.
67
 Government representatives had already contacted the 
governments of Germany, Belgium, and Spain. Secretary of State Hull urged that these 
representatives contact Stephen Duggan, or someone at Columbia Teacher‘s College. As 
with other fields, U.S. officials hoped to provide the model when Latin American elites 
contemplated reforming their national educational system. At the same time, the 
Ecuadorian government still had not ratified the Buenos Aires Convention. Ambassador 
Long thus met with Foreign Minister Tobar Donoso to suggest the importance of 
ratification.
68
 The minister explained that his government considered the idea to be an 
―excellent‖ one, but that they could do nothing about ratification until after the 
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educational institutions, ―which were summarily closed some months ago,‖ were again 
functioning normally.
69
 This does not mean that Ecuadorian elites ignored education. The 
political and economic chaos kept these elites busy throughout the 1930s. In the decades 
that followed, however, education would come to play a more important role in U.S.-
Ecuadorian relations as U.S. elites in Washington, and pro-U.S. elites in Ecuador, 
expanded the opportunities for the current and future leaders of Ecuador to participate in 
the world-system promoted by Washington.  
 From 1933 to 1939, U.S. officials and their counterparts in Latin America laid the 
foundation for increased cultural interaction through the establishment and funding of 
educational exchange programs. The Buenos Aires Convention of 1936 marked a 
significant turning point in this development. For the first time, officials in Washington 
created government agencies in the United States to coordinate a number of private 
exchange efforts, many of which had been in operation since World War One. Over time, 
policymakers expanded and refined these programs in order to meet new challenges to 
U.S. hegemony. Yet from 1939 to 1963, a fundamental belief underlay all of these 
programs—that exposure to a U.S. or U.S.-styled education would increase the 
cooperation and consent needed to support U.S. hegemony in Latin America, and the 
Third World.  
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3. Military Bases and Anti-Fascism 
 On 12 December 1941, thirty-five U.S. Marines left for Ecuador to establish bases 
on Seymour Island in the Galápagos and in the coastal town of Salinas.
1
 Japan had 
recently bombed Pearl Harbor, and officials in Washington wanted to defend the Panama 
Canal from Japanese attack. Soon after the assault on Pearl Harbor, the president of 
Ecuador, Dr. Carlos Alberto Arroyo del Rio, offered to the United States the use of this 
Ecuadorian territory. Ecuadorian elites who wanted to strengthen the U.S. presence in 
Ecuador, and to remove from Ecuador all fascist influences—businesses, schools, 
military missions, and even private individuals—supported Arroyo del Rio‘s decision. 
Policymakers replaced the German airline SEDTA with Pan American Airways, while 
they sent Germans living in Ecuador and suspected of Nazi connections to work-camps in 
the United States.
2
 Ecuadorian officials also forced Ecuadorian students attending a local 
school established by a Spanish pedagogic mission to transfer to the American School of 
Quito, which Ecuadorian elites who wanted to provide their children with an education 
modeled on the United States had founded. As the United States entered World War Two, 
some Ecuadorian elites supported the geo-strategic, economic, and ideological 
imperatives of Washington, thus helping to secure U.S. hegemony in Latin America. The 
establishment of U.S. bases in the Galápagos and Salinas was an integral part of this 
process. 
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 In the capital city of Quito at least, few Ecuadorians protested President Arroyo 
del Rio‘s decision to invite U.S. troops to occupy parts of their territory. This 
acquiescence was due in part to the relatively secret nature of the original agreements that 
established the two bases. This secrecy would not last, however. Public pressure against 
the Arroyo del Rio Administration mounted following the 1942 Rio Conference, and the 
ratification of the Rio Protocol which ended for the time being the border war between 
Ecuador and Peru by ceding to Peru a large portion of Ecuadorian territory. Many 
Ecuadorians—including military officers who felt slighted by Arroyo del Rio—blamed 
the administration for this loss, and thus, in 1944, a revolution led by Velasco Ibarra 
ousted President Arroyo del Rio. The new administration immediately began to negotiate 
with the United States over the future of the U.S. presence at the bases once the war 
ended. These negotiations dragged on for years as policymakers from the United States 
and Ecuador each attempted to maximize benefits for their nation. In the end, neither side 




 The establishment of U.S. military bases on Ecuadorian soil is an overlooked 
episode from the Good Neighbor era. Under the leadership of President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Washington attempted to solidify U.S. hegemony in the hemisphere by 
eschewing traditional U.S. policies of armed intervention. In this process, U.S. officials 
relied on the cooperation of Latin American elites. The use of coercion alone would have 
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been impossible. As one sign of their consent, elites from ten other Latin American 
nations joined President Arroyo del Rio in offering portions of their territory to the U.S. 
military for the establishment of air and naval bases.
4
  
 This chapter analyzes the coercion and consent involved in maintaining U.S. 
hegemony in Latin America from 1941-1948 by exploring the negotiations involved in 
the construction and eventual dismantling of the U.S. military bases in Ecuador. Prior to 
the attack on Pearl Harbor, Ecuador and most of the other nations in Latin America had 
agreed at the Lima Conference of 1938 to support the United States, and to defend the 
Western Hemisphere from outside attack. While the U.S. war effort depended in large 
part on primary resources obtained from Latin American nations, by 1944, poorly 
performing economies throughout the region sparked domestic disturbances against 
administrations considered too closely aligned with the United States. In Ecuador, the 
Arroyo del Rio administration came to an abrupt end in part because of public 
perceptions regarding his ties to the United States. Yet some elites in Latin America 
remained convinced that the ideologies and policies promoted by Washington were the 
best available solution to their country‘s problems.  
As officials in Washington debated the shape of the postwar world, some 
Ecuadorian elites attempted to secure visible and long-lasting support from the United 
States in order to offset growing domestic pressures. The establishment of U.S. bases on 
Ecuadorian territory marks a significant moment in this process, and in the history of the 
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relations between Ecuador and the United States.
5
 More than the actions taken against 
German businesses and individuals operating and living in Ecuador, the offer to allow a 
foreign military to establish bases on Ecuadorian territory clearly demonstrated the 
consent of some Ecuadorians to U.S. policy. While policymakers from other Latin 
American nations worried about U.S. imperialism, the government of Ecuador was more 
concerned about Peruvian imperialism. This fear has deep roots in Ecuadorian history. 
From the 1830s to 1995, Ecuador and Peru fought periodic border wars. The original 
agreements dissolving Gran Colombia did not clearly mark the boundaries between 
Ecuador and its neighbors. The border dispute with Peru proved to be the longest lasting 
of Ecuador‘s border wars, and it was fresh in the minds of Ecuadorian elites when World 
War Two erupted. State Department officials had to work to persuade the government of 
Ecuador to send representatives to the 1938 Inter-American Conference held in Lima, 
Peru due to the animosity between the two nations. As Hitler marched across Europe, and 
the United States prepared to enter the war, Ecuadorian policymakers began suggesting to 
their counterparts in Washington that it establish a base on the Galápagos in order to 
protect the Panama Canal. 
The negotiations between Ecuadorian and U.S. policymakers that resulted in the 
establishment, and later the dismantling, of the bases reveal the coercion and consent 
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involved in maintaining U.S. hegemony in Latin America. During these negotiations, 
Ecuadorian officials constantly reminded U.S. officials of the ―selfless‖ manner in which 
they had offered Ecuadorian territory to the United States in the hopes of securing 
economic aid from the United States. U.S. officials, on the other hand, realized that any 
aid could influence domestic political struggles in Ecuador, and so they took advantage of 
divisions within Ecuadorian politics when they could in order to try and secure a long-
term lease on the Galápagos base at the lowest possible cost. 
 U.S. interest in the Galápagos Islands did not begin with the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor. In 1854, the governments of Ecuador and the United States ratified an 
agreement for the exploitation of guano found on the islands, which the booming 
fertilizer industry in the United States needed.
6
 As part of the agreement, the United 
States pledged to defend the islands from any outside attacks that might threaten the 
industry or its Ecuadorian workers.
7
 In 1910, during the second administration of Eloy 
Alfaro, the governments of Ecuador and the United States began negotiating the sale of 
the Galápagos Islands to the United States due to their strategic importance and proximity 
to the Panama Canal, which was then under construction. Negotiations broke down, 
however, in January 1911 due to mounting Ecuadorian protests against the possibility of 
a U.S. lease on the islands.
8
 While anti-Americanism periodically surfaced in Ecuador 
throughout the 1920s and1930s, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought a temporary 
respite. The government of Ecuador now clearly aligned itself with the Allies, and 
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demonstrated its allegiance to the principles of democracy and capitalism as championed 
by the United States. 
 On 8 December 1941, Foreign Minister Julio Tobar Donoso sent instructions to 
Colón Eloy Alfaro—Ecuadorian Ambassador to Washington, D.C., and son of the former 
president and liberal revolutionary, Eloy Alfaro—asking him to express to U.S. 
policymakers the sincerest regrets of Ecuador for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. 
Tobar Donoso also instructed the ambassador to assure U.S. officials of the willingness 
of the Ecuadorian government to work with the United States to defend the hemisphere.
9
 
President Arroyo del Rio had come to power only one year earlier. As one of the leading 
Liberals in Ecuador, he had developed strong ties to the United States through his work 
as a lawyer for U.S. companies. He was more than willing to assist the United States 
during this war emergency.
10
 Recognizing an opportunity to strengthen U.S.-Ecuadorian 
relations while simultaneously challenging Ecuador‘s historic adversary, Arroyo del Rio 
warned U.S. officials that Peru might attack the Galápagos because of the influence of 
fascists, including Japanese, living in Peru.
11
 The following day, Ambassador Alfaro met 
with Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles to discuss the establishment of U.S. military 
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bases on Ecuadorian territory. By December 13, Welles reported that Ecuador was 
prepared to enter into a cooperative agreement establishing the bases.
12
  
 As the governments of Ecuador and the United States negotiated the details of the 
cooperative defense agreement that would permit the construction of the Galápagos and 
Salinas bases, policymakers from each side hoped to secure benefits for their nation. 
Ecuadorian officials wanted increased U.S. assistance in settling the Ecuador-Peru border 
dispute.
13
 In particular, they wanted to ensure that Ecuador received matériel under the 
U.S. Lend-Lease program in amounts comparable to those supplied to Peru. The main 
concern for U.S. officials was to secure the Panama Canal, an issue of ―extreme urgency‖ 
according to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, since a Japanese attack on the canal could 
cripple trade routes used by the United States to procure the primary resources needed to 
fuel the war effort.
14
 On 24 January 1942 the United States and Ecuador drew up the first 
agreement that authorized the construction of the base at Salinas. Then, on February 2, 
officials amended the Salinas Agreement to include Seymour Island in the Galápagos, 
where U.S. forces had already begun construction of the base.
15
 The government of 
Ecuador now authorized the U.S. military to construct and occupy bases on Ecuadorian 
territory for the duration of the war. 
 On February 25, the U.S. ambassador to Ecuador, Boaz Long, wrote to Hull 
announcing the approval of the amendments to the Salinas Agreement. Hull reported that 
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Ecuador would ratify the new agreement after receiving confirmation of increased Lend-
Lease matériel.
16
 Ecuadorian officials made clear that this matériel was needed so that the 
government of Ecuador could fulfill its commitments to hemispheric security, but U.S. 
officials knew that these supplies could also be used to protect against Peruvian attacks. 
These final considerations were taken care of by April 12 when Long reported that the 
Lend-Lease Agreement with Ecuador had been signed, adding that ―the War Department 
believes this agreement on the Galápagos is of the utmost urgency for the defense of the 
hemisphere.‖
17
 With the agreement signed, the United States and Ecuador were now 
prepared to defend the hemisphere through two U.S. military bases on Ecuadorian 
territory. This marked a high-point in the efforts to establish U.S. hegemony in Latin 
America. Tensions between Washington and Quito soon emerged, however, as the 
government of Ecuador found it difficult to secure the economic aid promised by the 
United States—a situation that sparked fresh rounds of anti-Americanism in Ecuador that 
challenged U.S. hegemony. 
 As had happened during the Great Depression, an economic downturn in Ecuador 
fueled this latest anti-Americanism. Despite a significant increase in Ecuadorian exports 
to support the U.S. war effort, the government did not evenly distribute the resulting 
profits. From 1940 to 1944, domestic prices in Ecuador doubled while salaries stayed the 
same.
18
 The administration of Arroyo del Rio faced increasing domestic pressure as the 
economy worsened, and the Ecuadorian public became convinced that his administration 
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had shamed Ecuador by agreeing to the terms of the Rio Protocol. Since the United States 
was one of the arbiter nations that had convinced Ecuadorian officials to sign the 
protocol, Washington and the close ties between Arroyo del Rio and U.S. elites were easy 
targets for popular discontent. This criticism of the Arroyo del Rio regime grew as the 
Ecuadorian press began reporting on new rounds of negotiations between the United 
States and Ecuador that would have prolonged the U.S. military presence in Ecuador 
following the end of the war. 
 President Arroyo del Rio had proposed a new agreement granting the United 
States a 99-year lease on the Galápagos base. While the proposal sparked some interest in 
Washington, government officials were debating the future of U.S. bases established 
throughout the world during this period of transition. Some wondered if Congress would 
continue to supply the funds needed to maintain these bases once the war was over. The 
U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador, Robert M. Scotten, received instructions from the State 
Department officials to delay negotiations on a new agreement until after the Ecuadorian 
congressional elections in June in order to allow Washington time to solidify its 
position.
19
 Soon after receiving these instructions, Scotten made clear that Ecuador was 




 On 1 May 1944 Scotten sent a follow-up report analyzing the political pressures 
faced by the government of Ecuador. The ambassador argued that Washington should not 
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approach Quito concerning the bases until the current administration changed since the 
Ecuadorian populous was still upset with the Rio Protocol of 1942.
21
 Postponing 
negotiations, Scotten felt, would allow ―Ecuadoran feelings regarding the boundary 
settlement with Peru to cool down and it may be that by then an administration would be 
in power in Ecuador which would be easier to deal with than the present one.‖
22
 By 
waiting, Scotten hoped to improve the U.S. negotiating position. He recognized the dire 
economic situation faced by the Ecuadorian government, and he wanted to take 




 The Ecuadorian elections of 1944 brought a dramatic change. Exiled in Colombia 
since his controversial loss to Arroyo del Rio in 1940, Velasco Ibarra based his 
presidential campaign in part on popular discontent with the Arroyo del Rio 
Administration. Many Ecuadorians felt that the present administration had devolved into 
a dictatorship that was threatening the prestige of Ecuador through the signing of the Rio 
Protocol, and the reported negotiations to lease the Galápagos to the United States. Public 
discontent reached a climax on May 28, when the Ecuadorian military launched a 
rebellion against the Arroyo del Rio administration. Thus began the ―Glorious 
Revolution‖ that brought Velasco Ibarra to office.
24
 Leading an unusual coalition of elites 
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from political parties on the left and the right, this was the second presidential term for 
Velasco Ibarra.  
 In response to Hull‘s inquiry regarding the possible impact of the coup on the 
Galápagos negotiations, Ambassador Scotten replied that Velasco Ibarra‘s victory was 
due in part to his attacks against the Arroyo del Rio regime over the Rio Protocol. The 
ambassador worried that now was an inopportune time to push an issue that some might 
interpret as infringing upon Ecuadorian sovereignty.
25
 Yet soon after his victory, 
President  Velasco Ibarra‘s foreign minister, Camilo Ponce Enriquez, approached Scotten 
with a message from the new president, saying that ―the Ecuadoran Government desire[d] 
‗as a gesture of courtesy‘ to offer the United States the right to maintain our base in the 
Galápagos as long as we wish after the war.‖
26
 Recognizing the fragility of the political 
coalition that had brought him to power, Velasco Ibarra wanted to secure the support of 
the United States as a sign of confidence in his administration. On July 31, Ambassador 
Scotten received instructions to mention to Foreign Minister Ponce Enriquez Ponce that 
―the question of appropriate compensation would, of course, be considered in any such 
negotiations.‖ The Assistant Secretary of State Edward Stettinius emphasized that the 
United States ―cannot withdraw from a base so vital to the defense of the Panama 
Canal.‖
27
 Thus the United States raised the possibility of compensation for the use of the 
bases, and this opened the next phase of the negotiations. 
                                                 
25
 Scotten to Hull, 23 June 1944, FRUS, 1944 VII: 1063-1064. 
26
 Scotten to Hull, 10 July 1944, FRUS, 1944 VII: 1064-1066. 
27
 Stettinius to Scotten, 31 July 1944, FRUS, 1944 VII: 1071-173. 
99 
 
 President Velasco Ibarra was attempting to consolidate his power by addressing 
the economic problems of Ecuador. During the war, governments throughout Latin 
America had taken out Eximbank loans to pay for the production of primary resources 
needed by the U.S. military. With the war over, the market for these goods was shrinking. 
The growth of these export industries during the war had also exacerbated economic 
imbalances in nations such as Ecuador, where the infrastructure for sustained economic 
development were still relatively nonexistent.
28
 President Velasco Ibarra thus approached 
the United States for a $20 million loan for various development projects. These projects 
could provide his administration with crucial domestic support since they would be a 
visible indication of U.S. support for his administration, while also strengthening the 
economic development of Ecuador.  
 In August 1944, Velasco Ibarra sent Victor Emilio Estrada to Washington to 
begin loan negotiations as a special representative to the president.
29
 Estrada, a prominent 
banker from Guayaquil who had ties with the United States, where his children had 
attended school, hoped to secure a loan to help pay for a variety of infrastructure 
programs in Ecuador that were designed to more fully integrate the country—both 
economically and psychologically. His project addressed the physical separation of 
Ecuadorians caused by rugged terrain, which had long hindered the construction of roads 
over the Andes Mountains. Overcoming this natural barrier, in Estrada‘s vision, would 
united Ecuador. Estrada also hoped to ―strengthen‖ Ecuador internationally, by increasing 
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Ecuador‘s prestige through a loan from the United States, and domestically, by improving 
the Ecuadorian economy. Soon after his arrival in Washington, however, State 
Department officials began to undermine the loan negotiations. 
 Estrada began the negotiations by attempting to convince U.S. officials of the 
sincerity of his mission. When Rollin Atwood from the Department of State raised the 
Galápagos issue, Estrada explained the difficulties facing the United States and Ecuador. 
He pointed out that the general sentiment of the Ecuadorian ―masses‖ was that ―Ecuador 
had given the United States something and hadn‘t received anything in return,‖ while ―the 
‗educated‘ people . . . knew that Ecuador had not given anything—that the bases were 
essential to hemisphere defenses and Ecuador was glad to cooperate.‖
30
 Yet this did not 
mean that all Ecuadorian elites supported the base negotiations. The National Assembly, 
according to Estrada, was complicating matters. Some members were voicing their 
opposition to the new rounds of negotiations claiming that Velasco Ibarra was continuing 
with threats to the national sovereignty of Ecuador begun by his predecessor Arroyo del 
Rio. Accordingly, Estrada argued that ―nothing could be settled while the present 
assembly was in session.‖
31
  
 To try to win the favor of U.S. elites, Estrada brought with him a letter from 
President Velasco Ibarra that emphasized his government‘s ―support of and close 
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understanding and unity of ideals with your noble country.‖
32
 Policymakers in 
Washington often worried about the rise of populist leaders in Latin America, and 
Velasco Ibarra wanted to eliminate any possible doubts in the minds of U.S. officials 
concerning the leanings of his administration. From the beginning of the base 
negotiations, however, officials in Washington seemed to distrust Estrada. They seemed 
to fear that he was coming to Washington to secure loans that might ultimately favor only 
his home city of Guayaquil, rather than Ecuador as a whole. Donald Heath, from the 
Division of North and West Coast Affairs, along with the President of the Export-Import 
Bank, Warren Lee Pierson, wondered if perhaps Estrada was not a true representative of 
the Ecuadorian government in Quito. This distrust hampered the negotiations throughout 
Estrada‘s stay in Washington. U.S. officials seemed hesitant to make any firm 
commitments. To complicate matters, U.S. policymakers recognized the political 
significance of the Estrada Mission. Heath suggested that Velasco Ibarra had sent Estrada 
to the United States because the president wanted a large public works project—financed 
by the United States—to maintain the ―blaze of popularity‖ that had won him the 
presidency.  
 While the Division considered Estrada‘s proposal to be ―fairly sound,‖ 
Ambassador Scotten recommended that officials do nothing regarding loans to Ecuador 
until the Ecuadorian government agreed to a continuation of the U.S. presence on the 
Galápagos base. Heath concluded that ―without necessarily mentioning the Galápagos 
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Islands by name or tying them in with these negotiations, Sr. Estrada should be informed 
that final action on the credits he seeks must await the consideration and discussion of 
our overall relations with Ecuador.‖
33
 While Estrada‘s original mission had nothing to do 
with the Galápagos negotiations, officials at the State Department tried to connect the two 
issues. With hemispheric solidarity secured, U.S. policymakers now focused on 
maintaining U.S. hegemony in the postwar world. By September 28, however, Pierson 
reported that none of the projects covered in Estrada‘s proposal were economically 
sound. Pierson also expressed apprehension about saddling Ecuador with any more debt, 
but he acknowledged that if there were a larger issue at hand, such as the Galápagos base, 
that would be a different matter. Pierson closed by suggesting that perhaps the bank could 
approve the project that was the ―least unsound economically‖ so as to send Estrada 
home with something.
34
 He thus recommended that the bank go ahead with the 
waterworks project, along with perhaps a small loan for new roads.
35
 Officials from the 
State Department and the Eximbank still seemed to doubt the true motives of Estrada, 
and they hesitated to fulfill his requests.
36
 
 Though Ambassador Scotten had already casually mentioned the possibility of 
compensation for Ecuador in connection with the Galápagos base, on October 3 the State 
Department officially linked the issue of the base with the loan sought by Estrada. 
Eximbank and State Department Officials, including Pierson, Atwood, Heath and Acting 
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Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs Norman Armour, reported to Estrada 
and Galo Plaza that ―a definitive decision on Sr. Estrada‘s program could thus best be 
made in the light of a definite arrangement for the mutual security and the conclusion of 
such arrangements would thus facilitate the final consideration of the program 
proposed.‖
37
 ―Mutual security‖ was a clear reference to the Galápagos base as some 
officials in the United States and Ecuador still considered the base strategically 
important. Arguing that continued maintenance of the base by the United States would in 
and of itself bring economic development to Ecuador, U.S. policymakers delayed the 
loan negotiations in order to secure a long-term lease on the base. These delays, 
compounded by domestic pressures in Ecuador and the United States as both the National 
Assembly and the U.S. Congress attempted to influence the negotiations, jeopardized the 
Estrada Mission.
38
 By October 5, it was clear that Estrada would not receive the loan, and 
he prepared to return to Quito to discuss matters with his government.
39
 In the end, 
Estrada received only a statement reasserting the interest of the Eximbank in pursuing the 
water works project for Guayaquil.
40
 As officials in the United States prepared for the 
end of the war, it became increasingly clear to Latin Americans that wartime favoritism 
was waning. 
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 With the failure of the Estrada Mission, negotiations over the future ownership of 
the Galápagos base took a new turn as domestic events in Ecuador began to have greater 
influence. President Velasco Ibarra faced political pressure from a population that was 
increasingly reluctant to see Ecuadorian territory leased to a foreign country. Those 
Ecuadorians who were still willing to consider such a lease, however, would now only do 
so if the United States provided an appropriate amount of economic aid as compensation. 
The Ecuadorian press had reported Scotten‘s earlier comments about compensation in 
ways that suggested to readers that this aid was a foregone conclusion. These pressures, 
combined with a growing rift between Velasco Ibarra and the members of the National 
Assembly, suggested to the president that they needed to secure a positive outcome to the 
negotiations quickly. Back in Quito, the National Assembly was meeting to discuss the 
latest U.S. proposal that would grant the United States a 99-year lease on the islands.
41
 
After considering reports from a special foreign relations committee, and from the armed 
forces of Ecuador, the National Assembly concluded that it could not support the 
agreement because it would threaten Ecuadorian sovereignty.
42
 The window of 
opportunity for a quick and equitable settlement of the Galápagos base negotiations was 
rapidly closing 
 On 2 January 1945, Foreign Minister Ponce Enriquez informed Ambassador Galo 
Plaza that the government of Ecuador, due to pressures from the National Assembly, 
would not consider leasing the islands to the United States. Yet the Ecuadorian 
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government was willing to consider a mutual cooperation agreement that would grant the 
U.S. military access since Ecuador could not afford to maintain the base.
43
 On April 23, 
Scotten reported to the Ecuadorian minister of the economy, Luis Eduardo Laso, that a 
mutual agreement on the continued use of the base by U.S. military forces would mean 
that ―the relations between the two countries would be placed on an entirely different 
basis and there would be a much better disposition both on the part of the Department and 
the American Congress to assist Ecuador.‖
44
 This suggested to Ecuadorian elites that 
although the Estrada Mission had failed, perhaps the Galápagos base could still be used 
to leverage State Department support in future loan negotiations between Ecuador and the 
Eximbank. By July 5, the United States became more specific regarding compensation, 
offering Ecuador $20 million in Eximbank credits, which the United Sates would pay 
back, as a form of compensation for the use of the bases.
45
 The offer of $20 million—the 
exact amount of the development loan sought one year earlier by Estrada—actually 
complicated negotiations in the upcoming years because Ecuadorians came to count on 
this dollar amount despite the fact that a shift to a peacetime economy in the United 
States diminished the domestic support for a loan of this magnitude. 
 In July 1945, Galo Plaza and Foreign Minister Ponce Enriquez began a new round 
of meetings with officials from the State Department and the Eximbank. Galo Plaza 
reported to the Foreign Ministry that he and Ponce Enriquez had secured a tentative 
agreement with the Eximbank and the State Department, but he said that Ecuador would 
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not sign any agreement until the United States delivered the full $17 million in matériel 
promised in the 1942 Lend-Lease agreement.
46
 U.S. officials began delaying negotiations 
in October, arguing that it would be hard to convince the Department of Defense of the 
need to maintain the Galápagos base following the end of the war emergency. Ecuadorian 
officials continued to insist that they could not reach an agreement allowing a prolonged 
U.S. presence on the base without the $20 million.
47
 Some in the Defense Department 
worried that such a payment would set a precedent for future negotiations with other 
foreign governments on whose territory the United States had constructed bases during 
the war. 
 The State Department and the president of the Export-Import Bank, Wayne 
Taylor, had not yet ruled out compensation, but at this point Taylor began insisting that 
the Department of Defense would have to determine the dollar amount to be paid. 
Officials told Galo Plaza that Ecuador should focus instead on using the $1 million 
already promised.
48
 Eximbank officials earmarked this $1 million loan for the creation of 
professional studies that would they would use to obtain a larger $20 million loan. This 
new line of reasoning angered President Velasco Ibarra, who wanted to announce a $20 
million loan agreement sooner rather than later.
49
 On October 26 it became increasingly 
clear that Ecuador had little hope of securing the $20 million loan when Eximbank 
officials reported that the end of the war meant that public pressure in the United States 
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would prohibit Congress, the War Department, and the Eximbank from making such a 
large loan as compensation.
50
 The end of the war marked a transition in U.S. hegemony, 
and officials debated the continuation of wartime commitments during this time of flux. 
Thus, despite Galo Plaza‘s efforts to convince U.S. policymakers to consider the question 
of compensation not in terms of the present climate of peace, but instead within the 




 By November 1945, negotiations over the future of the Galápagos base had thus 
ground to a halt.
52
 Ecuador continued pushing for the $20 million loan, but each time the 
Ecuadorians raised the issue, U.S. officials emphasized the restraints placed on U.S. 
economic aid by the current peacetime climate. Accordingly, the State Department now 
attempted to separate the loan from the base negotiations.
53
 In response, Velasco Ibarra 
instructed Galo Plaza to inform the Department of State that the Ecuadorian Constitution 
would not permit the maintenance of the Galápagos base without the legalization of the 
situation through a formal agreement.
54
 Though the agreement of 2 February 1942 that 
had established the base was in fact legal, Velasco Ibarra raised this question of legality 
as a way to justify to his constituents his continuance of negotiations with Washington. 
President Velasco Ibarra still hoped to secure U.S. economic aid in exchange for the 
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continued use of the Galápagos base in order to offset political pressures he faced at 
home. 
 With continued delays in the negotiations, Ecuadorian domestic opinion had by 
1946 turned against the idea of a prolonged U.S. presence at the Galápagos base.
55
 As a 
result, the new Ecuadorian foreign minister, Jose Vicente Trujillo, instructed Galo Plaza 
to inform the State Department that unless both sides reached an agreement concerning 
the base by March 10, the government of Ecuador would consider the negotiations failed, 
and demand the return of the base. In his memo to Undersecretary of State Dean 
Acheson, Galo Plaza emphasized that U.S. policymakers were the ones who had first 
linked the idea of a loan for Ecuador with a continued U.S. military presence at the base, 
and that Ecuador had been waiting over a year for a settlement of the two issues. In 
response, Foreign Minister Vicente Trujillo instructed Galo Plaza to remind 
Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson of the many sacrifices made by Ecuador in the 




 Meanwhile, Henry Dearborn from the Division of North and West Coast Affairs 
met with members of the State War Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) on January 
4 to discuss the possibility of joint occupation of the base by the U.S. and Ecuadorian 
militaries with the United States paying the maintenance costs. The military officers 
suggested that the ―maximum desired‖ outcome for the United States would be exclusive 
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rights for the U.S. military, while the ―minimum acceptable‖ would be for joint rights. 
They insisted further that the United States should not have to pay for the development of 
future projects in Ecuador that were not of interest to the United States.
57
 Despite the 
desire of the U.S. military to maintain the base, military officials could not decide on an 
appropriate dollar value for the Galápagos base. The State Department was now prepared 
to offer Ecuador only the minimum amount required for the maintenance of the base, 
while simultaneously discussing with Eximbank officials the possibility of fast-tracking 
any Ecuadorian loan proposals that seemed sound.
58
 
 While the military officials debated, Galo Plaza continued to push for State 
Department help in supporting the Ecuadorian position in negotiations with U.S. military 
and Eximbank officials. On January 14 the ambassador relayed to Quito his confidence 
that State Department officials would indeed provide this support.
59
 Galo Plaza‘s 
confidence in the promises of U.S. officials seemed warranted, because on February 2, 
the United States had conceded to Ecuadorian demands and returned the Salinas Base.
60
 
The return of the Salinas base reportedly brought a momentary change in public opinion, 
and Ecuadorians now seemed to accept the idea of a prolonged U.S. presence at the 
Galápagos base as long as the situation was ―legalized.‖
61
 Galo Plaza continued to insist 
that Washington first make it clear that the maintenance of the base was vital for the 
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protection of the Panama Canal; a caveat designed to satisfy requirements outlined by the 
Ecuadorian National Assembly that continued to worry about threats to Ecuadorian 
sovereignty. Galo Plaza also suggested that the State Department was ―morally 
obligated‖ to help Ecuador secure a loan with the Eximbank since the department had 
interfered in the 1944 loan negotiations.
62
 
 Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Spruille Braden seemed to 
agree with Galo Plaza. Braden believed that, regardless of whether or not the United 
States kept the base, it was still in their interest to help Ecuador economically since 
Ecuador would need financial aid in order to maintain the base.
63
 U.S. and Ecuadorian 
officials, however, were still unable to agree on the dollar amount of any possible 
payment to Ecuador, and the March 10 deadline came and went. By March 20, the 
government of Ecuador had tired of waiting. Once again citing public opinion, officials in 
the Foreign Ministry instructed Galo Plaza to present U.S. officials with an ultimatum—if 
the United States continued to insist on negotiating a Galápagos treaty, Ecuador must 
receive substantial economic aid. If the United States was unable to determine the 
strategic value of the base and the dollar amount of the compensation by March 31, Galo 
Plaza was to request the return of the base. Should Washington fail to respond in time, 
Galo Plaza could continue negotiations only if the United States agreed to the $20 
million.
64
 The U.S. military, however, continued to delay. 
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 On April 2, with the negotiations stalled again, Galo Plaza prepared a formal note 
requesting the withdrawal of U.S. forces as soon as possible.
65
 During a meeting at the 
State Department, Braden and other officials explained to the ambassador their rationale 
for refusing the $20 million loan. They began by emphasizing that the U.S. military 
wanted to maintain the Galápagos base because of its strategic importance. International 
treaties ratified by the government of Ecuador, they argued, required it to contribute to 
hemispheric defense, and Ecuador had already benefited from the U.S. military presence 
on the islands. According to these officials, the United States had so far spent around $11 
million on constructing the bases.
66
 This amount, combined with the training of 
Ecuadorian personnel by the U.S. military and shipments of Lend-Lease matériel to 
Ecuador, was more than enough compensation for the use of the base. Galo Plaza 
countered each individual assertion made by Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden, 
but neither side would budge, so Galo Plaza presented the note requesting withdrawal.
67
 
 The United States agreed to remove all military personnel from the Galápagos 
base by 1 July 1946.
68
 There were continued delays, however, when some members of 
the Ecuadorian military tried to convince U.S. officers of their desire to maintain a U.S. 
presence on the base. General L. Larrea Alba, the military assistant to the Ecuadorian 
Embassy in Washington, expressed his concern over the recent announcement that 
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Ecuador was going to request the removal of U.S. forces.
69
 Other Ecuadorian officers 
who were worried that Ecuador could not afford to maintain the base also supported 
Larrea Alba. The fact that the Arroyo del Rio Administration had spent considerable 
amounts of money developing the national police force while cutting the funding of the 
military only heightened their concerns. Ecuadorian officers blamed this budget cut for 
their loss to Peru in 1941—a loss that had tarnished the Ecuadorian military‘s reputation 
and revealed its weakness. 
 Pressured by their own militaries, policymakers from the Foreign Ministry and the 
State Department continued to debate the future of the base. Realizing that there was still 
hope of reaching an agreement, Ecuador attempted to buy some time by agreeing to allow 
a limited number of U.S. personnel to remain on the base after the July 1 deadline.
70
 
Neither the Foreign Ministry nor the State Department, however, had deviated from their 
original points of the negotiations—Ecuador still wanted compensation, and the United 
States still refused to pay. In a meeting with Foreign Minister José Vicente Trujillo, 
Scotten made it clear that the United States was willing to help maintain the base while 
granting Ecuador full sovereignty, but that the U.S. government was ―not willing to pay 
any compensation or allow this matter to be a bargaining point for other matters.‖
71
 
Despite this new round of negotiations, then, the United States returned the base to 
Ecuador as planned on 1 July 1946. 
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 With only a few U.S. military officials left behind at the base, Acheson, Dearborn, 
and others at the State Department spent the summer of 1946 discussing the Galápagos 
situation. All seemed to agree that if the United States was going to maximize its 
benefits, it needed to reach an agreement soon, before the last U.S. official left the base.
72
 
Ambassador Scotten, however, warned that domestic politics in Ecuador continued to 
hamper the negotiations. The Ecuadorian Foreign Affairs Committee of the National 
Assembly was reportedly unwilling to support an agreement effected through an informal 
exchange of notes. This meant that any agreement would have to be ratified by the 




 Policymakers had made little progress by 1947. That year the new Ecuadorian 
ambassador to the United States, Francisco Illescas Barreiro, met several times with 
members of the State Department, while continued delays in shipments of U.S. matériel 
to Ecuador fed a growing anti-Americanism in Ecuador.
74
 Though apparently pressured 
at home to settle the Galápagos situation, the new members of the Ecuadorian Foreign 
Ministry asked for more time to analyze the earlier negotiations.  
 The new staff recognized that they could not expect economic compensation for 
the wartime use of the base, so they now wondered if Ecuador could instead receive 
beneficial treatment under President Harry Truman‘s new military cooperation 
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 As plans for the new military schools in the Galápagos and Salinas under this 
program progressed, Ecuadorian diplomats continued to press their U.S. counterparts for 
economic assistance. This time, however, the Foreign Ministry instructed the Ecuadorian 
ambassador not to mention compensation specifically, but rather to emphasize 
hemispheric security by arguing that Ecuador would only be able to contribute fully to 
the cause of hemispheric security with economic aid from the United States. Only a few 
months after President Truman had announced his administration‘s determination to stop 
the spread of international Communism, Foreign Minister Vicente Trujillo hoped that 
State Department officials would help to secure an Eximbank loan for Ecuador in defense 
of this common goal.
76
 
 The year 1948 ended the negotiations between the United States and Ecuador for 
the maintenance of the Galápagos base. Growing anti-Americanism in Ecuador, coupled 
with dwindling military expenditures in the United States made worse by a global 
recession, compelled U.S. forces to withdraw completely from the base. The State 
Department informed the Foreign Ministry on 22 June 1948 that the United States would 
remove from Seymour Island all U.S. forces by July, because the U.S. military lacked the 
funds to sustain the mission.
77
 All that now remained was to figure out which 
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installations the United States would leave behind. Since Ecuador hoped to maintain the 
base in working order, the Foreign Ministry asked if the Ecuadorian military could 
purchase these installations at a reasonable price.
78
 The U.S. military agreed, and they 
sold to Ecuador most of the requested equipment at a 95 percent discount, while 
promising to have all U.S. personnel off the base by December 23.
79
 The Foreign 
Ministry closed the negotiations by officially thanking the United States for ―the manner 
in which the Government of the United States has acceded to the desires of the 
Government of Ecuador with regard to the acquisition of the equipment necessary for the 
maintenance of the Seymour Base.‖
80
 
 Negotiations for the establishment of U.S. military bases on Ecuadorian soil and 
the eventual return to Ecuador of these bases reveal the hegemonic process at work. 
While nobody can argue that the United States and Ecuador were equally powerful, it 
seems clear that Washington did not simply dictate the terms of the base agreements. 
Officials in Washington instead worked with Ecuadorian elites, many of whom supported 
the foreign policies of the United States, to ensure the security of not only the hemisphere 
but also of the emerging capitalist world-system. Ecuadorian elites were at times able to 
secure benefits for their home nation—such as the deeply discounted matériel—
throughout this process. Solidifying U.S. hegemony in Latin America during the Second 
World War was not limited solely to economic and geo-strategic negotiations among 
diplomats. The education and training of Latin Americans was also part of this process. 
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4. The American School of Quito, and the Buenos Aires Convention 
The 1936 Buenos Aires Convention and the 1938 Lima Accords laid the 
groundwork for increased hemispheric cooperation. As German military victories 
mounted, officials in Washington and throughout the hemisphere worried about a 
possible Axis invasion of Latin America. Some worried that fascist economic policies 
would challenge the economic world-system promoted by Washington. Others worried 
that Nazi propaganda would turn unsuspecting Latin American citizens against the 
United States. Whether or not this threat was ever real, what mattered most was that the 
perception of the threat in the minds of elites existed. As a result, policymakers devised a 
number or programs designed to counteract this perceived threat. Governments 
throughout Latin America rounded up Germans living in their nations and sent them to 
internment camps in the United States, while countries such as Ecuador contracted with 
Pan American Airways in order to replace the German airline SEDTA.  
In addition to this military and economic integration, representatives at both inter-
American conferences also agreed to expand cultural relations among the nations of the 
hemisphere in order to combat fascist ideologies. Education became a central part of this 
effort. In this context, policymakers interpreted education broadly, arguing that it 
included ―any activity from the acquisition of manual skills to the contribution of original 
research by scholars of the highest order.‖
1
 Officials promoted the acquisition of skills 
and knowledge through new education exchange programs, as well as through American 
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Schools in Latin America.
2
 Through education and training, policymakers hoped to 
convince current and future leaders of Latin America of the benefits of allying with the 
United States, thus solidifying U.S. hegemony in the region. 
As part of an evolving cultural relations program that included film, books, 
cultural centers and other sites of cultural contact, the exchange programs held a special 
place. Many policymakers believed that ―fundamental in the development of friendly 
inter-American relations is the effort to develop personal contacts between significant 
leaders of the other American republics and those of the United States.‖
 3
 Exchange 
programs could facilitate these contacts by bringing to the United States ―those persons 
having an influence on youth‖ from a variety of disciplines—journalists, writers, 
physicians, engineers, educators, scientists, businessmen and artists.
4
 Policymakers thus 
designed the exchange programs to foster cooperation for the long-term by targeting 
those individuals who could most effectively communicate to younger generations. 
Students themselves were also an integral part of the plan, and officials in Washington 
worked to expand the opportunities for Latin American students to study in the United 
States. Part of this effort included the founding and funding of American Schools in Latin 
America.  
Educating the children of elite Latin American families using methods developed 
in the United States served two main purposes. First, those students who chose to 
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continue their studies in the United States would, officials hoped, experience a smooth 
transition to their new schools thanks to the training they received in English and in the 
methods of U.S. educators. Second, this education would ideally instill in the future 
leaders of Latin America an appreciation for the United States. Increasing the number of 
pro-U.S. elites in Latin America could help to secure the hemisphere during this war 
emergency, and to lay the groundwork for more long-term support of the U.S. Empire. 
While financial support from the U.S. government for American schools abroad never 
reached the level of that for exchange programs, during the early 1940s the U.S. 
government did begin funding some of these schools—including the American School in 
Quito, Ecuador. 
From 1940 to 1948, U.S. cultural relations programs with the nations of Latin 
America passed through three phases in response to World War Two and the emerging 
Cold War. During the first phase from 1940 to 1942, officials worked to implement the 
operations called for at Buenos Aires and Lima. Along with the Bureau of Inter-
American Cultural Relations and the Division of Cultural Relations, both of which were 
created earlier in 1938 as a first step in a greater involvement by Washington in cultural 
relations, in 1940 policymakers established the Office for the Coordination of 
Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics (OCCCR), later 
shortened to the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA) and then 
the Office for Inter-American Affairs (OIAA).
5
 Officials at the Coordinator‘s Office 
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oversaw a vast operation focused on hemispheric defense during the war.
6
 Next, officials 
created the Division of Inter-American Educational Relations within the U.S. Office of 
Education in 1941
7
. Division officials worked closely with the Department of State and 
with OCIAA. Enabling the exchange of professors and students through the awarding of 
fellowships, the Division of Inter-American Educational Relations was one of the main 
agencies involved in educational exchange with the nations of Latin America.
8
 In an 
attempt to build on what already existed, these new federal offices and divisions worked 
closely with private organizations that had long been involved in exchange programs 
worldwide. The Institute of International Education (IIE) was the central partner in this 
effort.  
During the early years of the IIE, presidents of universities and colleges allotted 
scholarships to the institute to help fund the exchange program. By 1938, cooperation 
between private organizations and the IIE had generated over one hundred exchange 
scholarships. From 1919 to 1939, Stephen Duggan and his staff at IIE brought close to 
three hundred Latin American students to the United States to study.
9
 When officials in 
Washington began looking for a private organization with which to partner, the IIE was 
an obvious choice. Close cooperation between federal and private agencies remained a 
defining characteristic of U.S.-Latin American exchange programs throughout this era. 
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As for the specific programs instituted during this first phase, the Inter-American 
Trade scholarship provides an instructive example. Started by the OCCCR in 1940, the 
program brought Latin Americans to the United States for ―technical training and 
practical experience‖ in U.S. industries. Three main objectives underlay this exchange 
program. First, the training of ―future industrialists‖ of Latin America in the methods 
used in the United States was an attempt to help the nations of Latin America ―develop.‖ 
Some elites in the United States and in Latin America felt that they could duplicate the 
successes of the United States in Latin America by properly training Latin Americans. A 
second, related goal was more long-range in nature—to train a Latin American workforce 
in current U.S. methods in the hopes of attracting U.S. business leaders looking to expand 
their operations abroad. The third goal was to engender an appreciation ―of the American 
spirit and of the American way of life.‖
10
 While less easily defined than the first two 
goals, efforts to familiarize Latin Americans with the American ―spirit‖ and ―way of life‖ 
were catch phrases used by policymakers to justify exchange programs during World 
War Two and the Cold War. Some officials seemed to believe that by simply 
experiencing life in the United States, Latin Americans could correct what some 
considered to be deficiencies in their nations. 
In addition to these exchange programs, officials during this phase began to 
consider funding American Schools in Latin America. At the time of the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, there were around 400 schools in Latin America sponsored by, or receiving 
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substantial help from, U.S. nationals.
11
 While their individual missions varied, the 
victories of Hitler in Europe, and the Japanese attack on the United States, cast the 
schools in a new light. Officials now identified these schools as potential bulwarks 
against fascist influences in the hemisphere. By educating the children of elite Latin 
American families in schools modeled on U.S. institutions, policymakers hoped these 
future leaders would develop a strong appreciation for the United States.  
While the story of the exchange programs examined here focuses primarily on the 
efforts of elites in the United States to improve cultural relations with the nations of Latin 
America, the story of the American School of Quito reveals the efforts of leading Latin 
Americans in supporting U.S. policies. In 1940, Ecuadorian elites, working closely with 
officials from the U.S. Embassy, founded the school in order to provide the children of 
elite Ecuadorian families with the opportunity to receive a U.S.-styled education. By 
1942, policymakers in Washington were convinced of the value of the school in Quito, so 
they began funding it, as well as other American Schools throughout Latin America.  
The years from 1943 to 1945 marked a second phase in the development of U.S.-
Latin American cultural relations as officials planned for the postwar world. Recognizing 
the fine line between reciprocal cultural exchange and unilateral propaganda, 
policymakers in Washington shifted responsibilities for the various programs four 
different times.
12
 In 1943, policymakers transferred to the Division of Cultural Relations 
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most of the programs under the supervision of the OCIAA.
13
 This gave State Department 
officials even greater control over these programs, allowing the program to continue once 
the war, and the raison d‘etre of the OCIAA, ended.  
During this phase, officials emphasized the cooperative nature of the programs by 
increasing the number of grants jointly financed by Latin American governments and the 
United States.
14
 Thus they created the exchange of students and professors program under 
the Buenos Aires Convention. In this program, as in others during this period, officials 
promoted a ―spirit of reciprocity,‖ at least rhetorically.
15
 The definition of ―reciprocity‖ 
was open to interpretation. In the case of the exchange programs under the Buenos Aires 
Convention, policymakers in Washington quickly realized that the exchanges might 
never materialize if they insisted on true reciprocity. Some Latin American governments 
simply could not afford to participate. Thus the strict one-to-one ratio implied by 
―reciprocity‖ was relaxed to give the programs a chance to succeed.
16
  
Officials also applied similarly loose interpretations ―cooperative‖ and 
―exchange‖ during this time. Policymakers in Washington might claim that the various 
exchanges were truly cooperative, but ultimately it seems clear that the primary goal was 
more one-sided—to transmit knowledge from the United States to Latin America. The 
ultimate goal remained to generate consent to U.S. dominance. In order to increase the 
cooperative nature of the program, officials at the OCIAA, and the newly created Inter-
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American Educational Foundation, ratified bilateral agreements with the nations of Latin 
America that required these governments to contribute financially to support their 
grantees.  
The year 1945 brought another series of bureaucratic adjustments as officials 
modified programs to fit the postwar world. Some argued that the direct connection 
between the Department of State and the exchange programs should be limited to shield 
the programs from accusations of propaganda, and to enlist the expertise of organizations 
with more experience in education. As a result, that year policymakers transferred to the 
Office of Education the administrative responsibilities for the graduate student exchange 
program of the IIE. This shift of responsibilities freed State Department resources to 
expand its Foreign Leader Program to Latin America during the Cold War. Ultimately, 
then, the constant refinement of the policies and procedures governing the various 
exchange programs, in order to facilitate continued support of U.S. hegemony in the 
postwar world, marked the 1943 to 1945 period. 
A decline in Congressional appropriations for the exchange programs 
characterized the third phase, which lasted from 1946 to 1948. The emphasis of U.S. 
foreign policy now shifted from Latin America, to Europe and Asia. By 1948, funding 
had reached the lowest point of the postwar era.
17
 Yet the programs developed by the 
Coordinator‘s Office and the Division of Cultural Relations served as models for those 
developed by the United States in the rest of the Third World. The passage of new 
legislation by the U.S. Congress also created new programs, such as the Fulbright 
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Program, which policymakers modeled on these earlier programs with Latin America. 
Thus, despite a drop-off in Congressional appropriations for the wartime Latin American 
programs, the innovative partnerships established by officials at the Coordinator‘s Office, 
the Division of Cultural Relations and the IIE served as models for a variety of new 
programs worldwide. 
 From 1940 to 1948, U.S. Embassy officials in Ecuador worked with local elites to 
keep pace with the evolving exchange opportunities. Describing Ecuadorians as generally 
―friendly toward the United States,‖ these officials argued that ―assuring the continuation 
and intensification of this attitude is the basic aim of our cultural and informational 
program in Ecuador.‖
18
 In many ways, Ecuador was at the vanguard of the developing 
cultural programs under examination here. In 1940, the rector of the Catholic University 
of Quito, Dr. Aurelio Espinosa Polit, was the first Latin American leader to receive a 
travel grant under the Buenos Aires Convention. In 1942, the American School of Quito 




 As in the case of the Galápagos base, the U.S. and Ecuadorian policymakers who 
worked the hardest to ensure that U.S.-Ecuadorian relations remained strong were those 
who believed in the mission of the United States. In the United States, these were 
officials who above all else wanted to ensure hemispheric solidarity—a goal shared by 
some Ecuadorian elites. Many of these Ecuadorians also supported U.S. policies in order 
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to maximize gains for their country. They believed that the basic ideologies and 
principles underlying U.S. policies would benefit Ecuador and Ecuadorians. Through the 
efforts of these policymakers in Quito and in Washington, the number of Ecuadorians 
studying and training in the United States grew dramatically from 1940 to 1948. In 1942, 
the American School of Quito was the only American School in South America to 
receive funding from the U.S. government (the other two schools mentioned above were 
in Central America.) Along with the establishment of the U.S. military bases on the 
Galápagos and in Salinas, these developments in U.S.-Ecuadorian cultural relations 
marked a turning point in the solidification of U.S. hegemony in Latin America. 
 The American School of Quito served as a model for U.S. policymakers who 
argued in favor of federal support for American schools in Latin America. The majority 
of the students at the school were Ecuadorians from wealthy families whose parents 
wanted a good, non-denominational education for their children.
20
 To policymakers in 
Washington and Quito, the American School in Quito was in a unique position to 
influence positively the future leaders of Ecuador, while simultaneously improving 
hemispheric solidarity by discrediting the fascist ideologies taught in the German School 
of Quito. Unlike the exchange programs, however, the American School was not 
primarily the creation of U.S. officials. Rather it was an Ecuadorian, Galo Plaza Lasso, 
who had taken the lead in establishing the school. 
 In January 1939, Galo Plaza, then serving as the Minister of National Defense, 
met with Laurence Duggan who was touring South America. Reporting that there was a 
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movement underway to open an American School in Quito, Galo Plaza claimed that as 
many as one hundred Ecuadorian children eagerly anticipated the opportunity to enroll so 
that they could learn enough English to continue their education in the United States.
21
 
Galo Plaza had long been interested in education in the United States, and he himself had 
attended several U.S. universities as a young man. He pointed out that Ecuadorian 
children attending schools in the United States often faced challenges because of their 
limited training in English. Galo Plaza wanted his children and the children of ―other 
Ecuadorans who think as he [did]‖ to have the opportunity to attend a good American 
School.
22
 He hoped that the establishment of an American school in Quito would 
influence the current situation under which Ecuadorian elites had to choose between 
sending their children either to a public school, or a private Catholic or German one. 
Under the present situation, some officials in the Ecuadorian government, including Galo 
Plaza himself, elected to send their children to the German school in order to provide 
them with a high-quality, secular education.
23
 By 1939, then, Galo Plaza had already 
established himself as an influential Ecuadorian who generally supported U.S. policies. 
The story of his efforts to start the American School of Quito reveals that he was not 
alone in this support. 
Working closely with Galo Plaza, Ambassador Boaz Long contacted Richard 
Pattee, the Acting Chief of the Division of Cultural Relations, to advise him of the plan to 
open an American school of Quito, and to report that Galo Plaza was seeking help in 
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securing qualified teachers for the new school. Pattee responded to Long‘s message with 
interest, asking that he keep the State Department informed of any developments in the 
situation. He suggested that Long forward the question of locating teachers to the IIE.
24
 
While Pattee and others at the Department of State realized the value of the American 
Schools, at this point they had difficulty procuring funding for the schools. This of course 
was before the attack on Pearl Harbor, when the pressure to secure the hemisphere was 
not as great as it would later become.  
Despite the lack of U.S. aid, Galo Plaza and Ambassador Long moved quickly to 
open the school. In the spring of 1940, the founders of the American School of Quito 
hired Hazel Johnson and her husband-to-be Robert Tucker to run the school. By May, 
school founders had collected all of the funds needed to open the school, thanks to one 
hundred Ecuadorian families who had pledged their own money.
25
 Clearly other 
Ecuadorian elites agreed with Galo Plaza, and wanted their children to attend an 
American school. The Tuckers arrived in Quito in August, and the American School of 
Quito opened its doors to around 135 students on 14 October 1940.
26
 
The majority of the students at the American school were Ecuadorian, and with 
the exception of courses in Ecuadorian history and geography, teachers conducted all 
classes in English.
27
 In addition to the regular academic courses, students also enjoyed 
classes in dancing and music. Faculty at the school also offered a variety of cultural 
programs, including celebrations for Pan American Day, Health Day, Oriente Day, 
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Halloween, Christmas, and Fourth of July radio broadcasts.
28
 The cultural impact of the 
American School thus extended beyond the classroom. According to Ambassador Long 
―if it meets with the hoped for success, [the school] should be a most valuable 
development in improving cultural relations between the United States and Ecuador.‖
29
 
Long‘s report to Washington generated some interest at the Department of State, where, 
according to the Chief of the Division of Cultural Relations, Charles Thompson, officials 
were preparing to survey the situation in other Latin American countries to determine 




 In the spring of 1941, inspired by Embassy reports concerning the ―increasingly 
dangerous influence of German Schools in Latin America,‖ officials at the Coordinator‘s 
Office sent Andrew Corry to Latin America to conduct a survey of American schools.
31
 
Corry‘s primary assignment was to determine the advisability of funding these schools to 
serve as ―counter-influence[s]‖ to German and Spanish schools in the region.
32
 Over the 
next year, Corry visited twenty Latin American republics and gathered data on over 400 
American-sponsored schools.
33
 In each country, he analyzed the basic history, 
educational aims, and funding of the schools.
34
 In his final report, ―Memoir Proposing 
American-Sponsored School Program, 1942-1943,‖ Corry began by pointing out that 
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funds for education were limited in most Latin American countries. This meant that many 
Latin American governments openly welcomed private schools to share the burden of 
educating their citizens. Private schools attracted the patronage of elite Latin American 
families because, compared with public schools, private schools had better physical 
plants and equipment, as well as more advanced and varied course offerings—all of 
which Corry referred to as the ―prestige-winning factors‖ of the schools.  
 Corry next pointed out that around one-third of these private schools were 
foreign-sponsored, and that these particular schools played an important role in 
strengthening cultural relations since: 
with the second language it brings the thoughts of the sponsoring group. If well
 presented, its courses on their culture cannot fail to form an attractive, 
 sympathetic picture of the sponsoring nation and its citizens. The associations and 
 friendships it forms among students, and their elders, are the very basic stuff of 




As with the exchange programs, those elites who advocated for increased cultural 
programs considered the ―associations and friendships‖ that could be developed at an 
American school or through an exchange experience to be some of the most significant 
factors in strengthening U.S.-Latin American relations. Foreign-sponsored schools could 
thus exert great influence on the students of elite Latin American families, many of 
whom were the future leaders of their nations. 
 There were a variety of foreign-sponsored schools operating in Latin America 
when Corry arrived to conduct his survey—Britain, the United States, Japan, Spain, and 
Germany all had schools scattered throughout the hemisphere. It was the Axis-sponsored 
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schools, however, that most worried Corry and officials in Washington. Corry estimated 
that throughout Latin America there were roughly 888 Axis-sponsored schools, which 
were educating twice as many students as American Schools in the region. Three-quarters 
of these schools were German, one-sixth Japanese, and one-tenth Italian.
36
  
 The relatively large number of German schools, combined with Hitler‘s victories 
in Europe, meant that these schools became the primary targets of U.S. efforts to use 
education to offset Axis influence in the hemisphere. The Germans in Latin America 
were clearly taking advantage of the opportunities to open schools in Latin America. 
They did so, according to Corry, in order to strengthen the communities of Germans and 
German-connected nationals living in Latin America, and to indoctrinate local 
―collaborators.‖ Corry considered these schools to be a direct threat to hemispheric 
solidarity since they ―were chosen by the Axis powers to secure the active cooperation of 
Latin American states, or failing that, to weaken the present and future bases for inter-
American collaboration by cementing firm bonds of interest between their ruling classes 
and the Totalitarian would-be lords of the ‗Heartland‘.‖
37
  
 Whether German policy regarding German Schools in Latin America was ever as 
organized or deliberate as Corry suggested, one thing does seem clear—by the time Corry 
arrived in Latin America, Latin Americans considered the German schools to be some of 
the most prestigious schools in the region. The German School of Quito certainly enjoyed 
this distinction. Corry attributed German successes in this realm to the integration of 
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German Schools abroad with the Reich‘s domestic educational program, and to the 
funding that these schools received from the German government. All German School 
teachers passed through a centralized teacher-training program that included classes 
focused on teaching in Latin America. Once they graduated, students of the German 
Schools in Latin America received diplomas signed by Reich officials granting them the 
same ―rights and privileges‖ of graduates living in Germany.
38
 The German government 
also generously funded the schools by collecting taxes from German citizens and 
directing this money to the schools. School administrators used these funds to construct 
impressive physical plants and to hire qualified teachers—two things that the American 




If officials in Washington wanted to challenge the influence of the German 
schools, Corry concluded that they needed to do something quickly since all of the 
American schools he visited throughout the region were ―deficient in one or more 
respects.‖ Corry argued that the lack of financial support for American Schools by the 
U.S. Government was the root cause of the inability of these schools to compete with the 
German Schools.
40
 American Schools in the region were less centrally organized than 
their German competition and, prior to 1942, none of them received funding from the 
U.S. government. They all relied instead on private foundations and organizations for 
funding. As a result, roughly 92 percent of the students at American Schools in Latin 
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 Despite their economic problems, however, Corry and those he 
interviewed saw great promise in the American Schools. As one headmaster put it, these 
schools were ―an educational bridge between two cultures‖ since they offered training in 
English and other courses similar to those offered in the United States. According to 
Corry, American schools could ―challenge directly‖ the Axis-sponsored schools since 
they ―exert an immediate and lasting effect upon socially and politically significant 
elements in the other American republics.‖ Corry estimated that in the previous year 
alone, 59,000 students attended American schools in Latin America, and 50,000 of those 
went to school in the ten South American countries, including Ecuador. As evidence that 
the American schools were reaching the target audience, Corry reported that 95 percent 
of these students were nationals of the host countries. Despite these numbers, attendance 




So that the American schools could attract the patronage of ―upper-class 
elements‖ in Latin America, and form ―strong and mutually-beneficial cultural ties 
between them and United States residents of the republics,‖ Corry urged Washington to 
begin funding these schools.
43
 Ideally, according to Corry, this aid would not continue 
indefinitely, but rather it would make the schools self-sustaining. The immediate goals of 
U.S. aid would be to improve those areas of the school that contributed most directly to 
the ―prestige factor‖—the physical plant facilities, equipment and teaching staff. If 
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enough private and governmental funding could be secured, then school administrators 
could construct ―first-class bi-national schools—first-class in plant, in equipment, in 
staff, in curriculum‖ to replace ―the pro-German school influences among upper-class or 
leading nationals‖ in several strategic cities in Latin America.
44
  
In Ecuador, Corry reported that ―the stabilization of The American School of 
Quito on a permanent basis is the most important activity of short- or long-range 
significance which could be undertaken involving the field of Cultural Relations in 
Ecuador.‖ Corry praised the school, saying that in the first two years of operations, local 
parents ―have begun to change their attitude towards American culture, to appreciate its 
merits and to realize its relational values in connection with their own country and its 
culture.‖
 45
 The American School of Quito seemed to be in a position to counter the 
influence of the German School in Quito, which had developed a reputation among 
Ecuadorian elites as the best non-denominational, private school in the country. Corry 
recommended spending roughly $313,950 over a period of five years to help improve the 
facilities of the school by creating a permanent physical plant. After that, he anticipated 
that the American School of Quito would be stable enough to be self-sustaining without 
U.S. capital. 
Corry was not the only one requesting aid for the American School of Quito, as 
the Tuckers had already written to Ambassador Long seeking funding. As the heads of 
the school, the Tuckers were concerned about rumors circulating in Quito that the 
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German school was about to be closed by the Minister of Education in Ecuador. With the 
forced shutdown of SEDTA the previous summer, it seemed likely that the Ecuadorian 
government would indeed dissolve the German School. The Tuckers worried that the 
closing of the school would mean a rush of new students that the American school would 
not be able to accommodate. They reported that a number of former German school 
students had already enrolled because their parents had become ―disgusted with the 
methods in that institution and fearful of the results of their educational philosophy.‖  
The Tuckers asked for immediate funds to erect emergency classrooms on school 
property, arguing that, despite the Coordinator‘s Office expressed interest in their project, 
the current situation could not wait for the slow-moving bureaucracy to release the 
money.
46
 Ambassador Long agreed with the Tuckers, and he recommended to Hull that 
Washington give the school a gift of $200,000 to buy the land, and to construct the new 
buildings to make it ―a powerful factor for good.‖
 47
 In the end, however, Washington 
released only $6,000 a year for two years for this project.
48
 While this amount was not 
nearly enough to solve the financial problems of the school, it was more than most 
American schools in the region received from the U.S. government at this time. 
Despite financial difficulties, the Tuckers reported that they had made great 
progress over the past three years in ―establishing the [American] school as one no longer 
on an experimental basis.‖
49
 There were now 250 students studying in the primary and 
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the new secondary school (seventh grade only).
50
 In addition to the $6000 received from 
the Coordinator‘s Office, the school received grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, the 
South American Development Company, the Cotopaxi Exploration Company, and the 
Shell Oil Company. These funds, as well as the fees collected for tuition and other 
expenses, paid for the majority of the operating expenses of the school. Officials used 
some of this money to expand three classrooms, to construct a new brick building, and to 
create a new sports field. These improvements seemed to have had an effect on the 
―prestige-winning factors‖ identified by Corry. According to Duggan, the American 
School in Quito had successfully surpassed the German school in prestige, and would 
soon welcome one hundred new students.
51
  
 While officials in Washington and Quito acknowledged that the Tuckers and the 
other American school administrators were doing a fine job in turning the school into one 
that successfully supplanted the German school, there was one serious challenge that 
continually threatened the continuation of the school—finding and hiring qualified 
teachers. Writing to Duggan, Ambassador Long pointed out that of the five teachers hired 
for the fall of 1941, three had already left Ecuador by June 1942 because of the low pay. 
Being paid $75 a month for only eight months out of the year meant that teachers 
generally looked for summer employment elsewhere. Many teachers discovered that 
Americans working for the U.S. Embassy and for U.S. companies in Ecuador were often 
making more than twice the teachers‘ salaries, despite having less formal education.
52
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 With living costs in Ecuador ―rising tremendously‖ and higher paying jobs 
opening in the various sectors booming because of the war, the Tuckers found it 
impossible to pay teachers competitive salaries. Despite an increase in the teacher salaries 
for 1943, nobody had applied in the past few months. Because of the financial situation 
of the school, the Tuckers commented that ―we doubt if we can even get adventure-
seekers at the salary we are prepared to offer. There is plenty of adventure to be found in 
the world today and for higher salaries.‖ The Tuckers planned to re-open the school soon 
for the upcoming school year, but, according to them, this would be nearly impossible 
without new American teachers.
53
 
Thus, despite the interest of Ecuadorian and U.S. elites in supporting the 
American School of Quito, they never really solved the financial problems of the school 
during this period. In 1943, the Tuckers asked for an extension on the use of the $6,000 
granted the school the previous year, explaining that inflation in Ecuador, which was part 
of the wartime experience for many living in Latin America, meant that the $6,000 
earmarked for the construction of new classrooms was now not enough to cover 
construction.
54
 After visiting the school in 1944, Roy Tasco Davis, the president of the 
Association of American Schools in Latin America, recommended to the American 
Council on Education and to the Department of State that the government give the 
American School of Quito a ―large-scale‖ grant in-aid so that it could become self-
supporting as soon as possible. Davis, Scotten, and officials from the school calculated 
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that $103,851.75 would solve the problem and ―satisfy local demands for American 
education of efficiency and prestige and maintain a deeply rooted influence in favor of 
American life and culture.‖
 55
 Washington never honored this request. With a rising 
enrollment and improved facilities, officials in Washington and Quito could now focus 
their attention on other educational programs.  
While officials hoped that American Schools would influence future leaders, they 
also developed an increasingly complex system of educational exchange programs in 
order to target current leaders. These exchange programs provided funding for Latin 
American students, professors, and other leaders to come to the United States to pursue 
advanced training and education. They offered grantees an immediate opportunity to 
experience what the American Schools promised for the future; a chance to study in the 
United States. Officials from Latin America and the United States hoped that these 
exchanges would reach a broader audience than just the children of elites. 
During the first phase, the educational exchange programs with Ecuador and the 
rest of Latin America developed slowly. With the entrance of the United States into the 
Second World War, officials at the State Department sent a memo to the various U.S. 
embassies in Latin America announcing that the exchange of persons programs would 
continue despite the war emergency.
56
 Yet, while the 1936 Buenos Aires Convention 
called for each country to submit panels of professors who would then travel to the 
United States, so far no applications had reached Washington. Since the sending country 
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was responsible for all travel costs, U.S. officials wondered if perhaps the ongoing war 
was the reason for this silence. Although Latin American professors were not at this point 
traveling to the United States, however, Latin American students from every ratifying 
country except Honduras had made the trip.
 57
 The student exchange was also limited, 
though, since some countries had not yet selected any U.S. graduate students for study 
abroad. 
In addition to the region-wide problem of trying to secure panels of exchange 
professors from Latin America, Ambassador Scotten and other officials running the 
program in Ecuador faced unique difficulties. Despite the increase in scholarships 
awarded to Ecuadorians, the geographic distribution of the scholarship recipients worried 
some. The majority of the grantees came from Quito—56 versus seventeen from 
Guayaquil, and six from Cuenca. This problem threatened the exchange programs 
throughout this era because it exacerbated traditional divisions between coastal and 
highland elites in Ecuador.
58
 While policymakers designed the exchange programs to 
operate outside of the realm of domestic politics, issues such as the uneven distribution of 
grants enmeshed the programs within domestic power struggles. 
Addressing this uneven distribution became part of a larger effort, beginning in 
December 1942, to expand the scope of the exchange programs with Ecuador and the rest 
of Latin America. Alfred Nester, the Cultural Affairs Officer at the U.S. Embassy in 
Quito, reported to Secretary of State Hull that his staff had created two new information 
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centers in Guayaquil and Cuenca in order to disseminate information regarding the 
scholarships. In his report to Washington, Ambassador Long argued that these cultural 
centers should help offset the ―appalling lack of knowledge regarding awards and 
consequent confusion and misunderstanding,‖ especially outside of the capital city.
59
 
With this completed, Long hoped that Ecuadorians would come to the United States ―not 
in twos or threes but in large numbers.‖ He pointed out that the biggest challenge would 
be to keep Ecuadorians in Ecuador once they returned from their studies in the United 
States.
60
 This problem surfaced again in a few years during the tumultuous Glorious 
Revolution that returned Velasco Ibarra to power. 
Throughout this first phase, officials in the United States and the nations of Latin 
America attempted to fix technical problems with the educational exchange programs 
when they arose. One step in this process was to analyze closely the effectiveness of each 
program. Reporting from Ecuador, Ambassador Long argued that he and his staff had not 
yet carefully studied the results in terms of ―friendliness towards the United States and 
the wise use of the knowledge and skill that they facilitated.‖ He guessed, however, that 
the program had engendered greater friendliness, and that participants would soon be 
using their skills wisely. In his report, Long did highlight a recent summer school trip to 
the University of Michigan that resulted in the establishment of a Quito Michigan Club, 
―which is intensely interested in all things American.‖
61
 It was these types of personal 
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contacts between Ecuadorians and U.S. citizens that many elites throughout the 
hemisphere hoped to foster.  
Measuring the precise affect of these contacts, however, would take time and 
further study. It was one thing to view the growing number of exchange participants as 
evidence of success. During this period of solidifying U.S. hegemony, policymakers 
certainly welcomed this news. Yet higher numbers did not necessarily mean that the 
exchange experience was having the desired effect on each participant. Because of this, 
officials continued to push for further refinement and expansion of the exchange 
programs. Until they could collect and analyze more detailed data, officials in Quito and 
in Washington focused on increasing the opportunities for Ecuadorians to study and train 
in the United States.
62
  
As with other aspects of U.S.-Latin American relations, policymakers began 
discussing the postwar future of the exchange programs as early as 1943 as Allied 
victories mounted. Further changes in the bureaucratic structure administering these 
programs by officials working to maintain wartime solidarity marked this second phase. 
At this point, policymakers transferred to the Division of Cultural Relations the bulk of 
the cultural programs of the Coordinator‘s Office.
63
 As part of the effort to expand 
exchange opportunities, representatives from the United States and the nations of Latin 
America gathered in Panama City in September 1943 for the Conference of Ministers and 
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Directors of Education of the American Republics.
64
 The delegates debated ways to 
expand the programs instituted under the Buenos Aires Convention. The resulting 1943 
convention called for each Latin American government to ratify a bilateral exchange 
agreement with the United Sates. Participating governments would then establish a 
servicio within the local Ministry of Education to run the program, and both the United 
States and the local government would fund the servicio.
65
 By establishing an 
organization within each foreign government, U.S. officials hoped to avoid charges of 
meddling in the affairs of Latin American nations, and to project an aura of cooperation. 
In the United States, officials at the Office of Inter-American Affairs established 
the Inter-American Educational Foundation to handle the exchange programs called for 
in the Buenos Aires Convention. In collaboration with the Ministries of Education of the 
American Republics, foundation officials focused on developing and improving 
educational facilities in Latin America.
66
 Working together to reduce illiteracy, to 
improve primary, secondary, and normal schools, and to expand the teaching of English, 
and vocational training, these elites hoped to enhance the earning power and improve the 
health conditions among the ―low-income‖ populations of Latin America. Ideally, rising 
literacy levels would also create a ―more enlightened public opinion.‖ Once properly 
educated and informed, this public would then, officials hoped, resist totalitarian 
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 Policymakers designed the agreements under this new exchange program to 
last three years, and each would involve the loan of U.S. specialists, the training of Latin 
American specialists in the United States and the joint creation of educational materials.
68
 
While ostensibly a mutual exchange program attuned to the specific needs of each 
country, as with earlier ―reciprocal‖ programs, officials chose training methods that 
would primarily train Latin Americans in the ways of the United States. As Kenneth 
Holland from the Coordinator‘s Office argued, education in Latin America had a 
―cultural and classical‖ emphasis while that in the United States was more ―technical and 
scientific.‖
69
 At a time when the United States was showing the world its strength and 
efficiency, the assumption was that the ―technical‖ and the ―scientific‖ were attributes to 
be emulated. These characteristics were also hallmarks of the Axis powers. Thus officials 
emphasized both technical and scientific knowledge in their efforts to offset Axis 
influence in the region. 
As elites in the United States and Latin America worked to perfect the exchange 
programs, the number of scholarships allowing Ecuadorians to travel to the United States 
continued to grow. From October 1942 to October 1943, 150 Ecuadorian grantees 
traveled to the United States. This was a considerable jump in numbers from the 163 who 
had traveled to the United States during the previous two years combined. Seventy-seven 
of those 150 Ecuadorians received grants from U.S. agencies, while many of the others 
received travel money from the Ecuadorian government. Twenty-two of those seventy-
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seven were students, eight of them were laborers, and the rest were government officials 
or professional men—physicians, educators, teachers, army officers, journalists, 
engineers, and pilots.
70
 Thus the exchange programs attracted a cross-section of 
Ecuadorian society. In addition to those receiving official support, 56 private travelers 
from Ecuador had also come to the United States, with 24 of them receiving some form 
of U.S. financial aid.
71
  
The exchange program between the United States and Ecuador appeared to be 
progressing nicely; yet political turmoil in Ecuador threatened to slow this progress. In 
May 1944, José María Velasco Ibarra ousted Carlos Arroyo del Rio in the so-called 
Glorious Revolution. Velasco Ibarra‘s victory was due at least in part to claims that 
President Arroyo del Rio had sold out to the United States through his ratification of the 
Rio Protocol. By the time his term was over, Arroyo del Rio had expressed his desire to 
sign a bilateral exchange agreement with the United States as part of the Buenos Aires 
Convention program. In general, though, the record of the Arroyo del Rio Administration 
concerning education was not stellar. As president, Arroyo del Rio had made some 
―outstanding gestures in the cultural field,‖ yet during his tenure ―educational and 
cultural activities as a whole had been under a political shadow, teaching elements and 
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In 1943, the ―political shadow‖ reached a new level when President Arroyo del 
Rio began insisting that U.S. Embassy officials obtain his approval concerning the list of 
Ecuadorian candidates chosen for exchange grants before they awarded the grants. 
According to Ambassador Scotten, Arroyo del Rio was trying to prohibit certain political 
adversaries from securing travel grants. The president ordered Leopoldo Benites, a 
leading journalist and opponent of Arroyo del Rio, arrested and jailed far from Quito in 
the northern coastal town of Esmeraldas. Arroyo del Rio had reportedly learned of 
Benites‘s upcoming trip to the United States, sponsored by the National Press Club in 
Washington. Although Arroyo del Rio eventually released Benites, he did so a few days 
after the other Ecuadorian journalists selected for the trip had departed. Benites was thus 
left behind. It seemed that President Arroyo del Rio was similarly concerned about the 
upcoming trips of journalist Jorge Reyes, and professor Benjamin Carrion. Carrion was a 
leading Ecuadorian author and former secretary general of the Socialist Party of Ecuador. 
Following the publication of a series of his articles in El Comercio in which he called on 
Ecuadorians to look to their indigenous past to discover their true identity, Arroyo del 
Rio had vetoed Carrion‘s nomination as rector of the Central University in Quito.
73
 While 
Arroyo del Rio did not arrest Carrion as he had done with Benites, clearly Carrion was no 
friend of the president.
74
  
The arresting of grantees was embarrassing and potentially damaging to U.S.-
Ecuadorian relations. In the hopes of preventing future incidents, embassy officials 
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acceded to Arroyo del Rio‘s request, and presented the president with a list of candidates 
for his approval. Scotten ensured Hull, however, that the president was not involved in 
the actual selection process, nor did he nominate candidates. He simply approved the 
final list. The ambassador suspected that the president was motivated to take such actions 
because of his ―indifference to or positive animosity towards the Scholarship Selection 
Committee.‖ The committee included Galo Plaza Lasso, Julio Paredes and Benjamin 
Carrion. While Galo Plaza‘s political views were generally in-line with Arroyo del Rio‘s, 
Carrion was not the president‘s favorite person. According to Scotten, Arroyo del Rio 
had appointed Julio Paredes to the in order to add balance. Reportedly a ―tool of the 
president,‖ Paredes served as the committee chairman. Despite this, he had been 
―distinctly inactive‖ in committee operations. This suggested to the ambassador a more 




While trying to be respectful of the Arroyo del Rio administration, Scotten and 
others at the embassy tried to figure out a way to correct this problem. They realized that 
the current situation restricted the field of qualified candidates by omitting cultural 
leaders simply because they were political enemies of the current administration.
76
 If the 
exchange programs were to be successful in the long-term, the most qualified and 
influential Ecuadorians had to have the chance to participate, regardless of their political 
affiliations. The current situation could also cause political problems since by involving 
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President Arroyo del Rio in the selection process, no matter at what stage, critics could 
charge that the United States was ―mixing in local politics by unduly favoring the present 
administration.‖ Officials in Washington hoped to avoid this type of criticism during this 
Good Neighbor era. Fortunately for the United States, this problem resolved itself thanks 
to Velasco Ibarra and his Glorious Revolution.
77
 
In its immediate aftermath, however, the sudden change of administrations 
brought on by Velasco Ibarra‘s revolution worried officials in Washington. As with the 
negotiations over the Galápagos base, these policymakers were not sure if Velasco Ibarra 
would continue the negotiations begun by Arroyo del Rio for a bilateral exchange 
agreement. In Ecuador, however, Velasco Ibarra‘s coup ―aroused great optimism and 
fervor,‖ as the local press reported that the new president would seek ―national 
reconstruction‖ through education. Education reform was often part of a Velasco Ibarra 
administration. The new president planned to accomplish this with a variety of laws and 
decrees aimed at ending illiteracy and expanding opportunities for higher education, 
including the establishment of a new night school at the Centro Ecuatoriano-
Norteamericano.
78
 Officials in Washington were cautious, however, since Velasco Ibarra 
had never made a secret of his cultural allegiances—he clearly favored Europe over the 
United States. Ambassador Scotten warned that all of Velasco Ibarra‘s proclamations 
regarding education were generally political in nature. Yet he remained optimistic, saying 
that ―a deep show of interest on its part in education would offer a sharp contrast with the 
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attitude of most previous Governments.‖
79
 Shortly after assuming power the Velasco 
Ibarra administration began showing its intent. 
On 20 November 1944, the Ecuadorian Minister of Education Alfredo Vera 
―expressed emphatic immediate interest‖ in signing a cooperative exchange agreement 
with the OCIAA.
80
 The minister also emphasized the desire that ―the popular 
Government that rules the destinies of the country has in fomenting in the most ample 
manner cultural relations between our countries with the noble and disinterested object of 
knowing each other better and of sincerely serving the cause of democracy.‖ According 
to this lofty rhetoric, the Velasco Ibarra administration considered strengthened cultural 
ties with the United States to be part of its populist mandate. With this display of 
friendship on the part of the president, Holland and Vera signed the bilateral agreement 
on 22 January 1945, with both governments praising the other for its efforts in 
strengthening the ties between Ecuador and the United States.
81
  
With the agreement ratified, the number of Ecuadorians traveling to the United 
States increased. In his 1944 report on the Student-Scholarship program for Ecuador, 
cultural attaché Dominic de la Salandra reported that 181 Ecuadorian students had come 
to the United States to pursue professional or academic studies From October 1943 to 
October 1944.
82
 Seventy-six of those students financed their own trip, while forty 
received grants from the Ecuadorian government, and sixty-five received funds 
(scholarships, fellowships and travel grants) from U.S. sources. These numbers revealed 
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a shift in the scholarship program, with seven times as many Ecuadorians receiving local 
grants compared with the previous year. The number of those receiving U.S. grants, on 
the other hand, had dropped. Salandra could not explain this development since U.S. 
agencies were reportedly still interested in funding the exchanges. On a positive note, he 
argued that the relatively high number of Ecuadorians who had been willing to finance 
their own trip indicated ―a realization on the part of Ecuadorans of the advantages to be 
gained from a training obtained in the United States, advantages of a national as well as 
personal nature.‖ This realization seemed to extend to the Ecuadorian government as well 
since the increase in the number of local grants suggested to Salandra that Ecuadorian 
officials were also ―conscious of the advantages accruing from an American training.‖ 
This kind of progress pleased officials in Washington.
83
 
Despite the continued development of the exchange programs, however, technical 
difficulties still plagued daily operations. In their most idealistic form, these exchange 
programs existed outside of the world of politics. Yet as with the case of the distribution 
of awards in Ecuador, the reality was at times different. Because most officials involved 
in the exchange programs recognized that the goals were long-term in nature, they 
worked hard to adjust the existing programs to the emerging postwar world. In 1945, the 
American Consul General in Ecuador, Joseph F. Burt, reported that many Ecuadorian 
grantees were now unwilling to re-establish themselves in Ecuador after their period of 
study or training in the United States ended.
84
 This was a problem, since one of the long-
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term goals was to modernize Ecuador by training local leaders in the practices of the 
United States. These leaders, it was assumed, would then share with their fellow 
Ecuadorians what they had learned once they returned home. If the scholarship recipients 
refused to work in Ecuador after their stay in the United States, this crucial link in the 
modernization process would be broken.  
Burt described two recipients of trade scholarships given jobs by an ―American 
concern‖ upon their return to Ecuador. Both men were earning salaries ―considerably in 
excess‖ of what they had earned before their training in the United States. Yet both men 
had recently applied for immigration visas to the United States because they were ―so 
thoroughly discouraged about conditions in Ecuador.‖
 85
 These trainees felt that their 
futures, and the futures of their families, would be more secure in the United States. Burt 
insisted that the cases described in his report were not exceptional, yet he did not entirely 
blame the trainees for their reluctance to stay in Ecuador. He confirmed that the 
―recurring political problems‖ mentioned by several of the trainees did in fact make life 
complicated in Ecuador. This was, of course, around the time of the Glorious Revolution 
when street demonstrations and economic inflation disrupted daily life. Perhaps 
understandably, short-term concerns of security and stability for themselves and their 
families trumped long-term goals for many of the Ecuadorians brought to the United 
States for training. As with the problem of political meddling, the most that officials 
seemed able to do at this point was to wait and hope that the problem resolved itself. 
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 Not all Ecuadorian grantees refused to work in Ecuador after their experience in 
the United States. In 1941, Dr. Emilio Uzcátegui, a ―prominent person‖ in Ecuadorian 
teaching circles, traveled to the United States under the auspices of the American 
Association of Schools of Social Work.
86
 This was not Dr. Uzcátegui‘s first trip to the 
United States, however. From 1930 to 1931 he had studied education at Teacher‘s 
College at Columbia University in New York. Upon his return to Ecuador, Uzcátegui 
served as a Senator, and continued his work in the field of education. Yet despite the fact 
that he had studied in the United States, Dr. Uzcátegui reportedly made ―no effort to hide 
the fact that so long as he considered that American foreign policy followed an 
imperialistic trend he was anti-American.‖
87
 While some officials in Washington seemed 
to assume that contact with the United States alone would somehow change a person‘s 
anti-Americanism, clearly the reality could be more complicated. The report did not 
reveal whether or not the awarding of a travel grant to Uzcátegui was a direct effort to 
change his anti-Americanism—such efforts were made later under the Foreign Leader 
Program—but according to Salandra, the trip changed Uzcátegui‘s opinion of the United 
States. 
 During his one-month stay in the United States, Uzcátegui visited schools of 
social work, observed social workers in the field, and conferred with representatives from 
the American Association of Schools of Social Work.
88
 He also met with officials from 
the Children‘s Bureau and other governmental agencies to discuss health and welfare 
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issues. The goals of these meetings were to develop ―practical plans‖ for an expanded 
interchange of information and experience, utilization of teaching materials, and 
development of exchange fellowships and professors between Ecuador and the United 
States. Apparently Uzcátegui‘s trip had been a success; he was now described as ―one of 
the most effective friends of the United States to be found in Ecuador.‖ He published an 
article in El Comercio titled ―We Must Help the United States‖ following the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor, as well as a collection of his writings called ―At War Against 
Nazism‖ in which he argued for hemispheric solidarity against Axis ideologies. 
Uzcátegui also used his political connections to help establish the Night School of the 
Centro Ecuatoriano-Norteamericano of Quito, of which he served as director. According 
to Salandra, ―all evidence seems to indicate that Dr. Uzcátegui will continue in the future 
to work toward a better understanding between the United States and Ecuador.‖
89
  
 While Uzcátegui was an established member of the intellectual elite in Ecuador at 
the time of his U.S. visit, Dr. Feliz Miguel Albornoz was still a graduate student when he 
traveled to the United States. Thanks to a Roosevelt Fellowship obtained from the IIE, 
the 27-year old Albornoz came to the United States to study journalism at Columbia 
University during the 1942 to 1943 school year.
90
 At the time of his trip, Albornoz was a 
high-school teacher in Quito, as well as a contributing writer for El Comercio. While in 
the United States Albornoz worked as the New York correspondent for the Quito daily, 
writing articles about the United States at war that ―helped a great deal to increase the 
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pro-American tone of El Comercio at a time when that tone was not very strongly 
marked.‖
91
 He also worked as a reporter for United Press and as head of the Latin 
American publicity department of the CIAA programs while living in New York. Clearly 
busy with school and work, Albornoz somehow found the time also to start an 
Ecuadorian Students‘ Association at Columbia. 
 Albornoz continued to impress embassy officials after he returned to Ecuador. As 
he had done in New York, he published a series of articles ―favorable to the United 
States‖ for El Comercio. Now working as the assistant director of the paper, Albornoz 
was putting into practice the techniques that he had learned in the United States. 
Advertisements had disappeared from the front page of the paper, while there was a 
greater emphasis now on ―news reporting‖ rather than general observation as ―there is a 
movement away from the philosophical and sentimental columnizing in which local 
newspapers so largely deal.‖
92
 As with the previously discussed analysis of education in 
Latin America by Kenneth Holland, which contrasted the ―cultural and classical‖ with the 
―technical and scientific,‖ policymakers considered a move away from the 
―philosophical‖ and ―sentimental‖ to be an improvement.  
 Perhaps because of Albornoz‘s work at the paper, in 1944 the Columbia School of 
Journalism awarded the Mary Moors Cabot prize in journalism to El Comercio. Presented 
annually to Latin American newspapers that helped to foster inter-American unity, the 
award signaled the approval of journalism elites in the United States for the work done by 
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Albornoz and his staff. According to Salandra, this award was further evidence that 
Albornoz was a ―sincere and objective friend‖ of the United States who was valuable 
―especially as (below the surface) the chief influences on this daily [El Comercio] in the 
past have been only grudgingly friendly to the United States, tending to strong Ecuadoran 
nationalism.‖ For his next position, Dr. Albornoz was considering an offer to teach 
journalism at Central University in Quito, thus extending his U.S. training through 
teaching. Salandra concluded that Albornoz ―may be counted on to collaborate closely on 
all efforts to promote closer ties between Ecuador and the United Sates.‖
93
  
 The reports on Uzcátegui and Albornoz suggested the potentially long-term 
impacts that the exchange programs could have. Yet from 1946 to 1948, Congressional 
appropriations for these programs dwindled. By 1948 this funding had reached a postwar 
low.
94
 In part this decline was due to a new focus in Washington on rebuilding and 
rehabilitating Europe and Asia. To facilitate this process, policymakers now adapted and 
expanded worldwide the cultural exchange programs begun with the nations of Latin 
America during the war through the passage of new legislation. The Fulbright Act of 
1946, for example, authorized the State Department to enter into bilateral exchange 
agreements with foreign countries around the world.
95
 It took over a decade before the 
first Fulbrighter came to Latin America since the initial emphasis of the program was on 
Europe.  
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 Despite this shift in focus from Latin America to Europe and Asia, exchanges 
with the nations of Latin America continued. A comparison between the appropriations 
for Latin America, and those for Europe, Asia, and Africa at the 1948 low-point, reveals 
that the Latin American programs still received the majority of the funding—$3,957,836 
for Latin America, compared with $291,878 for the other regions combined.
96
 Thus the 
termination of the war did not end U.S. cultural relations generally, or educational 
exchange programs specifically, with the nations of Latin America. The period from 1946 
to 1948 was rather one of shifting priorities and new legislation as the United States and 
nations around the globe adjusted to the postwar world. 
 From 1940 to 1948, policymakers worked to solidify and maintain U.S. 
dominance in Latin America through the establishment and funding of American schools 
and educational exchange programs. These schools and programs were part of an 
ideological battle between the democratic, capitalist system promoted by Washington, 
and the state-directed fascism of the Axis powers. By exposing Latin American students 
and leaders to an education in the United States and in U.S.-styled schools, policymakers 
hoped to convince their good neighbors of the superiority of the U.S. system. As the war 
wound down, and with the battle against fascism over, officials in the United States 
turned their attention across the seas and away from Latin America. Unfulfilled promises 
from the war years soon threatened to undermine U.S. hegemony in Latin America at 
precisely the same time that policymakers attempted to solidify this hegemony 
throughout the Third World. 
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5. The 200-Mile Limit 
 During World War Two, pro-U.S. elites in Ecuador offered the use of Ecuadorian 
territory for the establishment of U.S. military bases to protect the Western Hemisphere 
during the wartime emergency. U.S. Marines constructed these bases in 1941 following 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. But by 1944, with the war winding down and the 
Ecuadorian public increasingly convinced that their leaders had sacrificed Ecuadorian 
sovereignty in exchange for little from the United States, president Velasco Ibarra began 
negotiating for the return of the bases—a process that was finally completed in 1948. 
That same year, Ecuadorians elected Galo Plaza Lasso as president. From 1948 to 1952, 
Galo Plaza oversaw a rapidly developing Ecuador, and despite several challenges to his 
authority, he became the first Ecuadorian president in twenty-eight years to complete his 
constitutional four-year term.  
 The election of Galo Plaza marked the beginning of a period of presidential 
stability in Ecuador with three elected presidents finishing their full terms of office—
Galo Plaza (1948 to 1952), Velasco Ibarra (1952 to 1956, his third term), and Camilo 
Ponce Enriquez (1956 to 1960). Galo Plaza‘s presidency issued in a period of presidential 
stability in Ecuador the likes of which had not been experienced since the years 1912 to 
1924. Political stability helped stimulate economic growth during the Galo Plaza years. 
As president, Galo Plaza strengthened economic and business ties with the United States 
by bringing in the United Fruit Company to run the Ecuadorian banana industry—a move 
that helped make Ecuador the leading producer of bananas in the world. Relations 
between the United States and Ecuador during the first three years of Galo Plaza‘s 
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administration were strong. In 1951, the President Truman invited Galo Plaza to 
Washington. Galo Plaza hoped to secure loans from the United States while officials in 
Washington focused on Cold War concerns—a contract for the use of the military bases 
on the Galápagos in case of war, and the supposed danger of communists infiltrating the 
national labor party of Ecuador.
1
  
 Yet relations between Ecuador and the United States during this era were not 
always close. In 1950, the Ecuadorian Navy began arresting, detaining, and fining U.S. 
fishermen operating in waters claimed as sovereign territory by the government of 
Ecuador. In 1952, Galo Plaza issued Presidential Decree 003, which asserted that the 
territorial waters of Ecuador extended twelve miles from the mainland, and from the 
coast of the Galápagos.
2
 This definition of Ecuadorian territorial waters directly 
challenged the three-mile limit historically supported by the United States. Thus began 
years of negotiations—and further arrests—that lasted well into the 1970s. 
 This chapter examines the bilateral and multilateral negotiations involved in the 
territorial waters dispute. This issue was especially complex and difficult to solve 
because it involved the conflicting interests of a variety of elites in both countries. For the 
United States, this meant State Department officials, including secretaries of state Dean 
Acheson and Allen Dulles, U.S. ambassadors to Ecuador John Simmons, Paul Daniels, 
Sheldon Mills and Christian Ravndal, leaders of the two main tuna fishing unions on the 
West Coast (the American Tunaboat Association, and the Seafarers International Union 
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of North America) and their Congressional representatives. Ecuadorian presidents—
primarily Galo Plaza Lasso and Velasco Ibarra—played leading roles by issuing 
executive decrees that changed Ecuadorian fisheries legislation. Officials at the Foreign 
Ministry, especially foreign ministers Neftali Ponce Miranda, Teodoro Alvarado 
Garaicoa, Luis Antonio Peñaherrera, Rafael Arizaga Vega, Jorge Villagomez Yepez and 
Carlos Tobar Zaldumbide, the Ecuadorian Ambassador to Washington José Ricardo 
Chiriboga Villagómez. Naval officers and seamen, as well as local congressmen also 
played their part. From 1950 to 1957, the continued arresting, fining and even wounding 
of U.S. fishermen by the Ecuadorian Navy strained U.S.-Ecuadorian relations. Initially, 
elites in Washington reacted to these incidents by sending notes of protest stating the U.S. 
support of the three-mile limit and the right of innocent passage.  
 The first phase of the bilateral negotiations concerning the territorial waters issue 
under examination (1949 to 1952) included changes in Ecuadorian fisheries laws that led 
to the capture of U.S.-flag fishing vessels. These arrests led to protests from Washington, 
but it quickly became obvious that these protest notes were ineffective. In 1953 
representatives from Ecuador and the United States thus met to try to work out a modus 
operandi whereby U.S. fishermen could continue to operating in Ecuadorian waters. 
These attempts at compromise marked a second phase of negotiations, which lasted 
roughly from 1953 to 1957. With newly elected presidents in both countries, 
policymakers involved in the territorial waters negotiations hoped that a fresh perspective 
would facilitate an equitable solution to the problem. The conference settled little, 
however, and the arrests continued. From 1953 to 1957, policymakers in Washington and 
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Quito, operating against a tense background of growing animosity between their two 
governments, increasingly sought multilateral solutions to the territorial waters problem. 
 For the government of Ecuador, the shift towards a multilateral approach began in 
1952 when representatives from Chile and Peru persuaded Ecuadorian officials to join 
them in Santiago for a tri-partite fishing conference. The resultant Santiago Accord 
declared the territorial waters of Chile, Ecuador and Peru (CEP) to extend to 200 miles 
from the coast of each nation. The ratification of the Santiago Accord by all three 
governments in 1953 led to an increase of multilateral negotiations as representatives 
from the United States challenged CEP claims. In 1955, representatives from the 
governments of Chile, Ecuador and Peru met with their counterparts from the United 
States to try again to settle the dispute. Following this conference, delegates participated 
in a series of special sessions to discuss the territorial waters issue held during the 1955 
Organization of American States conference in Caracas, Venezuela, as well as a 1956 
special session of the United Nations that developed proposals for the 1958 Conference 
on the Law of the Sea held in Geneva.
3
 Despite repeated efforts to settle the problem, 
however, officials accomplished little during this period. By 1957, fundamental 
differences of opinion between the government of the United States and Ecuador 
persisted. 
 To complicate matters, elites in Washington and Quito faced domestic pressures 
to settle the territorial waters dispute. Leaders of the powerful California fishing unions 
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repeatedly urged their Congressmen to convince State Department officials to force 
Ecuador to end the detaining and fining of their vessels and fishermen. Local fishing 
interests in Ecuador—particularly in the coastal town of Manta—exerted similar pressure 
on the Ecuadorian government in order to maximize profits for their own people. 
Whenever the diplomats from Quito and Washington met to discuss the territorial waters 
issue, each group had to protect their own domestic interests as well. These pressures also 
influenced the various multilateral negotiations.  
 Unlike the 1941 to 1948 period, the years 1949 to 1957 were ones of relative 
political stability in Ecuador. Yet repeated clashes with the government of the United 
States over the question of territorial waters tested U.S.-Ecuadorian relations, and 
challenged U.S. hegemony in the Third World. While elites in Quito and in Washington 
had worked during the war to solidify the U.S. Empire in Latin America, the emergence 
of the Cold War brought new challenges to the maintenance of that empire. As officials 
in Washington focused on rebuilding Europe and containing communism, they seemed to 
leave behind Ecuador and the nations of Latin America—a process that had begun even 
before the war was over. Though this strained U.S.-Ecuadorian relations during this 
period, a number of Ecuadorian elites continued to push for close relations with the 
United States. Debates during this era often focused on how best to operate within a 
world that, with the emergence of the Cold War, was once again experiencing a period of 
transition. While Ecuadorian policymakers may have pushed the United States to adopt 
policies that would favor their own citizens, seldom, if ever, did those elites suggest 
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breaking with the United States altogether. For their part, officials in the State 
Department never employed the degree of force urged by some in Congress. 
 Disputes between the United States and Ecuador over territorial waters, and the 
rights of fishermen to exploit the resources in these waters, began as early as 1934. On 
August 29 of that year, the government of Ecuador passed a new fishing regulation that 
extended Ecuadorian sovereignty over waters up to six miles from the coast of Ecuador.
4
 
U.S. reaction to this declaration was clear; embassy staff informed the government that 
―the United States cannot admit the right of the Ecuadoran Government to apply its 
fishing regulations to American vessels beyond the belt of three miles from low water 
mark.‖
5
 During the late 1940s, however, disputes over these waters increased as countries 
around the world laid claim to the resources of the sea. This trend was a reaction to 
proclamations made by President Harry Truman on 28 September 1945. The Second 
World War had revealed the importance of natural resources such as oil to the 
development of the United States. In the Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf, 
President Truman therefore claimed for the United States the natural resources found in 
the subsoil and seabed of the Continental Shelf adjacent to the U.S. coastline.
6
 The 
second proclamation claimed the right of the United States to conserve the natural 
resources of the fisheries located adjacent to its coast.
7
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 Truman‘s Continental Shelf proclamations set off a global wave of similar 
decrees, with leaders of various nations using Truman‘s words as precedent.
8
 From 1940 
to 1950, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Argentina, Peru, and Saudi Arabia issued official 
declarations that extended the jurisdiction of each government over waters beyond the 
three-mile limit—sometimes extending that limit to as far as 200 miles from the coast.
9
 In 
each case, the United States, through the Department of State and its embassies, issued 
formal, though often private, messages of disapproval to those leaders who challenged 
the three-mile limit. The government of Mexico, for example, received two such 
warnings, one in 1948 and one in 1950, when the Mexican Navy began arresting U.S. 
shrimping vessels operating within nine miles of the Mexican coast. In the case of 
Ecuador, rumors of new fishing regulations began reaching officials in the Department of 




 Despite the fact that the Truman Proclamation only mentioned the resources 
found within the subsoil of the Continental Shelf, many world leaders expanded on this 
idea by also claiming the resources found within the waters covering the Continental 
Shelf.
11
 Such claims, according to U.S. officials, challenged the traditional right to 
innocent passage—the right of non-military vessels to pass freely through the territorial 
waters of a nation—which was something that the Truman Proclamation had been careful 
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 U.S. officials insisted that foreign leaders had misinterpreted the U.S. 
position. According to them, Truman‘s words in no way pertained to the activities of 
foreign fishermen operating in the waters adjacent to the United States—they merely 
reserved the right of the United States to establish conservation zones in these waters if it 
became necessary.
13
 All of this was complicated further in 1953 when President 
Eisenhower signed into law the Submerged Lands Act, and the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act.
14
 Both Truman and Eisenhower sought to clarify the rights of states and the 
U.S. federal government to exploit the resources found within the Continental Shelf 
 As with other industries in the United States during the 1950s, the California 
fishing industry had to adjust to changing global realities as the Cold War deepened. For 
fishermen, this meant increased competition from fishing industries in Latin America and 
Japan, as well as a lower level of protection provided by the U.S. Congress. Since 1900, 
California fishermen had expanded their territory from local waters off the coast of the 
United States into the rest of the eastern Pacific Ocean.
15
 By World War Two, companies 
had firmly established the industry. Wartime restrictions imposed by the U.S. government 
on their activities, however, meant that California fishermen could no longer fish the 
waters of Ecuador and Peru. During the war the U.S. government also requisitioned 
fishing vessels, and limited the provisions—especially oil—that vessels could carry 
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 Conversely, the wartime isolation imposed by the government, which 
sheltered the industry from foreign competition, also allowed it to continue developing.
17
 
The industry rebounded following the end of the war as new technological advancements 
improved efficiency so that companies could satisfy a domestic population that had 
developed a taste for canned tuna during the war years.
18
  
 By the end of the war, despite possessing the most advanced equipment and 
techniques, a trade agreement with Japan threatened the livelihood of U.S. tuna 
fishermen. In 1951, the U.S. and Japan signed a Peace Accord officially ending the 
World War Two belligerence between the two nations. As part of this accord, 
policymakers in the United States granted Japanese fishermen greater access to territories 
in the Pacific that U.S. fishermen had previously monopolized. The accord also relaxed 
tuna import restrictions in order to provide the Japanese with a market for their fish. 
Policymakers in Washington did not want to ―lose‖ another Asian country to the 
Communists. Of course U.S. tuna fishermen had faced foreign competition before, but 
usually their union had been able to convince Congress and the State Department to 
provide the protection they needed in order to operate. Now, however, the global 
environment had changed, and it was less clear that Washington officials either would be 
willing or able to protect the industry. Faced with this competition from the Japanese, 
U.S. tuna processing companies such as Star Kist Foods and Van Camp spent the 1950s 
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expanding their processing divisions into Puerto Rico, Peru, Chile and Ecuador.
19
 New 
canneries increased the demand for fresh tuna to supply the canning machines. This 
demand, plus the encroachment of Japanese fishermen in waters formally monopolized 
by U.S. fishermen, pushed U.S. fishing companies to send more and more boats into 
Latin American waters in search of tuna. 
 In May of 1950, word reached Washington that the government of Ecuador was 
considering changes to its fishing regulations.
20
 Under the current system, foreign-
flagged vessels could fish in Ecuadorian waters after first purchasing the appropriate 
permits and licenses. U.S. fishermen would typically first secure a permit at the 
Ecuadorian Consulate in San Diego, and then purchase a license upon arrival in 
Ecuadorian waters. Once captains of foreign-flagged vessels reached Ecuadorian waters, 
they could then radio ashore to purchase a license. Debate over new regulations centered 
on the issues of these radio requests, and the cost of the licenses. If the government of 
Ecuador changed the regulations, Harold Cary, the General Manager of the American 
Tunaboat Association, warned that the price of licenses would double, and ship captains 
would no longer be able to radio for a license once they reached Ecuadorian waters. 
Owners of all foreign-flagged vessels would now have to know that they were going to 
fish for tuna in Ecuadorian waters before they left the United States. Knowing this ahead 
of time proved challenging, however, since the natural migration of tuna made it difficult 
for fishermen to know where the fish would be at any given time. In addition, the owners 
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would have to pay twice as much as before to secure the appropriate license. Cary warned 
that the rumored changes could hurt the Ecuadorian economy as U.S. fishermen—who 
were earning 18 percent less per ton than they were the previous year—might not be able 
to afford the license fees. Fishermen might choose to avoid Ecuadorian waters altogether, 
and the government of Ecuador would lose this revenue source.
21
  
 Acting on Cary‘s Report, Undersecretary of State James Webb notified 
Ambassador Maurice Bernbaum that they were concerned ―over the possibility that this 
[Economic] Council contemplates a fishing law which will be arbitrarily enforced against 
the nationals and vessels of other states beyond three miles seaward from the Ecuadoran 
coast.‖
22
 U.S. officials hoped to effect a change in Ecuadorian policy by insisting that 
such changes would hurt the Ecuadorian economy. 
 In Ecuador, the National Economic Council was preparing to meet as instructed 
by President Galo Plaza. The president wanted to develop the nascent fishing industry in 
Ecuador, and he argued that the failure of his government to protect and develop this 
industry would cause ―grave harm‖ to the Ecuadorian economy.
23
 The president of the 
council, Alberto Llarea Chiriboga, informed the president that the council had found 
justification for making the proposed changes ―in the least possible time.‖
24
 Llarea and 
the others hoped this bill would ―fill the gaps‖ in existing fisheries legislation while also 
encouraging the industrialization of fishing in Ecuador so that one day Ecuador could 
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become an exporter of processed fish rather than just fish in their natural state, which 
brought lower revenues. With the support of his economic council, on 22 February 1951, 
Galo Plaza issued Presidential Decree 003, stating that ―the State exercises its 
sovereignty over the territorial waters (of the insular and continental seas, lakes, lagoons, 
and river systems) and their resources.‖ The decree further defined these ―territorial 




 Under the new law, all foreign-flagged fishing vessels needed to purchase the 
proper permits and licenses before fishing in Ecuadorian waters. For now, captains could 
still request licenses via radio as long as they had purchased a permit before leaving the 
United States.
26
 Through Ambassador Paul Daniels, officials at the Department of State 
including Wilbert McLeod Chapman, who was serving as a Special Assistant to 
Undersecretary Webb, expressed their concern over the new law. First, they pointed out 
that the inclusion of a twelve-mile belt around the entire Galápagos Archipelago 
effectively ignored the fact that as 90 miles of water separated some of these islands. The 
protected zone would therefore extend well past the twelve mile limit in some cases. In 
addition, the language used to exert governmental control over the natural resources of 
the continental shelf implied ―an unlimited degree of control and protection over fishing 
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areas corresponding to the continental shelf.‖
27
 Such a definition was a direct challenge to 
the U.S. commitment to enforcing the three-mile limit.  
 This definition of Ecuador‘s territorial waters also introduced another issue that 
would plague the negotiations over territorial waters for the next decade—the meaning of 
the term ―conservation.‖ From the perspective of policymakers involved in the territorial 
waters negotiations ―conservation‖ meant both the protection and the exploitation of the 
natural resources found in the waters adjacent to the continental shelf. Ecuadorian 
officials used the rhetoric of conservation to argue that they needed to protect the fish 
found in this zone so that they could develop a domestic fish-export industry. U.S. 
officials, however, challenged this conservation defense. They claimed that if the 
government of Ecuador truly wanted to conserve the species found in its territorial 
waters, then it should commission scientific studies of the supposed problem, and join 
international organizations, such as the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, 
which provided multilateral sites where delegates could discuss conservation issues.
28
 
Each time U.S. officials spoke of conservation, Ecuadorian elites understood this to mean 
that U.S. fishermen should have access to Ecuadorian territorial waters so that they too 
could exploit the natural resources found therein. Thus, as they had done with other 
governments that had passed legislation challenging the three-mile limit, officials at the 
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 Soon after the passage of the Presidential Decree, the Ecuadorian Navy began 
detaining and arresting fishermen on foreign-flag vessels suspected of breaking the new 
regulations. On 15 September 1951, the Ecuadorian Navy apprehended the Marico—a 
U.S.-flag fishing vessel working for the South Pacific Canning Company of Long Beach, 
CA. Ultimately the courts fined the ship captain $7,000 for illegal fishing.
30
 The Marico 
case highlighted several aspects of the new Ecuadorian law that would ultimately lead to 
further arrests and fines, as well as a deepening rift between the United States and 
Ecuador. The captain of the Marico, Frederick Libby, claimed that he was only coming to 
shore in order to make some needed repairs after requesting the proper permits via radio 
through the Ecuadorian Consulate in California. According to Ecuadorian law, however, 
the captain needed to obtain the initial permit at the Consulate before leaving the United 
States. Libby also claimed that he needed more bait, and thus had started for shore when 
a Navy patrol Navy patrol boat confronted him.
31
  
 While President Galo Plaza expressed his sympathy in his private discussion with 
Libby, he stood firm, and said that he could not rule against his cabinet ministers. Despite 
these setbacks, officials from the State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Quito 
continued to push for whatever compromises they could get. Ultimately, however, the 
Minister of Economy, Alfredo Peñaherrera, upheld the fine—although he reduced it to 
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$5,388—because officials could not confirm Libby‘s claim of mechanical problems.
32
 As 
a gesture of good faith, Secretary of State Acheson agreed to notify the California fishing 
industry that the government of Ecuador had changed the laws, and to suggest that all 
companies involved should consider purchasing the $200 permits ahead of time, 
regardless of whether or not they planned to fish near Ecuador, as a precautionary 
measure.
33
 The Marico case made it clear that future confrontations were likely as the 
unanticipated needs of the fishermen would continue to bring them into waters claimed 
by Ecuador.  
 The detention of U.S.-flagged vessel Notre Dame on 3 November 1951 raised 
another aspect of the new Ecuadorian fishing regulations that would cause problems over 
the next few years. Captain John G. Cardosa said he entered Ecuadorian waters in order 
to take a directional bearing during bad weather. When a patrol vessel stopped them near 
Isla de la Plata, which is located near the fishing village of Manta, Cardosa insisted that 
he and his crew were not fishing. He pointed out that they had no fresh fish on board and 
that their fishing gear was stowed. Cardosa maintained that he and his crew were headed 
for the fishing banks of Peru when the bad weather hit, but he admitted that he did not 
have a Peruvian fishing license since the banks were some forty-five miles offshore, and 
thus well outside the accepted three-mile zone. As further proof that he was not fishing in 
Ecuadorian waters, Cardosa pointed out that the tuna-fishing season in those waters ran 
from May to September, and thus there would be no reason for him to be fishing for tuna 
                                                 
32
 Daniels to Acheson, 22 October 1951, Central File, 1950-54, Box 4588, RG 59, NACP. 
33
 Acheson to Daniels, 8 October 1951, Central File, 1950-54, Box 4588, RG 59, NACP; and, Herrington to 





 Despite these protests, the Government of Ecuador fined the Notre Dame 
$5,700, arguing that it did not matter whether or not Cardosa was fishing within the 
twelve-mile limit. The important factor was that his ship had passed into these waters 
without the appropriate permits, thus raising the issue of innocent passage.
35
  
 In their note of protest over the Notre Dame incident, State Department officials 
argued that the right of innocent passage through territorial waters was ―an accepted 
principle of International Law.‖
36
 The Ecuadorian Navy, they charged, had violated the 
right of innocent passage when they detained the Notre Dame for merely passing through 
Ecuadorian waters. The Ecuadorians tested this right of innocent passage again on 16 
February 1952 when the Navy detained the Venus of San Pedro, California in the Gulf of 
Guayaquil, and fined it $2,848.20 for illegal fishing. As with the Notre Dame, there were 
reportedly no fish on board the Venus, and the fishing nets were stowed. In this case, 
however, the Ecuadorian Navy apprehended the Venus ten miles from the coast, and 
officials at the Department of State worried that protesting against this seizure as they had 
in the case of the Notre Dame might inadvertently support the Ecuadorian claim to a 
twelve-mile limit on its territorial waters.
37
 In the Notre Dame case, U.S. representatives 
had argued that international law ensured the safe passage of non-military vessels through 
the territorial waters of all coastal nations. If they used the same argument in the Venus 
case, this might imply that the government of the United States considered Ecuadorian 
territorial waters to extend twelve miles from the coast.  
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 By August 1952, the government of Ecuador began to qualify just which ships 
enjoyed innocent passage through Ecuadorian waters.
38
 According to U.S. officials, 
international law guaranteed safe passage to all merchant and non-military ships passing 
through the territorial waters of any given nation. Ecuadorian officials, however, now 
insisted that there was a difference between merchant vessels and fishing vessels.
39
 No 
longer were fishing vessels guaranteed free passage through Ecuadorian waters. As with 
the issue of conservation, discrepancies over the definition of innocent passage would 
surface repeatedly during this period.  
 During the early Cold War years, challenges from nations such as Ecuador over 
the issue of territorial waters, particularly the detaining and fining of U.S.-flag fishing 
vessels, troubled U.S. policymakers. Having only a decade earlier convinced Latin 
America governments that defending the hemisphere from fascist attack was a common 
priority for all American nations, now U.S. policymakers discovered that their arguments 
in defense of the three-mile limit on territorial waters fell on deaf ears. With twentieth-
century advances in weaponry, particularly nuclear weapons, it was hard to convince 
foreign governments that a protective three-mile zone around all maritime states was a 
geo-strategic necessity. No longer did belligerents need to pass so close to their target. 
Thus, despite growing concern in Washington concerning the spread of communism, 
policymakers found themselves challenged by countries such as Ecuador that no longer 
believed in a basic tenet of the nineteenth-century model of empire.  
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 Despite the new legislation, domestic pressure in Ecuador intensified as some 
involved in the fishing industry urged the government to do more to protect their 
interests. In response, Executive Decree 0160 of 29 January 1952 further modified 
Ecuadorian fishing regulations. The decree upheld the twelve-mile limit on territorial 
waters, but now officials would take that measurement from the westernmost points of 
the coast. This meant that in some areas the territorial waters would actually extend forty 
or fifty miles from the coast. The new decree also eliminated the option to radio for a 
permit for those who wanted to fish in the waters around the Galápagos.
40
 And while 
under the old system the Navy received a percentage of any fines levied against offending 
vessels, the new decree promised 50 percent of any fines to be paid to any Ecuadorian 
flag vessel that reported the offenders.
41
 According to U.S. Embassy officials, this new 
decree was a reaction to the pressure of local fishing interests within Ecuador, as well as 
the proposed import duty on tuna, which the U.S. Congress was debating.
42
 On 19 
September 1951, the U.S. House of Representatives began considering a bill calling for a 
30 percent duty on imports of fresh and frozen tuna in order to protect U.S. tuna 
interests.
43
 This measure was the result of pressure exerted by the major tuna companies 
in the United States who were facing increased competition due to agreements between 
the U.S. government and other fishing nations including Japan and Mexico.  
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 Tariff debates in Washington were not the primary concern of fishermen from the 
Ecuadorian town of Manta, however, as they pushed their government to ban all fishing 
by foreign-flag vessels in the waters near the town.
44
 Arguing that the modern technology 
used by foreign fishing crews was endangering the lives of Manta families by stripping 
the waters of fish, Manta fishermen seemed to be concerned primarily with protecting 
their own territory. According to Oswaldo Tamayo, who was the representative of the 
American Tunaboat Association in Quito, however, this recent decree designed to protect 




 Rankin‘s Company Inepaca became one of the major operators in the Ecuadorian 
fishing community after he secured a contract with the government of Ecuador in 1948.
46
 
That contract guaranteed Rankin and his company the right to fish for tuna in Ecuadorian 
waters in exchange for establishing a tuna canning factory on the Ecuadorian mainland.
47
 
Because of the U.S. tariff on imported canned tuna, however, Rankin never established 
the factory. He had focused instead on shipping fresh and frozen tuna directly to the U.S. 
market, where companies either sold or canned it.
48
 When Rankin heard that the U.S. 
Congress was considering a new tariff on imports of fresh and frozen tuna, he mobilized 
the support of the Manta fishermen‘s union. He began pressuring the government of 
Ecuador to restrict foreign-flag fishing in the waters off the Manta coast in order to 
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 This restriction would limit the presence of U.S. fishermen in the 
waters that Rankin hoped to monopolize, while also weakening his chief local rival, 
Pesquera Nacional, whose fleet contained several foreign-flagged vessels working under 
contract with the company. 
 Officials in the United States also faced increased domestic pressure following the 
arrest of the Notre Dame. Writing in protest from the San Diego Chamber of Commerce, 
Assistant Manager Arnold Klaus argued that the government of Ecuador had ―flagrantly 
violated all concepts of international law…in an attempt to establish an unknown 
precedent‖ by arresting U.S.-flagged vessels.
50
 Klaus reported that the fishing community 
was ―greatly disturbed‖ that the Department of State had not taken swift action. He urged 
State Department officials to intervene in order to secure the release of the Notre Dame, 
and a withdrawal of the fine, since to do otherwise ―would establish the precedent of 
paying tribute to a country committing an act of piracy.‖
51
 Clearly Klaus was frustrated, 
as were presumably others involved in the U.S. fishing industry who found their 
businesses jeopardized by the new Ecuadorian fishing laws, but other international 
realities limited the options of State Department officials when negotiating with 
Ecuadorian officials.  
 Domestic pressure on policymakers at the Department of State continued to 
mount towards the end of 1952. Writing to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Senator 
Warren Magnuson from Washington relayed the concerns of Wilbert McLeod Chapman, 
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the Director of Research at the American Tunaboat Association.
52
 Arguing that the 
situation in Ecuador was serious and ―loaded with the possibility of more serious things 
to come,‖ Chapman reported that some of the U.S. fishermen were beginning to arm 
themselves to prevent the seizure of their vessels.
53
 Pointing out that several captains had 
been ―threatened with seizure‖ but had managed to flee and escape pursuit, Chapman 
predicted that ―it is only a matter of time until an Ecuadoran gunboat lobs a shell onto 
one of our vessels and kills some American citizen, at which time there will be hell to 
pay.‖
54
 Fed up with the situation, Chapman urged Magnusson to pressure officials at the 
Department of State to do something, believing that ―if the State Department takes a firm 
stand these acts can be stopped overnight.‖
55
 Failing that, Chapman warned that ―serious 
trouble‖ was on the way.
56
  
 A few days later, Secretary of State Dean Acheson received another letter 
protesting the actions of the Ecuadorian government. Harry Lundeberg, the President of 
the Seafarers International Union of North America, wrote that ―this practice of the 
Ecuadorian Government is not only causing our fishermen immeasurable hardship from a 
monetary standpoint, but the very lives of these citizens are in constant danger by these 
pirate-like tactics.‖
57
 Lundeberg also warned that ―unless our State Department takes 
immediate steps to protect these U.S. citizens—these fishermen—like any other red-
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blooded American citizens are apt to take matters in their own hands in self-protection.‖
58
 
Lundeberg sent his letter to President Eisenhower, Senators Knowland, Nixon, Morse, 
Kerr, Justice Earl Warren, as well as several union leaders. The response letter from 
Milton Barall, Acting Officer in Charge of North and West Coast Affairs at the State 
Department, simply stated that the U.S. government had sent official notes to Ecuador 
and Peru reserving its rights.
59
 At this point State Department officials were more 
concerned with a shifting global economic system than they were with protecting the 
interests of the U.S. tuna industry. 
 As the Ecuadorian Navy continued to detain U.S. fishermen who felt pushed out 
of their traditional waters by the Japanese, the congressional debate over the new tuna 
tariff represented another response to the shift in the economic system. While officials at 
the Department of State understood the concerns of the U.S. fishing industry, they 
worried that such a tariff would effectively close the U.S. market to Japanese tuna 
fishermen. This might encourage the Japanese to look towards China to sell their catch. 
In his presentation before Congress regarding the tariff, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Economic Affairs Harold F. Linder emphasized the importance for the Japanese 
economy of tuna exports to the United States. Linder pointed out that, while Japanese 
tuna represented only one-tenth of the tuna sold on the U.S. market, it ranked second on 
the list of Japanese exports to the United States.
60
 He also noted that Japan depended on 
the U.S. market because of the ―virtual embargo‖ on trade with China. A cut in Japanese 
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tuna imports to the United States could therefore ―create significant risks for our policies 
in the Far East.‖
61
  
 The termination of a U.S. trade agreement with Mexico in 1951, which increased 
the tariff on tuna imported in oil, complicated the tariff situation further.
62
 In anticipation 
of the higher tariff, tuna companies in the United States had imported as much Mexican 
tuna as they could, and then they had switched over to fresh and frozen tuna to avoid the 
new tariff altogether. The Mexican case suggested to Linder and others at the Department 
of State that instead of establishing a blanket tariff on all imported tuna, fresh or frozen, 
perhaps the industry instead could benefit from limits placed on the amount of duty-free 
tuna that could enter the market. The government could then apply a tariff on any amount 
exceeding those limits.
63
 Yet despite the warnings of Linder and others, the Senate 
Finance Committee voted eight to five in May 1952 to recommend passage of the new 
import tariff.
64
 Ultimately, U.S. fishermen lost this battle; the tariff passed the House but 
not the Senate. Throughout this period tensions remained between Congress—responding 
to pressure from their domestic constituents—and the State Department—attuned to the 
global realities facing the U.S. government—concerning how best to balance the 
competing demands of national and international interests.
65
 
 Up until this point, representatives from Ecuador and the United States had 
monopolized the discussions concerning Ecuadorian fishing regulations and their impact 
                                                 
61






 Alfonso Moscoso Cardenas to Ponce Miranda, 15 May 1952, Series C, Comunicaciones Recibidas de la 
Embajada en los Estados Unidos, MREAH. 
65
 Wolff, 14. 
179 
 
on the U.S. tuna fishermen. This issue actually involved several other countries that had 
already declared territorial rights over waters beyond the traditional three-mile limit 
recognized by the United States. Yet U.S. officials still refused to budge. Faced with the 
intransigence of policymakers who would not acknowledge the right of governments to 
extend their territorial waters, the governments of Ecuador, Chile and Peru began joint 
negotiations to try and exert pressure on Washington to abandon the three-mile limit. 
This process began in August 1952 when the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Fernando García Oldini, approached the Ecuadorian Ambassador to Chile, Jorge 
Fernandez, and presented him with a newly passed Chilean law—written in partnership 
with representatives from Peru—which claimed a 200-mile limit on territorial waters.
66
 
Officials from Chile and Peru hoped to convince the Ecuadorians to join them in 
supporting the 200-mile limit.  
 To solidify their position, representatives from Chile, Ecuador and Peru (referred 
to as CEP throughout this period) gathered in Santiago to discuss the ―indiscriminate‖ 
fishing off the coasts of their countries.
67
 Ecuadorian officials did not immediately sign 
the resulting Santiago Accord, instead requesting more time to study the various 
positions. For his part, Ambassador Fernandez pointed out that other countries were 
likely to push for an extension of the three-mile limit, and he believed that the OAS 
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would soon take up the issue.
68
 The Santiago Conference of 1952 foreshadowed this 
multilateral approach, which policymakers developed more fully during the 1953 to 1957 
phase of negotiations.  
 With the Ecuadorian Navy detaining more and more U.S. fishing vessels, and the 
cutthroat competition among Ecuadorian fishing companies such as Inepaca and Pesquera 
Nacional, Secretary of State Acheson decided that this would be a good time to hold a 
fishing conference between Ecuador and the United States.
69
 Both governments were 
under the leadership of new heads of state—Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador and Dwight 
Eisenhower in the United States—and perhaps a fresh perspective would help officials 
settle the territorial waters dispute. In January 1953, Acheson proposed a conference to 
explore two main issues—the extension of territorial waters to twelve miles by the 
Ecuadorian government, and the denial of innocent passage to foreign-flag fishing vessels 
in these waters.
70
 A few weeks later, Maurice Bernbaum (who was now the Director of 
the Office of South American Affairs), Bernbaums‘ colleague at OSA, Edgar McGinnis, 
Ecuadorian Ambassador Chiriboga, and William Herrington from the U.S. Department of 
the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, met to discuss the details of the proposed 
conference.
71
 According to Chiriboga, even if Velasco Ibarra wanted to, he could not 
change the Ecuadorian fishing legislation simply to meet the needs of Washington. Any 
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modifications at this point would require legislative action.
72
 This, of course, was the 
same argument used by Galo Plaza in the Marico case. Since that time, however, the 
international situation had changed.  
 With a number of governments passing similar legislation, Chiriboga argued that 
the Government of Ecuador was now merely doing its part to keep up with international 
trends.
73
 According to Chiriboga, the question of territorial waters had evolved beyond a 
simple disagreement between the governments of the United States and Ecuador.
74
 He 
suggested that officials could perhaps develop some form of bilateral agreement allowing 
U.S. fishermen to continue operating in Ecuadorian waters, while government 
representatives could meet at a multinational conference to discuss the territorial waters 
issue.
75
 The ambassador acknowledged that the Eisenhower Administration faced 
domestic pressure, and he suggested to the Foreign Minister that perhaps Ecuadorian 
officials should take into account the impact that the detentions were having on official 
and public opinion in the United States.
76
 He urged his government to accept the U.S. 
invitation to a bilateral conference.
77
  
 As plans for the bilateral conference progressed, rumors of an upcoming tri-partite 
conference between Chile, Ecuador and Peru reached policymakers at the Department of 
                                                 
72
 Memorandum of Conversation, 13 January 1953. 
73
 Jose Ricardo Chiriboga Villagomez to Peñaherrera, Series C, Comunicaciones Recibidas de la Embajada 
en los Estados Unidos, MREAH. 
74
 Memorandum of Conversation, 13 January 1953. 
75
 Memorandum of Conversation, 13 January 1953. 
76
 Jose Ricardo Chiriboga Villagomez to Peñaherrera, Series C, Comunicaciones Recibidas de la Embajada 







 The assumption in Washington was that this conference would address the 200-
mile limit outlined in the Santiago Accords of 1952, which participating countries still 
had not ratified by the participating countries.
79
 Hoping to maximize their position at the 
bilateral conference, Dulles and others worried about the timing of the United States-
Ecuador conference. If it occurred before the CEP conference, then U.S. representatives 
might have the chance to influence the Ecuadorian position at the conference. But, in this 
scenario Ecuadorian officials would probably be unable and unwilling to make any firm 
commitments to the United States without first consulting their counterparts in Chile and 
Peru.
80
 If the bilateral conference took place after the CEP conference, on the other hand, 




 After careful consideration, Dulles instructed Embassy officials in Quito to go 
ahead with the plans for the bilateral conference. If officials at the Ecuadorian Foreign 
Ministry seemed to want to delay the conference, policymakers at the State Department 
instructed Embassy officials to tell the Foreign Minister that ―the United States is 
disturbed over the poor fisheries relations between the two countries and would regret 
any unnecessary delay in the joint discussion and consideration of means of improving 
those relations.‖
82
 Policymakers wanted to ensure Ecuadorian cooperation in this matter 
during this time of flux in the U.S. Empire as the Cold War deepened. 
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 Preparations for the bilateral conference were well under way when, on March 13, 
William Herrington, the designated chairman of the U.S. delegation to Quito, received his 
official instructions.
83
 Herrington had significant experience working for various state 
and federal fisheries bureaus. In 1953 he was in his second year as the Special Assistant 
for Fisheries and Wildlife at the Department of State.
84
 Herrington and his delegation 
focused on the effects of Ecuadorian fisheries laws and policies on the rights of U.S. 
fishermen, as they explored possible solutions to the problem that fell ―within the 
framework of United States policy generally.‖
85
 Policymakers also instructed the 
delegates to discuss the multilateral impact of Ecuadorian fisheries policies. Since 
Ecuadorian officials insisted that the updated regulations were part of a broader effort to 
conserve natural resources, U.S. officials emphasized again the desirability of Ecuador 
joining the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission so that they could conduct a 
scientific study of the tuna population in Ecuadorian.
86
 Finally, U.S. delegates hoped to 
discuss the issue of safe passage for U.S.-flag vessels in Ecuadorian waters, and to 
challenge directly the efforts of the Ecuadorian government to use the declarations of 
other nations to defend their own position. The State Department instructed Herrington 
and his team to remind the Ecuadorian representatives that no maritime nation, including 
the United States, would support a 200-mile limit.
87
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 The Conference on United States-Ecuadoran Fishery Relations was held from 25 
March to 14 April 1953 in Quito.
88
 Delegates at the conference focused on three main 
issues: 1) questions arising from the seizures of U.S.-flag fishing vessels; 2) examinations 
of the various acts and decrees that have caused the difficulties in U.S.-Ecuadorian 
fisheries relations, and; 3) ―ways and means‖ of increasing cooperation in fishery matters 
―of mutual interest and to the benefit of the two countries.‖ Thus the conference 
addressed both the issue of conservation, and the question of territorial waters limits.  
 The head of the Ecuadorian delegation, Rene Espindola Coronel, the Chief of the 
Fish and Wildlife Service of Ecuador, outlined the position of his government during the 
first plenary session. Arguing that it was within the right of the government of Ecuador to 
protect and conserve the natural resources found in the waters adjacent to the Ecuadorian 
coast, Espindola emphasized the contributions Ecuador had already made to inter-
American harmony and security.
89
 He reminded his audience of the willingness of the 
Ecuadorian government to allow the U.S. military to establish bases in Salinas and on the 
Galápagos during World War Two ―without thought of benefit for itself,‖ while also 
exporting to the United States ―substantial amounts‖ of primary resources for the war 
effort.
90
 Espindola hoped to convince U.S. delegates that he and the other Ecuadorian 
representatives were eager to work out a solution that would satisfy the needs of U.S. 
fishermen, protect the sovereignty of Ecuador, and ensure the delegates that Ecuador 
continued to support the United States. In other words, although changes in Ecuadorian 
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fishing regulations had created tensions in U.S.-Ecuadorian relations, part of Espindola‘s 
assignment was to convince U.S. policymakers that Ecuador still supported the United 
States. 
 Ambassador Paul Daniels outlined the U.S. position. Daniels also referred to the 
global dynamics of the task, but to him, the crucial task facing the delegates was to reach 
agreement concerning the political and economic aspects of the central questions under 
review.
91
 Daniels emphasized that delegates from each country needed to take into 
consideration the international aspects of the questions at hand, since the conservation of 
fisheries and the extent of sovereignty over territorial waters affected many nations. 
Herrington further emphasized this approach, commenting that, for the U.S. fishing 
industry, ―what we do with respect to Ecuador is an important matter influencing what 
we do or cannot do with respect to other nations.‖
92
 If the United States acknowledged in 
any way the right of the government of Ecuador to extend its territorial waters to 200-
miles from the coast, then other governments would expect similar treatment.  
 Overall, the 1953 conference settled little. In terms of U.S.-Ecuadorian relations, 
the delegates did manage to generate a list of general recommendations to alleviate the 
immediate problems caused by the detention of U.S.-flag fishing vessels. The first called 
for the establishment of a new licensing system to control fishing in Ecuadorian waters, 
and a review of the legality of reinstating the license-by-radio system.
93
 These changes, 
the delegates hoped, would allow U.S. fishermen to continue to operating in Ecuadorian 
                                                 
91
 ―The Conference on United States-Ecuadoran Fishery Relations: The Final Act of the Conference and 




 Daniels to Dulles, 14 April 1953, Central File 1950-54, Box 2758, RG 59, NACP. 
186 
 
waters while explicitly avoiding the legal definition of the limits of those waters.
94
 
Regarding the international questions, the representatives agreed that it was not within 
their ―competence to resolve differences in legal dispositions and juridical concepts of the 
United States and Ecuador regarding territorial waters and innocent passage.‖
95
 The 
question of territorial waters and safe passage, in other words, were international issues 
that the representatives gathered at the conference alone could not solve. Postponement 
by the Ecuadorian government of the actual implementation of the few recommendations 
agreed to by the delegates caused friction between the United States and Ecuador for the 
next several years. 
 These delays were due in part to the hesitation of Ecuadorian officials such as 
Espindola who worried that hasty implementation of the recommendations might suggest 
the willingness of the Ecuadorian government to do whatever it had to in order to please 
the United States.
96
 The perception of such willingness on the part of former president 
Arroyo del Rio almost ten years earlier had led to his defeat by Velasco Ibarra‘s Glorious 
Revolution. Now in office for a third term, Velasco Ibarra was unlikely to do anything 
that might similarly jeopardize his administration. In addition, Lorenzo Tous and Maurice 
Rankin were also working to delay the adoption of the conference recommendations in 
order to protect their own interests in the domestic Ecuadorian fishing industry.
97
 By late 
October 1953, word reached the Department of State that the Ecuadorian Senate had 
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voted unanimously to recommend that the Minister of Economy implement the 
recommendations from the United States-Ecuador conference.
98
 A few days later, the 
Ecuadorian Chamber of Deputies passed the resolution handed down from the Senate, 
and urged Minister of Economy Jaime Nebot Velasco to adopt the recommendations.
99
 
This was not the end of the delays. While Nebot claimed that the government could 
implement the recommendations within four months, he insisted that Ecuador needed 
first to acquire new patrol boats in order to monitor effectively the waters in question.
100
 
Just as his predecessors had done in the case of the Galápagos base, Nebot hoped to 
secure more advanced equipment from the United States to help the Ecuadorian 
government fulfill its duties—in this case patrolling the fisheries.  
 By September 1954, Nebot was still delaying the implementation of the 
recommendations from the bilateral conference. He insisted that Ecuador needed new 
patrol vessels, arguing that Ecuador ―could not open up its waters to foreign fishing fleets 
until the country has an effective means of patrolling the operations of the fishing 
vessels.‖
101
 Frustrated with the delays, officials at the Department of State and the U.S. 
Embassy in Quito began to develop a different approach.
102
 Speaking with Minister 
Nebot, Ambassador Paul Daniels suggested that perhaps it would be better to present the 
issue of territorial waters to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). When the Ecuadorian 
Navy began detaining and fining U.S. fishing vessels in 1950, State Department officials 
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had initially resisted this idea since they were not convinced that the ICJ would rule in 
their favor. They first wanted to try other methods of resolving the problem before 
resorting to the court.  
 Now, however, increased international pressure to abandon the three-mile limit, 
and the ongoing delays by the Ecuadorian government in reinstating the license system, 
suggested to some in the United States that the bilateral conference and discussions with 
various Ecuadorian elites had failed.
103
 With the actions of Ecuador and other countries 
growing, in the words of Herrington, ―more pugnacious, possibly encouraged by the 
failure of the U.S. to take positive action on the matter,‖ Herrington, William F. Gray, the 
Economic Attaché at the American Embassy in Quito, and others worried pushed for the 
submission of the case to the ICJ. They worried that continued delays on the part of the 
United States to submit the case might suggest to the Ecuadorians that U.S. officials 
doubted the strength of their case.
104
 In Gray‘s opinion, the United States would likely 
win if it took the case to the ICJ, while a refusal to submit the case by Ecuador would, he 
felt, put the Ecuadorian government at a ―psychological disadvantage‖ since officials 
could interpret this rejection as suggesting the weakness of the Ecuadorian case.
105
 The 
goal was to try and generate support at the ICJ for the U.S. position—a position that was 
quickly losing favor in Latin America. 
 While U.S. officials debated presenting their case to the ICJ, domestic events in 
the United States once again added to the pressure to settle the territorial waters issue. In 
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late September, Byron Blankinship from the Office of the Secretary of the Army met 
with Ambassador Chiriboga.
106
 Arguing that he personally considered the fisheries 
dispute to be the ―most serious current problem‖ between the United States and Ecuador, 
Blankinship emphasized the disappointment of State Department officials over the failure 
of the Ecuadorian government to enact the recommendations from the Quito conference. 
In his report back to Quito, Chiriboga relayed Blankinship‘s concerns.
107
 He pointed out 
that the American Tunaboat Association was one of the ―strongest‖ organizations in the 
United States, and that every time the Ecuadorian Navy detained a boat, Senators sent 
letters of protest to the Department of State.
108
 Recently the U.S. Congress had even 
passed legislation, according to Chiriboga, whereby the federal government would 
effectively pay the fines of any U.S. vessels detained by the Ecuadorian Navy. Public 
Law 680 stated that, whenever a foreign government detained and fined a U.S.-flag 
vessel for violating laws that the government of the United States did not recognize, the 
Secretary of State would act in defense of the crews of the vessels, and the U.S. Treasury 
would reimburse companies for any fines paid.
109
 This law, according to Chiriboga, 
encouraged tuna fishing companies to ignore the laws of other countries since the 
government would bail them out of any financial penalties that they might incur.
110
  
 One month later, an article by the United Press cited a representative for the 
American Tunaboat Association as saying that his organization would not recognize the 
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200-mile limit claimed by Ecuador, Chile and Peru.
111
 The Association was reportedly 
instructing the captains of fishing vessels that they were operating in waters considered as 
high seas by the U.S. government, and could therefore continue fishing these zones. To 
Chiriboga, this was proof of the negative effects brought on by the recent Congressional 
legislation.
112
 With the diplomatic efforts apparently stalled, U.S. fishing companies and 
Congress were attempting to solve the problem on their own. Chiriboga suggested that in 
response, the governments of Ecuador, Chile and Peru should detain as many vessels 
operating without licenses within the 200-mile zone as possible.
113
  
 Two months after calling for stronger reactions from the CEP governments, 
representatives from each government finally ratified the 1952 Santiago Accords.
114
 The 
Peruvian government had recently begun detaining unlicensed vessels passing through its 
own territorial waters.
115
 Spurred by these seizures, and the U.S. response to them, 
Peruvian officials sent word to the Foreign Ministry in Quito proposing that the CEP 
governments generate and ratify a united response to the recent U.S. protests.
116
 Such a 
show of unity by the CEP governments could come be helpful at the upcoming OAS 
conference. Ecuador hoped to get the Continental Shelf issue on the official schedule for 
the upcoming, 1954 OAS meeting in Caracas. 
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 Chiriboga suggested that the Ecuadorian representatives to the conference should 
push for three main provisions.
117
 All states should first agree to recognize the 
jurisdiction of each state over the natural resources found in the continental platform 
adjacent to their coast. This position differed from that of the United States as outlined in 
the Truman Proclamations since those decrees only claimed the right to create 
conservation zones in these waters without claiming specific jurisdiction over the natural 
resources located therein. Once each government acknowledged the rights of all coastal 
governments to legislate their portion of the continental shelf, Chiriboga suggested that 
delegates hold a special conference to work out the details of this system. Finally, in a 
nod to repeated U.S. insistence that governments wishing to conserve the natural 
resources of their waters first needed to gather scientific data concerning those resources, 
Chiriboga recommended the establishment of an Interamerican Oceanographic Institute 
to oversee the general conservation efforts of coastal nations.
118
 The ambassador hoped 
that these measures would contribute positively to a new system whereby individual 
governments could decide the limits of their territorial waters, while also working 
together to conserve the natural resources found in those waters. In that effort, however, 
Chiriboga acknowledged that officials might have to reconsider the 200-mile limit since 
it could create problems for smaller countries whose borders with their neighbors were 
less than 200-miles in distance.
119
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 Reporting from the Tenth Interamerican Conference at Caracas in March 1954, 
Chiriboga claimed victory for Ecuador. A working group of representatives had agreed 
on a resolution that ―practically‖ mirrored the Ecuadorian proposal concerning the 
continental shelf. To Chiriboga, this vote revealed the interest of all present in debating 
the issues as raised by Ecuador.
120
 The resolution called for the holding of a special OAS 
conference to study the legal and economic issues pertaining to the continental shelf and 
territorial waters.
121
 OAS members instructed representatives to the upcoming 
conference, scheduled for some time in 1955, to bring scientific evidence to support their 
claims.  
 As expected, representatives from the United States and Cuba attempted to block 
the consideration of the Ecuadorian proposal.
122
 For their part, the Cubans presented a 
counter-proposal that softened the Ecuadorian approach by eliminating specific reference 
to the 200-mile limit.
123
 The Brazilians also voted against the resolution, arguing that 
Ecuador and others should present the question instead to the United Nations.
124
 
Delegates to the OAS conference ultimately accepted the bulk of the Ecuadorian 
proposal, but representatives from the United States did manage to postpone further 
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 In the meantime, the capture of the Santa Ana and Arctic Maid by the Ecuadorian 
Navy proved to be the two most difficult to settle of all the detention cases. According to 
U.S. Embassy reports, on 28 March 1955, an Ecuadorian patrol vessel stopped the Arctic 
Maid for fishing illegally. While there was some debate over what happened next, one 
thing was clear—an Ecuadorian sailor shot a seaman working on the Arctic Maid.
126
 The 
captain of the Arctic Maid had stopped his vessel following the signal of an Ecuadorian 
patrol boat. Captain Kyros and Lieutenant Hugo Leon, the commander of the Ecuadorian 
ship, then had a short conversation. When Leon returned to his boat, Kyros prepared to 
leave.
127
 Kyros claimed that he waited ten minutes before actually leaving, but he soon 
realized that the patrol vessel was following and firing live rounds.
128
 Leon had ordered 
his crew to fire warning shots because it appeared that Kyros was fleeing and ignoring his 
arrest order.
129
 This volley of gunfire wounded seaman William Peck.
130
 The shooting of 
a U.S. fisherman by an Ecuadorian sailor marked a clear intensification of the dispute 
between the governments of Ecuador and the United States. 
 The note of protest over the Arctic Maid incident sent by Secretary of State Dulles 
to the Ecuadorian Foreign Office was much stronger than previous protests.
131
 Writing 
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that he was ―shocked‖ to learn that a member of the Ecuadorian Navy had shot a U.S. 
seaman, Dulles expressed his ―serious concern.‖
132
 Insisting that the Ecuadorian 
government release the Arctic Maid immediately and pay a ―suitable indemnity‖ for the 
wounding of Peck, U.S. officials warned that ―attempts to establish [territorial waters] 
claims by force cannot fail to arouse public opinion in the United States and to invite 
more serious consequences.‖ 
 Ecuadorian officials, however, disagreed with the U.S. interpretation of events as 
outlined in the note of protest. According to Undersecretary of Foreign affairs, Haime 
Suarez Morales, the government of Ecuador did not actually claim sovereignty over 200 
miles of ocean water. The Santiago Accord, according to Suarez, only claimed 
sovereignty over the fishing rights in that zone.
133
  
 Ambassador Sheldon Mills responded that the United States was sympathetic to 
Ecuadorian efforts to conserve the national resources of the oceans. He insisted that doing 
so, however, would require a formal agreement ratified by all states that held interests in 
the proposed conservation zones. A simple declaration by one, or even three, countries of 
a 200-mile limit to their territorial waters would not automatically make that limit 
international law.
134
 Suarez reminded Mills about the unilateral declarations of former 
president Truman concerning the continental shelf, stating that ―Ecuador was merely 
creating in the same way another new principle of international law.‖
135
 The bottom line, 
according to Mills, was that the U.S. government ―not only held that its vessels had the 
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right of innocent passage on the high seas but that they had the right to fish in the absence 
of an international agreement restricting such a right.‖
136
 U.S. Ambassador to the OAS, 
John Dreier argued that ―the main question now is what kind of pressure we can put on 




 On April 3, Ambassador Mills transmitted the official Ecuadorian response to the 
U.S. protest note.
138
 In it, acting Foreign Minister Gonzalez had rejected all three U.S. 
demands—to release the vessels, to offer assurance against future attacks, and to pay an 
indemnity for the wounded sailor.
139
 The Foreign Minister also denied that Leon and his 
men had fired on an unarmed vessel. Instead, he argued, the Ecuadorian sailors had 
merely fired warning shots at a ship that was attempting to flee.
140
 Regarding the U.S. 
charge that the government of Ecuador had tried to establish precedent by detaining U.S.-
flag fishing vessels, the Minister replied that ―normal exercise of the sovereignty of a 
state‖ can never be considered ―as an attempt to establish claims or demands to enforce 
respect for the sovereignty when its violation with impunity is intended as an act of 
legitimate defense.‖
141
 The Minister based this argument on the Truman Proclamations of 
1945, insisting that Ecuadorian officials were acting within the boundaries of 
international behavior as modeled by the United States. The Minister insisted, finally, 
that he could do nothing to speed the release of the Arctic Maid and the Santa Ana since 
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both were now under the control of the Ecuadorian courts. He also reasserted the 
Ecuadorian position that the government would continue to respect the right of free 
passage through its territorial waters except for when the passing vessels were fishing.
142
  
 The Arctic Maid incident, and the continued intransigence on the part of 
Ecuadorian officials, prompted a rethinking of the U.S. position within the Department of 
State. Rollin S. Atwood, the Director of the Office of South American Affairs, and 
Edward J. Sparks, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, met to 
discuss Atwood‘s recent meetings with Ecuadorian officials.
143
 Atwood had been sent to 
Quito in order to investigate the Arctic Maid case, and to try and gauge the position of the 
Ecuadorian government. He was then to return to Washington and meet with Mills in 
order to ―determine [the] next step most likely [to] influence the Ecuadoran attitude in 
[the] right direction.‖
144
 Atwood reported that the Ecuadorian officials with whom he had 
met would not budge, and he inquired if now would perhaps be a good time to suggest a 
new round of bilateral negotiations. Sparks thought that this would be a useless exercise, 
arguing that ―we had tried this once and the next step was theirs.‖
145
  
 Secretary of State Dulles supported Sparks‘s interpretation. Dulles sent Sparks a 
copy of a note to the government of Peru in which U.S. officials proposed a new round of 
negotiations with the Peruvians to try and solidify a bilateral agreement for the 
exploitation of tuna found in Peruvian waters, without dealing specifically with the 
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question of the 200-mile limit.
146
 Officials at the State Department recognized that 
perhaps they would be more likely to secure for the United States the fishing rights 
demanded by U.S. fishermen if they could negotiate with each CEP country individually, 
while avoiding altogether the legal question of territorial waters. Dulles himself 
supported this approach, writing to Ambassador Mills that the United States needed to 
―avoid being placed in [a] position of having to negotiate simultaneously with three 




 Soon after receiving this information from Dulles, Ambassador Mills met with the 
acting Foreign Minister and the Undersecretary of the Foreign Office in Quito.
148
 Mills 
relayed to the Ecuadorians the hopes of the U.S. government that together they could 
reach a diplomatic solution protecting the natural resources of the territorial waters.
149
 To 
this the Undersecretary responded that Minister of Economy Jaime Acosta Velasco 
favored the reinstating of a license by radio system. Although this was one of the two 
main recommendations agreed to during the 1953 bilateral conference between U.S. and 
Ecuadorian officials, things had changed. Now U.S. officials would not agree to the 
establishment of a license system that covered waters beyond the three-mile limit, which 
the United States continued to claim as high seas.
150
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 Faced with growing international pressure to abandon the traditional three-mile 
limit, policymakers in the United States did not want to give any indications that they 
acceded to these demands by forcing U.S. fishermen to abide by a licensing system that 
covered fisheries beyond the three-mile zone. If the United States and any, or all, of the 
CEP countries could reach an agreement establishing a system of conservation of these 
natural resources, then this agreement would apply to the vessels of each country.
151
 
While U.S. policymakers were willing to discuss a conservation agreement with all three 
countries, they would not consider the question of the 200-mile limit.
152
 Officials in the 
United States were now convinced that an international body where Washington enjoyed 
the support of nations outside of Latin America, such as the ICJ or the United Nations, 
could best settle the question of limits. They hoped to draw on global support, or at least 
the threat of that support, to convince the Ecuadorian government to abandon the 200-
mile limit.  
 With negotiations dragging on, both U.S. and Ecuadorian policymakers now 
focused on a new multilateral approach by insisting that the questions of conservation 
and limits on territorial waters were two distinct issues.
153
 Representatives would develop 
conservation agreements based on scientific studies of the natural resources found in the 
waters in question that would be ―open to the adherence‖ of those countries operating in 
these fisheries.
154
 Until the ICJ was able to make a firm decision on the matter of 
territorial water limits, U.S. officials proposed that all parties involved should agree to 
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reserve their respective legal positions (the 200-mile limit for CEP countries and the 




 As had happened before, Ecuadorian officials resisted the suggestion that the two 
issues should be, or even could be, separated. Such a separation, they realized, would 
only help the United States, while damaging the CEP claim to a 200-mile limit. As 
Ambassador Chiriboga explained, by separating the two issues and focusing on bilateral, 
or even multilateral, conservation agreements that ignored the question of territorial 
waters, U.S. officials were in effect implying that the three-mile limit was still in force.
156
 
Since all nations party to any potential conservation agreement would enjoy the right to 
exploit the natural resources found in the waters covered by the agreement, and since the 
United States considered those waters to begin at three miles from the coast, the 200-mile 
limit claim would effectively be null and void.
157
  
 Ambassador Chiriboga also insisted that his government would never agree to 
have the Arctic Maid and Santa Ana cases submitted to the ICJ unless the case focused on 
the legality of the Santiago Accord.
158
 Focusing instead on the legal questions involved in 
the seizing and fining of the two vessels would challenge Ecuadorian claims to 
sovereignty in ways that the government of Ecuador wanted to avoid. The Ambassador 
suggested that perhaps representatives to a regional conference, rather than an 
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international one, could best settle the territorial waters question. He reminded Sparks of 
the upcoming special conference of the OAS that would address the continental shelf 
issue, and that delegates to the United Nations were at that very moment considering the 
need for a global conference on the issue.
159
 Because opinion in the region was clearly 
not on their side, U.S. officials insisted that only the ICJ or the UN could solve the 
problem. A regional approach, according to Sparks, ignored the global pressures 
connected with fisheries matters. The expanding global reach of U.S. hegemony—as well 
as the tuna industry itself—meant that the regional approaches used by Washington 
during the Second World War to secure U.S. hegemony were no longer sufficient. If U.S. 
policymakers wanted to generate support for their three-mile limit, they would have to 
look outside of the hemisphere. 
 Ecuadorian officials worked with their colleagues from Chile and Peru to 
convince the United States to negotiate with the group. In addition to working on a group 
strategy for the UN conference, in early May 1955, officials from Peru, Chile, and 
Ecuador also began to discuss the possibility of holding a joint conference with U.S. 
officials.
160
 The Peruvians insisted that they would never abide by a decision handed 
down by the ICJ in this case since the territorial waters issue was a matter of national 
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 They also agreed to participate in a multilateral conference between CEP 
and U.S. representatives.
162
 Still, the Ecuadorian Ambassador was suspicious of the 
Chileans motives. He pointed out that the tuna populations in question lived primarily in 
the waters of Ecuador and Peru, yet Chile had initiated the 200-mile declaration. This 
action by the Chilean government, according to the ambassador, revealed their 
preoccupation with the growing power of the Peruvian Navy. The actions of the Chilean 
government might be an effort on their part to pressure officials in the United States to 
give Chile more economic aid. Uniting the historically-divided governments of Ecuador 
and Peru could bolster the image of Chile as an influential force in the region. The 
ambassador pointed out that the Chilean government was the only one of the CEP 
governments that had so far refrained from detaining and fining U.S. fishing vessels. 




 In Washington, State Department officials seemed to pick up on these weaknesses 
in CEP unity. They informed the U.S. ambassadors in Lima and Santiago that it was clear 
that the governments party to the Santiago Declaration were ―fully aware that their case 
would be extremely weak if brought before the ICJ and that they are therefore extremely 
reluctant to consider such a step.‖
164
 In the case of Ecuador, Ambassador Chiriboga also 
suggested that presenting the case to the ICJ could threaten the Ecuadorian position, 
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because the court contained of European nations that were more powerful than Ecuador, 
and that had their own fishing interests.
165
 When encountering arguments against the 
submission of the case to the ICJ, policymakers in Washington instructed the chiefs of 
mission in Quito, Lima, and Santiago to make it clear that officials in the United States 
saw no way to reach a satisfactory long-range agreement if ―the legal rights of the parties 
concerned continue to be the subject of controversy.‖
166
 Washington wanted an end to the 
detentions, while the CEP governments continued to insist on their right to control their 
territorial waters as they saw fit. Dulles thus suggested that the United States invite 
representatives from each government to participate in a joint conference that would 
focus specifically on the territorial waters issue.
167
  
 By June, all three of the CEP governments had agreed to defer for now the 
question of submitting the territorial waters issue to the ICJ.
168
 Foreign Minister 
Peñaherrera of Ecuador assured William Gray, the Economic Attaché for the U.S. 
Embassy in Quito, that the deferral was not a sign of unwillingness to negotiate. Instead, 
he argued that international law had never fully answered the question of international 
waters.
169
 CEP officials felt that the U.S. proposal to submit the question to the ICJ 
mischaracterized the problem as a ―basic legal controversy‖ when in fact it was ―a 
difference of evaluation of aspects of international law not yet defined but which are in a 
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 By deferring, CEP officials hoped to first explore all possible 
diplomatic routes among themselves and with U.S. officials before submitting the 
question to the ICJ. If no initial solution could be found, then ―submission to said Court 
could be considered eventually.‖
171
 For now, though, all three nations were willing to 




 In response to these notes, Sparks re-emphasized that the United States would not 
enter into any negotiations ―which imply acceptance of the 200-mile maritime claims.‖
173
 
Despite this, he still held out hope that a conservation agreement could be reached. 
Sparks remained confident that CEP representatives lacked the unity and international 
support to defend their case. The challenge would prove to be agreeing on the 
―acceptable terms.‖ CEP officials saw in all U.S. proposals for a conservation agreement 
the loss of sovereignty. On the other hand, U.S. officials saw in CEP counterproposals a 
direct challenge to the freedom of the seas, which had historically been a key provision in 
the development of U.S. hegemony.  
 The new conservation agreement conceived of by the United States would apply 
to both the high seas and to territorial waters, and it would cover the fishery resources ―of 
joint concern to the contracting parties‖ found within these waters.
174
 With reference to 
the question of limits, signatories of the convention would draft it ―without reference to 
                                                 
170






 Sparks to Murphy, 24 June 1955, Central File 1955-59, Box 2465, RG 59, NACP. 
174
 ―Negotiations with Chile, Ecuador and Peru Regarding Fishery Problem,‖ 1 July 1955, Central File 
1955-59, Box 2465, RG 59, NACP. 
204 
 
the claims of any of the four Governments with respect to territorial waters or other forms 
of special jurisdiction over the seas adjacent to their coasts.‖
175
 To further enforce the 
non-acceptance of the 200-mile limit by the United States, the official proposal for the 
conference made clear that ―such regulations, based as they are on your Government‘s 
claim to sovereignty over waters extending 200 miles from the coast, do not apply to the 
national of non-signatory states.‖
176
  
 This latest U.S. proposal for a joint conference exposed further weaknesses in the 
CEP coalition. Some Ecuadorian officials were already questioning the motives of the 
Chilean government in proposing the initial Santiago Accords. Now, however, the 
traditional divisions between the governments of Ecuador and Peru over their shared 
border resurfaced. Both governments agreed to postpone the conference of CEP 
representatives scheduled to take place on 18 July 1955 in Quito. This delay was in part 
an effort to give all governments involved a chance to solidify their positions prior to the 
meeting.
177
 At the same time, however, Peruvian Foreign Minister David Aguilar Cornejo 
wanted the delay because of the ―anti-Peruvian‖ campaign going on in the Ecuadorian 
press.
178
 By postponing the conference, the foreign minister hoped that the governments 
of Ecuador and Peru could project an image of unity instead of division.
179
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 Ambassador Chiriboga also presented his own suggestions for the conference 
with the United States. He warned that Ecuadorian representatives should not be too 
―obstinate‖ in their position when negotiating with their U.S. counterparts.
180
 Such a 
position might lessen the willingness of U.S. policymakers to help Ecuador with their 
―biggest territorial problem.‖
181
 Clearly referring to the Ecuador-Peru border dispute, 
Chiriboga suggested that ―elasticity and flexibility‖ on the part of the Ecuadorians would 
not preclude firmness and dignity.
182
 He also reminded his Foreign Minister that both 
Chile and Peru had been complacent in the face of State Department demands while 
simultaneously defending their right to the 200-mile limit. Chiriboga thus wanted to 
avoid taking a principled stand against the United States when the support of Chile and 
Peru appeared to be somewhat tenuous.  
 The final agreement at the joint conference between the United States, Chile, 
Ecuador and Peru failed to settle the territorial waters issue. While U.S. representatives 
offered some concessions designed to protect the fisheries of coastal towns such as 
Manta, ultimately delegates could reach no agreement concerning the extent of the 
territorial waters limit.
183
 In his report on the final agreement, Ecuadorian Foreign 
Minister Luis Antonio Peñaherrera commented that, while the CEP propositions 
presented to the United States offered the ―maximum concessions possible,‖ the U.S. 
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representatives accepted none of these suggestions.
184
 According to Peñaherrera, 
jurisdiction over territorial waters was still the biggest point of contention.
185
 CEP 
representatives had proposed, for example, that perhaps twelve miles of water could be 
under the direct control of each coastal nation, and that U.S. fishermen would be required 
to buy licenses to fish in these waters. This proposal did not seem to satisfy U.S. officials 
who argued that their instructions prohibited them from considering the conservation of 
any resources found within the maritime zone as defined in the Santiago Agreement. CEP 
unity was at a low point following the conference. Ecuadorian Foreign Minister Arizaga 
Vega argued that the Peruvian and Chilean officials had been irreconcilable concerning 
the 200-mile limit, while the Ecuadorians had been more flexible.
186
  
 The years 1956 to 1957 witnessed few significant changes in the territorial waters 
dispute—U.S. officials continued to push for a return to the three-mile limit, while 
officials in Ecuador continued to insist on a limit of 200 miles. In fact, the dispute over 
these fisheries continued through the 1970s during the period known as the ―tuna wars.‖ 
Negotiations over territorial waters from 1949 to 1957 represented a shift in U.S.-
Ecuadorian relations. As President Galo Plaza worked to develop modern industries in 
Ecuador, his decrees challenged influential U.S. tuna interests that were facing increasing 
global competition. No longer willing or able to come to the defense of all U.S. 
companies or industries operating in Latin America, officials in the Department of State 
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attempted to establish a Modus Operandi that would satisfy all concerns. These efforts 
failed, however, and the seizures and fines continued. As the Cold War deepened, U.S. 
officials found that countries as small as Ecuador could challenge the continued 
hegemony of the United States.  
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6. The Foreign Leader Program 
 From 1949 to 1957, U.S. policymakers continued to modify the exchange 
programs with the nations of Latin America, while also working to secure U.S. hegemony 
in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Building on the pioneering wartime U.S.-Latin 
American cultural programs, officials now introduced similar programs to other regions 
of the globe. The passage of the Fulbright and Smith-Mundt acts in 1946 and 1948 
respectively provided the legislative support for this expansion. P.L. 584 (the Fulbright 
Act) was designed to promote peace through educational exchange, while P.L. 402 (the 
Smith-Mundt Act) served as the mandate for all U.S. cultural programs, and expanded the 
Fulbright Program beyond its initial focus on participants in the wartime Lend-Lease 
Program. In addition, President Truman‘s Point Four program served as an early attempt 
to address a key limitation of previous programs. Focusing explicitly on technical 
assistance to developing nations in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, the Truman 
Administration hoped to raise living standards in these countries. Policymakers felt that 
this emphasis on technical assistance would lead to greater internal stability, a 
prerequisite for the private investors whose capital could jump start the various 
development projects recommended by Point Four specialists.  
 While U.S. officials deployed Point Four technicians throughout the Third World 
during the early Cold War, they also brought to the United States leaders from Ecuador 
and elsewhere under the Foreign Leader Program. Since its Beginning in 1947, 
policymakers running the Foreign Leader Program carefully selected grantees for their 
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potential roles as national leaders.
1
 They began their time in the United States with a one-
week training session in Washington, D.C. organized by the Department of State and the 
American Council on Education. This orientation offered grantees a basic introduction to 
the United States and its history, economy, geography, government and institutions, using 
lectures, discussion periods, films and tours.
2
 Ultimately, the Foreign Leader Program 
was designed to influence foreign public opinion by generating ―[a] better understanding 
of the United States‖ among influential members of those publics.
3
  
 To achieve the widest influence, the Foreign Leader Program rested on four 
central goals, each of which addressed specific issues related to the expansion of U.S. 
hegemony in the Third World. The first goal, ―to strengthen the unity of those nations 
devoted to the cause of freedom and to show that their interests and those of the United 
States coincide,‖ was an attempt to build on the hemispheric solidarity of World War 
Two, as perceived threats from the Communists replaced those by the Fascists. Through 
goal number two, ―to spread the conviction that the United States is an enlightened and 
strong power, determined to cooperate with and support other free nations in common 
undertakings of mutual benefit,‖ policymakers hoped to convince foreign peoples that 
cooperation with the United States would benefit all free nations. Goal number three, ―to 
stimulate among free nations the building of the unified strength necessary to deter 
aggression and secure peace,‖ reflected Wilsonian principles of peace and prosperity 
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through cooperation. The fourth and final goal, ―to develop and maintain psychological 
resistance to Soviet tyranny and imperialism,‖ connected the Foreign Leader Program 
with broader Cold War imperatives.
4
 According to the architects of the program, the need 
to resist effectively and immediately ―Soviet tyranny‖ lent the Foreign Leader Program 
―an urgency… which does not exist in other programs‖ since grantees returned to their 
leadership positions in their home countries after a relatively short stay in the United 
States.
5
 While ultimately focused on preserving long-term hegemony, then, officials 
designed the Foreign Leader Program to have a more immediate impact in the battle to 
contain Communism.  
 Running the Foreign Leader Program required the dedicated efforts of personnel 
from six organizations—the Office of International Labor Affairs, and the Women‘s 
Bureau, which were both part of the Department of Labor, the Office of Education, the 
International Educational Exchange Service (IES) of the Department of State, and finally, 
the Governmental Affairs Institute and the National Social Welfare Assembly, each of 
which was responsible for specific categories of grantees.
6
 Officials responsible for the 
creation and maintenance of the various programs did their best to adjust the workings of 
these programs to the evolving world-system. In terms of U.S.-Latin American relations 
from 1940 to 1948, that meant first solidifying hemispheric solidarity in the face of war, 
and then ensuring the continuation of this cooperation as the postwar world took shape. 
Though seldom stated this explicitly in the documents, during this era policymakers 
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treated education and educational exchange programs as tools for exposing Latin 
Americans to the United States and to U.S. ideas in order to encourage their consent to 
U.S. policy.  
 By the 1950s, policymakers had become more explicit in discussions of their 
vision for the role of education and educational exchange in furthering U.S. foreign 
policy. Appearing before the House Committee on Education and Labor in 1954, for 
example, Director Russell Riley of IES stated bluntly, ―the success of our foreign policy 
today depends largely on the willingness of other nations to cooperate with us on matters 
of common concern.‖
7
 Economics, politics, culture and security all fell under this 
category of ―common concern,‖ and each was a target of the Foreign Leader Program. 
Riley argued further that officials designed the exchange programs to ―provide an active 
form of cooperation through personal contact—through actual experience with America 
and Americans. In this way we are building up and maintaining a climate of opinion 
overseas favorable to the interests and policies of the United States.‖
8
 Policymakers now 
defined more clearly the underlying goal of hemispheric security that Washington had 
pursued during the war, and linked it to the educational exchange programs and the 
expansion of U.S. hegemony into the Third World. As the director reminded the 
Committee members, ―while the educational character of the program is clearly evident, 
it is also clear that its paramount purpose is to strengthen this Government‘s cooperative 
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 In so doing, policymakers designed the Foreign Leader Program, as 
well as other cultural programs during this time, to ―make evident the basic principles of 
the free world ideology to contrast the American way of life with that of the Communist-
dominated world and to provide material for arguments with which to counter those of 
Communism.‖
10
 Contrasting the ―American way of life with that of the Communist-
dominated world‖ became the guiding principle in U.S.-Third World cultural relations 
during this era.  
 In establishing this contrast, the image of the United States held by other peoples 
took center stage. One perception of the United States that troubled Riley and those 
running the exchange programs was the ―feeling prevalent in many countries that our 
motives are selfish and materialistic and our policies shallow and short range.‖
11
 This 
critique had been a common one leveled at U.S. businessmen operating in Latin America 
from the start of U.S. commercial relations with those republics. The information 
programs of President Roosevelt‘s Good Neighbor Policy had taken direct aim at this 
perception during the war. Now with the increased ideological tensions of the Cold War, 
the image of the cynical and greedy U.S. businessman and politician had to compete with 
the workers‘ paradise advertised by the Soviet Union. In Ecuador, embassy officials 
therefore recommended challenging any propaganda that described the United States as 
an imperialist nation, while simultaneously making sure that Ecuadorians understood that 
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international Communism was ―tyrannical imperialism promoted by the USSR.‖
12
 Thus, 
the Foreign Leader Program was part of a broader ―campaign of truth‖ designed to 
combat the Soviet‘s ―Hate American campaign.‖
13
  
 Officials worried too about propaganda that focused on racial inequalities in the 
United States.
14
 Those in charge of the Foreign Leader Program saw a need for a ―more 
thorough briefing of foreign leader grantees, before their departure for the United States, 
concerning certain racial discrimination which they will probably observe and perhaps 
may experience personally during their travels in this country.‖
15
 Because of the 
sensitivity of the issue, the State Department warned foreign officers to keep race in mind 
when nominating candidates, and ―persons who are likely to be so overwhelmed 
emotionally by instances of discrimination as to lose their general perspective should, 
when possible, be avoided as leader-grant candidates.‖
16
 Once they arrived in the United 
States, grantees attended lectures on a variety of subjects, many of which addressed the 
―minority problem‖ in the hopes of providing grantees with ―a fairly complete and 
objective picture of the situation and of its historical roots, and of the efforts which are 
being made to combat it.‖
17
 Policymakers hoped to diffuse the potentially explosive issue 
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of racism in the United States by teaching foreign leader grantees how ―objective‖ people 
in the United States understood the situation.  
 In the ideological battle between the United States and the Soviet Union, between 
capitalism and communism, the maintenance of the U.S. Empire continued to rest on the 
consent of foreign populations to U.S. policies. Challenges by nations such as Ecuador at 
times tested this consent. In part, officials designed the foreign leader program to limit 
those challenges by targeting leaders from the most influential sectors of foreign 
societies. In Ecuador and elsewhere in the region, this meant intellectuals, labor, 
university students and educators. The policymakers responsible for the design and 
implementation of the Foreign Leader Program hoped to expand the reach of their 
message by selecting leaders from these fields who would ideally spread the word. That 
message remained essentially the same as it was during the Second World War—only by 
supporting the United States and the world capitalist system promoted by Washington 
could the nations of the Third World prosper. 
 Education and training were key components of the Point Four program from the 
very beginning. In his inaugural address, President Truman argued that ―greater 
production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a 
wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge.‖
18
 
Before people could apply this knowledge, however, they had to be taught. The 
development and refinement of educational exchange programs designed to bring 
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technical experts from the United States to Latin America, and to bring Latin American 
leaders from technical fields to the United States for advanced training, were part of this 
project.  
 During this first decade of the Cold War, however, officials in the United States 
focused primarily on rebuilding Europe and securing U.S. hegemony in Asia. This often 
meant that U.S.-Latin American programs had to struggle for funding. In 1949, for 
example, policymakers in the United States informed U.S. Embassy officials in the 
American Republics that the budget for 1950 only allowed for approximately one leader 
or specialist from each country, because policymakers had expanded the program to the 
rest of the world under the Smith-Mundt Act.
19
 Despite this restriction, officials in 
Washington still hoped that the exchange programs would continue to play an ―important 
and integral part‖ in achieving State Department objectives.
20
 The limited budget simply 
meant that greater care had to be given to the nomination of potential grantees who were 
―in a position to influence a large segment of public opinion in their respective 
countries.‖
21
 With limited resources, officials wanted to be as efficient as possible in their 
attempts to influence foreign public opinion.  
 The primary goal of the Foreign Leader Program during this era paralleled that of 
U.S. foreign policy in general—securing and maintaining U.S. hegemony in the face of 
perceived Soviet expansionism. Instructions for the 1950 Leaders and Specialist program 
in labor, for example, indicated that the State Department was providing funds for up to 
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four trade unionists from Ecuador and other Latin American nations to come to the 
United States to observe first-hand U.S. trade union administration, organization, and 
labor management. Ideally, these grantees would ―absorb an understanding of the role of 
a free trade union movement in a democracy.‖
22
 As in the earlier struggle against fascism, 
policymakers tried to avoid the appearance of meddling in the internal affairs of foreign 
nations. The State Department reminded embassy officials of the political implications of 
the labor grants, and warned that they should not consider individuals who were, or who 
had been, active in political life. The Communists might identify such political recipients, 
and then accuse the United States of interfering in domestic politics.
23
  
 Such fears were had some basis in reality. During the early months of 1950, the 
Ecuadorian newspaper La Tierra, referred to by the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) in 
Quito Joseph Privitera as the ―Socialist organ of Quito,‖ ran a series of articles attacking 
the exchange programs of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. The author charged 
these programs with ―infringing upon the sovereign rights of the country.‖
24
 Privitera and 
others worried that such accusations could potentially affect the long-term success of the 
Foreign Leader Program in Ecuador. In order to best the Soviet Union and international 
communism, officials knew that they had to present the Foreign Leader Program as 
operating solely on a cooperative basis, as opposed to the totalitarian approach identified 
with the Soviets. 
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 Driven in part by this effort to control the image of the United States as reflected 
by the Foreign Leader and other exchange programs, State Department officials 
transferred responsibility for some of the program from the State Department to various 
outside organizations.
25
 Policymakers contracted the Department of Labor and 
Agriculture, the Federal Security Agency, the Governmental Affairs Institute, and the 
National Social Welfare Assembly. Together these organizations assumed responsibility 
for the programming of 1,072 leaders for fiscal year 1952 from the fields of labor, 
women‘s activities, agriculture, education, public health, social welfare, community 
affairs, and youth activities.
26
 State Department officials described these transfers as an 
important phase in the Foreign Leader program since the Leaders and Specialists Branch 
was now relieved of a number of administrative duties. With a lighter administrative 
load, officials working in the Leaders and Specialists Branch could now focus on the 
remaining areas of information (press, radio, and motion pictures), cultural activities, and 
other ―miscellaneous‖ categories—leaving them with ―direct responsibility‖ for 554 
leaders during 1952.
27
 This move, policymakers argued, would also improve the 
experiences of foreign leaders since their professional counterparts in the United States 
would were now scheduling the leaders‘ itineraries.  
 In her report on activities in Ecuador for 1949, Acting Public Affairs Assistant 
Lottie Paez argued that, in general, the exchange programs in Ecuador were bringing 
about a ―higher standard in the social and economic life of the country and consequent 
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improved economic and cultural relations with the United States.‖
28
 Many returned 
Ecuadorian grantees held ―key positions‖ in the national government which had ―in 
varying degrees…improve[d] its services by utilizing the experiences gained by U.S. 
trained personnel.‖ In discussing the role of the American School of Quito, the ―best 
educational institution in the country,‖ Paez argued that ―the Ecuadorans who have 
graduated thus far reflect their training in democratic ideals and purposes.‖ She 
concluded that ―no better foundation could be laid than this for combating communistic 
and other totalitarian ideologies.‖  
 As further evidence of the effectiveness of the exchange programs with Ecuador, 
Paez sent officials in the State Department a newly published agricultural magazine. The 
Office of Agriculture in Ecuador, headed at that time by Antonio Garcia who had been a 
State Department grantee in 1948, as well as a scholarship student at the University of 
Michigan, published the magazine. In addition, Hernan Orellana, who was a Department 
of Agriculture grantee in 1949, served as the chief editor. Inside the magazine, 
Ecuadorians nominated by embassy officials to receive training grants wrote three of the 
lead articles, and former Ecuadorian grantees and U.S. technicians assigned to Ecuador 
wrote eleven more.
29
 In a country with an economy heavily dependent on agriculture, 
evidence of U.S. influence in this crucial field was a particular triumph.  
 Similarly, a number of leader grantees had since returned to Ecuador where they 
were reportedly using their new training. These included the Director of Census and 
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Statistics, the Director of Forestry, the Director of the Public Health Center in Quito, the 
Director of the School of Agriculture of the University of Guayaquil, the Director of the 
Agricultural Experimental Station in Portoviejo and the Director of Civil Aviation. The 
present Minister of Public Works had also studied engineering in the United States under 
the auspices of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, and the Minister of Economy had 
received an IIE fellowship to study economics in the United States. All of these examples 
suggested to Paez and others running the exchange and training programs that their 
efforts to influence a wide range of Ecuadorians were paying off. 
 The years 1948 to 1956 were a time of unprecedented political stability in 
Ecuador as three consecutive presidents completed their full terms in office. This period 
began with the election of Galo Plaza to the presidency in 1948. Through his efforts to 
establish the American School of Quito, Galo Plaza had proven himself a champion of 
education, and close relations with the United States. Or, as he himself put it in an 
address at the University of North Carolina: 
 from my experiences as a student in the United States I learned to admire and love 
 this great nation of yours and always dreamt that knowledge and understanding of 
 both our cultural backgrounds could bring about a powerful democratic America 




Throughout his career Galo Plaza worked to improve cultural understandings among 
American peoples. As president he continued this crusade by consistently embracing 
opportunities to expand and improve cultural relations between Ecuador and the United 
States.  
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 In his 1950 address to the Ecuadorian congress President Galo Plaza promised to 
coordinate his administration‘s educational activities with those of its economic 
development program.
31
 He used the new rural education program, which operated in 
cooperation with the Servicio Cooperativo Interamericano de Educación run by the 
Education Division of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs under the Point Four 
Program, as an example of the impact he hoped to make. The program was preparing 
teachers and curricula ―which will assist rural citizens in reaching a higher economic 
level by using better methods of farming, and at the same time, enable them to enjoy a 
higher standard of living.‖
32
 This approach was clearly in-line with the goals of Point 
Four. Galo Plaza also praised the work of public finance technicians from the United 
States who were ―assisting us to put our fiscal system in order,‖ as well as U.S. 
technicians in agriculture and public health. In short, Galo Plaza used his congressional 
address to assert his determination to continue working closely with the various exchange 
and development programs of the United States. 
 Underlying U.S.-Latin American relations during this era was the concern of U.S. 
officials over the issue of political stability. Instability was considered to be a breeding 
ground for communism. Two years into his term, Galo Plaza had already been in office 
longer than the average Ecuadorian head of state, yet USIE officials still worried that ―the 
political scene [was] charged with numerous cross-currents and present[ed] a potentially 
dynamic situation.‖
33
 Traditional divisions among the political and economic elites of 
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Guayaquil and Quito were once again visible, as individuals on both sides tried to 
maximize benefits for their home region. Galo Plaza thus faced ―political and regional 
groups and combinations [that] vie behind the scene to upset the existing balance of 
power which may possibly result in the overthrow of the administration.‖
34
 These 
divisions were had emerged earlier during the territorial waters dispute discussed earlier 
as the fisherman‘s union in the coastal town of Manta pressured the Ecuadorian Congress 
and Galo Plaza to protect their local interests.  
 When it came to political stability in Ecuador and The Third World, U.S. officials 
often were not quick to give promising leaders the benefit of the doubt. In Ecuador, USIE 
officials were particularly concerned with the ―marked impartiality‖ to foreign 
―propaganda‖ that they saw in the actions of Galo Plaza. The president had granted 
tourist and official passports to ―known and suspected Communists.‖
35
 Despite Galo 
Plaza‘s long history of allegiance to the United States and of championing U.S. 
ideologies, during the early years of the Cold War, some U.S. officials considered any 
appearances of impartiality to communism to be a dangerous sign.  
 Not surprisingly, PAO Privitera and others saw the influence of communists most 
clearly in the cultural and educational organizations in Ecuador, the majority of which he 
described as ―either controlled or infiltrated by leading intellectual Socialists and other 
Left-Wing representatives.‖
36
 Privitera claimed that Galo Plaza‘s apathy towards 
communist propaganda encouraged this alignment of intellectuals with communism. The 
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president, he claimed, viewed communism with ―an apparent blandness,‖ so that ―many 
of the cultural leaders consider it, if not fashionable, at least smart, to possess Leftist 
tendencies.‖
37
 This made Ecuador, according to Privitera, a ―soft under-belly‖ on the 
West Coast of South America that ―offer[ed] a unique haven to international 
Communists.‖
38
 As his colleagues had before him following the attack on Pearl Harbor, 
Priviterra emphasized the strategic importance of Ecuador in the struggle to maintain 
U.S. hegemony.  
 By 1952, the overriding psychological objective in the State Department‘s 
Country Plan for Ecuador was to challenge attitudes of neutralism that Privitera claimed 
were prevalent among some segments of Ecuadorians, while simultaneously convincing 
them that economic and cultural cooperation with the United States and other free nations 
was in the best interest of Ecuador.
39
 In addition, Embassy staff encouraged the 
government of Ecuador to continue its support of U.S. policies at the United Nations and 
at the Organization of American States. Privitera reported that Ecuadorian officials had 
already provided ―strong support of U.S. regional and world policies‖ in both 
organizations, thus revealing their support of U.S. hegemony.
40
 In this connection, 
officials also pointed to the ―absence of significant trade‖ with the USSR or with Soviet 
satellites. Policymakers considered this absence, along with the lack of diplomatic 
relations between Ecuador and the Soviet Union, to be evidence of Ecuadorian support 
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for the United States.
41
 Despite these positive signs, serious problems remained. 
Economic underdevelopment, a relatively low standard of living, social unrest, and a high 
percentage of illiteracy were all significant enough to cause U.S. officials to worry that 
Ecuadorians were susceptible to communist propaganda.
42
  
 In 1952, Galo Plaza completed his full term and handed over the reins to Velasco 
Ibarra, whom Ecuadorians had elected to a third term as president. Velasco Ibarra 
inherited a country that, at least on paper, was experiencing a period of prosperity that 
was unusual in its recent history.
43
 Yet the return of Velasco Ibarra brought new concerns 
for U.S. officials who never fully understood his behavior. Velasco Ibarra‘s allegiance to 
the cultures of Europe, particularly French culture, combined with his populist image to 
cause worry in Washington. Still, officials held out hope, since Embassy staff reported 
that the top members of the new administration were ―uniformly anti-communist and 
right of center.‖
44
 The Minister of Education, Jose Martinez Cobo, for example, had 
stated that he would ―drive out every communist he could from government posts and 
from the schools of the nation.‖
45
 Despite the change in presidential administrations, the 
targets of USIE efforts in Ecuador remained largely the same as they had been during 
Galo Plaza‘s administration—intellectuals, labor, university students and educators.  
 From 1953 to 1957, U.S. officials continued to fine tune the Foreign Leader 
Program. Initially, this meant building up the specialist division, which policymakers had 
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 In 1956, the new Leaders and Specialist Division of IES was then 
split into three different branches—Foreign Leaders, American Specialist and Foreign 
Specialist—as officials at IES worked to expand the program into Asia and Africa.
47
 Out 
of the 192 American Specialist grants awarded during this year, 97 went to grantees 
traveling to Asia and Africa while officials divided the rest of the grants evenly between 
specialists traveling to Europe and to Latin America. These specialists represented 
twenty-five fields—youth leadership, journalism, music, religious affairs, community 
recreation and welfare, history, agriculture, philosophy, law, women‘s affairs, atomic 
energy, literature, sciences, economics, political science, public administration, 
communications, theater, labor, education, art, medicine, English teaching, social 
services, and library science.
48
 When combined, these fields covered the most important 




 During the early Cold War, exchange programs enjoyed the support of President 
Eisenhower, who, during his address to the 1953 annual meeting of the American 
Council of Education, argued that greater mutual understanding was the key to continued 
peace in the world:  
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 I am talking about the understandings that must come about in the world, if we are 
 to achieve, in this day and time, that sort of machinery—the kind of techniques—




Achieving this understanding, the president suggested, required the continued efforts of 
educators, administrators and officials around the world since ―your programs of 
interchange of students and professors and others in schools, is one of the great ways—
one of the principal ways—that this can come about.‖
51
 Regarding Latin America, a 1953 
report on South America urging the president to strengthen the exchange programs 
written by the president‘s brother, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, reinforced President 
Eisenhower‘s belief in cultural exchange.  
 In addition to the usual rhetoric praising mutual understanding and cooperation in 
terms of economics, politics and the military, Dr. Eisenhower argued that ―the whole 
inter-American system is and must be based on the reality of juridical equality and the 
concept of consent, not coercion.‖
52
 This juridical equality was one of the central 
concerns of Latin American governments involved in the territorial waters negotiations. 
Their representatives insisted that each government be granted equal freedom in 
determining the limits of national sovereignty. One could interpret Dr. Eisenhower‘s 
statement on equality in various ways. On the one hand, he was suggesting that relations 
between all of the independent republics of the inter-American system had to be treated 
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as relationships among equals, with no state using its superior strength to force another to 
do something against its will. On the other hand, Dr. Eisenhower clearly positioned the 
United States at the head of this system. Nowhere in his report did he suggest otherwise. 
Therefore, one could also read this passage as emphasizing the need for the United States 
to generate consent to its policies among the various populations of the Americas—an 
interpretation born out in the language of the report.  
 In discussing economic cooperation, for example, Eisenhower noted that ―we 
found misunderstanding of the United States in South America—misunderstanding 
especially of our economic capacity and an underestimation of the degree of the 
sacrifices the people of the United States have made since 1941.‖
53
 Eisenhower was 
concerned that the peoples of Latin America misunderstood the position of the United 
States, particularly the capacity for the United States to solve Latin American economic 
problems during this time when the United States was focused elsewhere globally. In this 
case, then, the image projected by the United States needed to be a realistic one that did 
not raise Latin Americans‘ expectations too high. Eisenhower saw education and training 
as the keys to achieving this goal. He reported that around 70,000 students each year 
enrolled in American-sponsored schools in South America, and that the technical 
cooperation programs were some of the ―most successful methods of promoting mutual 
understanding.‖
54
 Despite the evidence of misunderstanding in the field of economics, 
which Dr. Eisenhower argued needed to be addressed, he concluded that in general ―we 
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learned that in South America there is a growing understanding of the United States, its 
methods, and its philosophy.‖ Dr. Eisenhower urged his brother to continue fostering this 
understanding through expanded programs of intellectual and cultural cooperation.  
 The Foreign Leader Program in Latin America continued to grow during the 
Eisenhower Administration. In 1954, IES officials requested, and received, 
supplementary appropriations from Congress targeted exclusively at Latin America.
55
 Dr. 
Eisenhower‘s report of the previous year seemed to be having an effect. With this new 
funding, IES was able to award grants to three times as many foreign leaders from Latin 
America for the upcoming 1955 fiscal year than they had been able to for 1954.
56
  
 Yet problems with the educational exchange programs in Ecuador continued. 
While eight years of continuous economic growth had led to an expansion of jobs, for 
example, there were still not enough job opportunities for even the ―limited number‖ of 
college-educated Ecuadorians. The total number of lawyers and liberal arts graduates was 
―far in excess‖ of the number of jobs available.
57
 This problem was part of a broader 
issue that threatened to undermine U.S. cultural policies throughout Latin America—the 
relative slowness with which the benefits of these programs reached the masses. In the 
case of Ecuador, the lack of jobs for the college educated suggested significant holes in 
the development of Ecuador‘s infrastructure. If those who were doing what they thought 
was necessary to compete and to succeed in the economic system promoted by their 
government were having trouble finding opportunities, then that foreshadowed even 
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greater difficulties for the disenfranchised masses. Nevertheless, embassy officials and 
their colleagues in Washington worked to expand Ecuadorian participation in the 
exchange programs. 
 The working journalist program was part of this growth in interest in U.S.-Latin 
American exchanges. In an effort to reach a broader audience outside of the United 
States, U.S. officials began in 1951 to bring groups of journalists from other countries to 
the United States.
58
 Under this program, officials hoped to provide grantees with 
―working knowledge of American newspaper practices; and, by their experience as 
members of American communities, to provide them with a factual knowledge of life in 
the United States which they [would] report to their home newspapers.‖
59
 Policymakers 
modeled the program on a NATO operation that had proven successful. Journalists who 
had participated in that program had written a ―large number‖ of articles that were 
favorable to the United States.
 60
 As one participant put it, ―it is through exchange 
programs such as yours that a great deal is done to remove misunderstandings and to 
create a spirit of community among the peoples of the western world which is essential if 
they are to hold their own in these dangerous times.‖
61
 This was precisely what 
policymakers wanted. For the new Latin American program, they planned to bring three 
to four groups of working journalists—not owners of newspapers—from the region to the 
United States for tours lasting thirty days.  
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 The ultimate goal of the journalist program was to give the participants 
opportunities to experience a variety of areas of life in the United States—industrial, 
political, social, agricultural, military, general economic, and cultural. These experiences, 
policymakers hoped, would generate a ―greater understanding‖ of life in the United 
States, as well as of U.S. public opinion, and ultimately of U.S. foreign and domestic 
policies. The underlying theme of the program was to convince the journalist of the 
preparedness and willingness of the United States to ―contribute to the defense efforts 
and economic well being of the rest of the free world.‖ The journalist program thus fit 
within the Cold War paradigm of U.S. foreign policy during this era.
62
 By 1955, the 
working journalist program had become so successful and popular, that every Latin 
American post that had already sent a participant requested more grants for 1956.
63
 
 Many of the exchange programs had long-term effects that were hard to measure. 
There were, however, exchange programs that showed more immediate results. Programs 
in military and police training, for example, sought to ensure internal stability in Ecuador 
by training the national security forces using methods developed in the United States. 
Regarding these programs in, PAO Walter Bastian echoed earlier reports that the 
technical assistance programs focused on the military and police forces ―dwarfed‖ the 
IES program.
64
 This imbalance between the military and police programs and those 
targeting civilians made sense to Bastian and others who believed that ―he who 
control[led] the army control[led] the government,‖ in Ecuador. These men felt that ―the 
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favorable regard in which the army now holds the United States‖ was due ―to the large 
number of officers and enlisted men who have trained at American service schools.‖
65
  
 In addition to the programs of military training, IES staff also oversaw a Foreign 
Specialist Group program aimed at Ecuadorian police administrators. Two of the 
participants, Lieutenant Jaime Cabrera and Lieutenant Pacifico de los Reyes, had 
―profited greatly‖ from the program. Both trainees expressed ―complete satisfaction‖ 
with the program, and according to Cultural Affairs Officer (CAO) Michael Karnis, their 
participation would ―assist us greatly toward the realization of our country objectives.‖
66
 
As with the Ecuadorian military, the National Police in Ecuador was ―on most friendly 
terms with the American mission.‖ The police offered their support ―in every way 
possible, its chiefs being fully aware of the value which the police training grants have 
had for its participants.‖
67
 In terms of internal security, then, the Ecuadorian military and 
police forces seemed firmly embedded in the U.S. camp.  
 In January 1955, embassy officials in Quito nominated Enrique Echeverria 
Galvanes and Antonio Romo Davila for the working journalist program.
68
 Walter Bastian 
described Echeverria, who worked for El Universo in Guayaquil, as a ―serious-minded‖ 
and ―extremely able‖ newspaperman, who asked ―searching and penetrating questions at 
press conferences.‖
69
 Echeverria was also serving as the General Counsel for the national 
journalist union in Ecuador, and thus he was in a position of some influence over his 
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 Embassy staff also nominated Rafael Gomez Buenaño, and Rafael 
Alberto Borja Ortega. Gomez was a general assignment reporter for El Comercio, and 
Borja was the Editorial Chief of the Quito bureau of El Universo. If forced to nominate 
only one, Bastian suggested that Gomez was more important because he worked for the 
influential El Comercio, which had long been a target of USIS interest in Quito.
71
 Yet 
Bastian recommended that ―in order to extend American influence as widely as possible 
in this priority country, means be found to effect both grants at this time.‖
72
 Again, 
because of its geographic location and relative weakness when compared to its immediate 
neighbors, some U.S. officials, among them PAO Bastian, considered Ecuador to be a 




 In December 1955, U.S. embassy officials also nominated Nicolas Ulloa Figuera 
for a foreign journalist grant. Bastian claimed that Ulloa‘s nomination was especially 
important since he would someday inherit and direct his father‘s newspaper La Prensa. 
Thus, according to Bastian, ―a grant to him would help to dispose a newspaper to the 
national interest of the United States for many years ahead.‖
74
 Described as ―friendly‖ 
towards the United States, Bastian suggested that Ulloa still needed a deeper 
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 While officials had already exhausted the 1956 budget for the journalist program 
in Ecuador with the awards for Gomez and Ulloa, Bastian wrote the Department 
requesting special assistance for the Ecuadorian journalist Lilo Linke. Described as the 
―most important woman journalist in the country,‖ Linke had been born in Germany and 
was ―highly respected‖ in Ecuadorian cultural circles.
76
 As a special features author for 
El Comercio, the owners of the Quito daily had already agreed to pay Linke‘s salary 
while she traveled to the United States on a trip sponsored by the Agricultural Division of 
the U.S. Operations Mission in Ecuador. Arguing that Linke‘s column written from the 
United States would have ―considerable influence among out [sic] primary target 
audience,‖ Bastian hoped that the State Department would agree to pay her per diem 
expenses.
77
 In addition to her work as a journalist, Linke was also a respected author who 
wrote an influential English-language history of Ecuador, but as a German, officials 
certainly would not have offered her this opportunity fifteen years earlier.
78
 The shift 
from the anti-fascism of World War Two to the anti-Communism of the Cold War made 
her story possible. 
 Linke was not the only Ecuadorian author awarded a Foreign Leader grant. As 
mentioned earlier, Benjamin Carrion was also among those Ecuadorians nominated for 
foreign leader grants during this period. Carrion was a leading author in Ecuador, as well 
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as the former secretary general of the Socialist Party of Ecuador. In 1955, the Secretary 
General of the OAS, Carlos Davila, extended an invitation to Carrion to present a lecture 
at the Pan American Union.
79
 State Department officials felt that this would be a perfect 
opportunity to award a foreign leader grant to Carrion. This was a period when U.S. 
policymakers were emphasizing the role of international organizations such as the OAS, 
and the UN in maintaining the international system promoted by Washington. A foreign 
leader grant from the United States for Carrion could perhaps win favor among the 
member states of the OAS who were, after all, at this time challenging the U.S. insistence 
on the three-mile limit on territorial waters. Though the brief biographical sketch that 
accompanied Carrion‘s application stated that his ―exact political stand‖ was ―unknown,‖ 
Davila‘s interest in him impressed U.S. officials. Officials therefore awarded Carrion a 
grant, and his trip proved to be a great success. Although he was a known leftist, Bastian 
reported that Carrion was now showing a ―marked interest‖ in a cultural treaty with the 
United States. This development, according to Karnis, was significant since Carrion was 
a man of ―great national stature‖ who as president of the ―communist-infiltrated‖ Casa de 
Cultura was ―listened to with great respect.‖
80
 
 From the labor division of the Foreign Leader Program, U.S. officials in Quito 
nominated Cesar Humberto Navarro. Navarro was a Senator, but Bastian claimed that he 
now had no political affiliations after the Socialist Party expelled him for being too 
conservative.
81
 This was not the first time that embassy officials had worked with 
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Navarro. In 1945, Navarro had helped to arrange a meeting with Ecuadorian labor leaders 
of ―non-communist leanings‖ and Kenneth Holland during the latter‘s travels in Ecuador, 
and this had impressed Embassy staff. Because the Ecuadorian government had already 
agreed to fund Navarro‘s trip to the United States so that he could investigate ways to 
increase U.S. tourism to Ecuador, Bastian and others at the embassy felt that this might 
be a good time to approach the senator. Navarro, Bastian argued, represented ―the 
middle-of-the-road leader who is very scarce indeed in Ecuador,‖ and in order to reach 
labor parties in Ecuador, which were primary targets of the Foreign Leader program, 
Bastian believed that they needed to ―begin with such a person as Navarro who is already 
somewhat predisposed toward us.‖
82
 Starting with someone from the far left who might 
be unwilling to participate, or whose participation the communists might easily use 
against him and the United States, seemed like an unwise decision at this point. 
 In addition to the leaders discussed above, Ecuadorian students also continued to 
receive Foreign Leader grants. Of the several graduate students grantees for 1955, the 
name Juan Miguel Quevedo Garcia stood out. The son of a former Ecuadorian delegate to 
the United Nations, Quevedo was also a lawyer for an Ecuadorian firm that handled more 
cases for U.S. businesses operating in Ecuador than any other local practice.
83
 Given his 
intellectual ability, his ―social presence‖, his previous experiences living in the United 
States, and his desire to study comparative law in order to better serve the U.S. 
companies he represented in Ecuador, CAO Karnis ranked Quevedo‘s nomination at the 
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top of the list.
84
 Differences in legal interpretations did at times develop into challenges 
to U.S. hegemony in the Third World. Attempts to foster common legal points of view, as 
represented by Quevedo‘s grant, were thus part of the broader goal of maintaining the 
U.S. Empire. In addition to the graduate students, four out of the six undergraduate 
nominees for 1955 were graduates of the American Schools of Guayaquil and Quito—
both schools thus seemed to be achieving the desired long-term effects envisioned by 
Galo Plaza Lasso, Boaz Long and their colleagues.
85
 Having graduated from institutions 
designed to make it easier for Ecuadorian students to continue their education in the 
United States, policymakers now offered these students an opportunity to continue their 
education in the United States. 
Given the heightened ideological tensions of the Cold War, officials running the 
exchange programs during this era continued to worry about the political implications of 
the foreign leader grants. In 1956, cultural affairs officers in Quito and officials at the 
Department of State had awarded Humberto Navarro a foreign leader grant in labor. CAO 
Karnis worried that any perceived connection between Navarro and the U.S. government 
could weaken his position as a labor leader. Navarro himself had raised this concern, and 
he had thus secured his own transportation to Miami. From Miami Navarro would then 
take a bus to Washington, D.C., to avoid any appearance of a connection with the U.S. 
government. This, PAO Bastian argued, was a ―highly unorthodox‖ approach. Since 
Navarro was one of the few ―well-oriented labor leaders of importance‖ in Ecuador, 
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Bastian thought that the elaborate procedure was necessary in order to ―preserve the 
appearance that his anti-communist campaign is completely his own idea.‖
86
 In this 
ideological battle between the White House and the Kremlin, appearances were 
extremely important. The message that U.S. policy was not imperialistic might be 
difficult to believe if Latin Americans know about the direct government funding of 
foreign leader grants, particularly of grantees such as Navarro who worked in politically 
sensitive fields.  
This sensitivity to the political implications of Foreign Leader grants was, of 
course, part of the rational for outsourcing the running of these programs to the private 
companies discussed earlier. Still, as had happened during the Arroyo del Rio 
Administration, Ecuadorian officials again tried to manipulate the workings of the 
exchange programs for political ends. When in 1957 news reached Quito that former 
president Velasco Ibarra was returning from Uruguay, where he had been teaching, the 
sitting president, Camilo Ponce, confidentially asked Ambassador Christian Ravndal if 
the ambassador could arrange for an offer for him to teach in the United States.
87
 Ponce 
had heard rumors that Velasco Ibarra was associating with leftists in Montivideo, and he 
believed that the former president ―should be insulated against the Left [in Ecuador] and 
that the best way to accomplish this would be to offer him a chair at an American 
university of prestige.‖
88
 During the previous administration of Velasco Ibarra, Ponce had 
been a vocal critic of his policies. With the former president scheduled to return to 
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Ecuador, Ponce worried that the populist, who he described as a ―potent political figure‖, 
might constitute a threat to the stability of Ponce‘s administration.
89
 Velasco Ibarra‘s 
association with Carlos Guevara Moreno, a ―Peron-type‖ leader of Ponce‘s main 
opposition party, the Concentration of Popular Forces (C.F.P.), was of particular concern 
to the sitting president.
90
 Guevara too would soon be a person of interest to officials 
running the foreign leader program.
91
  
Policymakers in the United States tended to have a hard time trusting Velasco 
Ibarra. This issue had surfaced during the president‘s first two administrations in 1934 
and 1944. Now, almost nine years later, Ambassador Ravndal returned to past themes. He 
described Velasco Ibarra‘s political outlook as being comprised of ―elements of 18
th
 
century French liberalism, nationalism, and paternalism overlaid with his own highly 
unpredictable personality.‖ These descriptors were all buzzwords for someone about 
whom U.S. officials needed to worry.
92
 According to Ravndal, ―a sojourn in the United 
States under proper conditions might make Velasco Ibarra more sympathetic to our point 
of view,‖ and thus such a trip ―would be in the interest of the United States.‖
93
 This type 
of political manipulation was nothing new. In 1944, president Arroyo del Rio had 
successfully kept his political enemies from participating in the exchange programs that 
the Department of State was then beginning to formalize. Now, however, the situation 
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was a bit different as Ponce hoped to keep his political rival even from returning to 
Ecuador.  
Interested in Ponce‘s plan, Secretary of State Dulles and others at the Department 
of State began arranging for a lectureship for Velasco Ibarra. These early efforts to find a 
prominent U.S. university to invite the former president pleased President Ponce.
94
 He 
emphasized, however, that the offer should come from a university, rather than from any 
organization directly linked to the U.S. government in order to avoid any appearance of 
government meddling. Ambassador Chiriboga predicted that Velasco Ibarra had a ―good 
chance‖ of becoming President of Ecuador again, and since he had never before been to 
the United States, Chiriboga felt that ―it would certainly be a good thing for him to be 
invited here by an American university.‖ In doing so, the U.S. government might 
neutralize Velasco Ibarra, while also assisting President Ponce who had proven to be ―a 
true friend of the United States.‖
95
 To the Ecuadorian ambassador, then, a lectureship in 
the United States for Velasco Ibarra could benefit both Ecuador and the United States, 
both now and in the future. Ultimately, however, assistant secretary of state for Latin 
American Affairs Roy Richard Rubottom informed Chiriboga that Velasco Ibarra was 
proving to be a ―difficult person to sponsor.‖ Rubottom offered the ambassador no 
encouragement that the situation would improve.
96
 Thus, officials dropped the plan to use 
the exchange program as a pretext to remove Velasco Ibarra from Ecuador for political 
purposes. 
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 In connection with the Velasco Ibarra plan, Ambassador Ravndal realized that a 
grant for CFP leader Guevara, the man identified as the one responsible for bringing 
Velasco Ibarra back to Ecuador, might also contribute to political stability in Ecuador. 
Ravndal suggested that the Department of State award Guevara some type of travel grant 
allowing him to come to the United States in order to both ―orient him to the American 
way of life,‖ and to remove him from the domestic political scene.
97
 In his report, 
Ravndal described Guevara as a ―truly strong and growing force‖ in Ecuadorian politics 
who ―conceivably might be elected President in 1960.‖
98
 While embassy officials 
considered the CFP to be a serious challenge to Ponce‘s Conservative party, the potential 
complications that might arise if anyone discovered that the U.S. government had brought 
Guevara to the United States seemed to outweigh the potential benefits of awarding him a 
grant. Such a discovery could conceivably damage the ―present cordial relations‖ 
between Quito and Washington, especially if Guevara took advantage of his time in the 
United States to ―rabble rouse.‖
99
 Guevara might, for example, attack the United States 
on the sensitive issue of desegregation. In addition, a grant could provide political capital 
for Guevara as some might consider it to represent U.S. support of his potential 
presidential bid in 1960. Political considerations thus negated the awarding of a grant to 
Guevara. 
Despite these challenges in the political Foreign Leader Program, the student 
program in Ecuador continued to flourish during 1956. Intellectuals were always a 
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primary target for the U.S. exchange programs in Ecuador. In 1956, Embassy officials 
identified the economics faculties of the University of Guayaquil and the Central 
University of Quito as being particularly worrisome. Both faculties, according to Bastian, 
―have within them some elements which are—to say the very least—oriented toward left 
wing economic theory.‖
100
 Yet apparently things were changing; there were now eleven 
young professors teaching economics at Central University who had trained in either the 
United States, or in ―well-oriented schools of economics‖ in Spain, England, and Chile. 
These professors reportedly welcomed ―the cooperation of the United States in helping 
them to raise the standards of their school.‖
101
 They had even convinced the Dean of 
Central University, Manuel Agustin Aguirre, whom Bastian described as a well-known 
and respected leftist, to write a letter to the Department of State requesting a visiting 
professor in economic theory for the university. The Dean also suggested an increase in 
the number of grants allowing Ecuadorian students of economics to study in the United 
States. The efforts of these eleven faculty members, along with the requests of their 
Dean, suggested that progress was being made in achieving one of the USIS country 
objective for Ecuador—―to bring American economics into the presently Marxist 
dominated schools of Economics of the Universities of Quito and Guayaquil.‖
102
 Once 
properly oriented, it was hoped, students in these schools of economics would receive an 
education along the lines of the world capitalist system promoted by Washington.  
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In the meantime, the rector of Central University, Dr. Alfredo Pérez Gurrero, was 
reportedly showing ―increasing friendliness‖ to Bastian and other USIS officers 
specifically, and to the United States generally.
103
 At this point Bastian downplayed the 
possibility that Pérez was a communist, suggesting that instead he was probably an 
―opportunist‖ who used his image as a left-wing intellectual to mollify the student body 
and the faculty.
104
 Bastian still recommended, however, that Pérez‘s nomination be taken 
seriously since the award could strengthen the U.S. image in Ecuadorian intellectual 
circles.
105
 Embassy staff nominated Pérez for a Foreign Leader grant in 1957, and in his 
nomination packet, Karnis described the rector as one of the ―vital key figures‖ in 
Ecuador.
 106
 Although Pérez was interested primarily in making contact with university 
administrators in the United States, officials also suggested that he be given a ―full 
orientation‖ on student government organizations, ―especially as related to international 
affiliations, and the development of youth leadership on our [U.S.] campuses.‖
107
 This 
might help Pérez to identify the Sino-Soviet orientations of student organizations in 
Ecuador, while also providing him with a model for a more moderate form of student 
organization that he could pass on to his own students. 
 In keeping with the emphasis on Ecuadorian students and universities, Secretary 
of State Dulles informed embassy officials in Quito that the Department of State was 
exploring the possibility of establishing a student leader program for 1957. With the 
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support of the Pan American Union, State Department officials planned to bring twenty 
Ecuadorian student leaders to the United States.
108
 Embassy officials in Quito hoped to 
encourage the rector to reorient the student organizations on his campus. If he could not 
do the job, however, perhaps a trip to the United States by key student leaders would help 
to convince them of the dangers of the communist path. Policymakers in Washington 
advised Bastian was choose the student candidates carefully, and to consider ―whether 
their effectiveness as potential anti-Communist leaders might in any way be jeopardized 
by the fact of a visit to the United States under these auspices.‖
109
 Shortly after receiving 
these instructions, officials in Quito submitted their list of twenty candidates. Karnis 
suggested that, even at this early stage in the execution of the new program, there had 
been a marked increase in the ―acceptance of and desire to understand more about United 
States universities on the part of the Ecuadoran university administrations and student 
bodies.‖
110
 This acceptance meant that ―for the first time Embassy officers have been able 
to enter into close association with the student organizations and talk frankly on a 
friendly basis about the needs of the university students and about the means by which 
their needs can be met through the exchange-of-persons program.‖
111
 Thus Karnis and his 
staff seemed to be making progress in reaching the university students of Ecuador. 
 In addition to their successes in reaching Ecuadorian students, embassy staff also 
reviewed favorably the work of returned Ecuadorian trainees. Jorge Jurado, an assistant 
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manager at El Comercio, for example, was reportedly using his grant experience to ―good 
effect‖ by promoting greater U.S.-Ecuadorian understanding and cooperation.
112
 
According to Karnis, Jurado was now ―an outspoken proponent of the Pan-American 
cause‖ who defended ―the objectives of our country in its Latin American foreign 
policy.‖
113
 Similarly, Jose Vicente Vargas had ―unquestionably become of greater service 
to his national police as a result of the experience gained from the grant and because of 
professional training acquired and contacts established during that period.‖
114
 Overall, the 
doubling of the P.L. 402 budget for Ecuador in 1957 had allowed Karnis and his staff to 
make a ―marked advance‖ in all target areas.
115
 Karnis reported that the student exchange 
program discussed above went smoothly, despite being the largest project executed up to 
that point. After their return, the students were ―voluntarily carrying out numerous 
activities on their campuses under the direct counsel of the exchange officer and the 
group leader.‖ These activities would, Karnis believed ―assure in the long range a change 
in the attitude of many of the students toward the United States.‖
116
 The trip had been so 
successful in fact that Karnis and his staff planned to repeat it in 1958.  
 Efforts to maintain favorable relations with the media in Ecuador had also gone 
well over the past year. Humberto Vacas Gomez, awarded a foreign leader grant in this 
field, had a ―great impact‖ upon the Ecuadorian population through his articles and 
speeches. According to Karnis, ―the investment in Vacas Gomez has yielded rich 
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dividends in the form of prestige for the United States in Ecuador because as former 
functional senator representing cultural entities and currently director of the Quito 
municipal department of cultural relations, he is a respected figure, one with many 
contacts, and one who is outspoken in his praise of our institutions.‖
117
 Ecuadorian and 
U.S. officials alike considered the grant awarded to Pérez to be a ―most commendable 
and farsighted action,‖ that would have a ―favorable repercussion on U.S. acceptance in 
Ecuador.‖ The publisher of El Comercio even went so far as to say that the Pérez award 
was ―one of the best diplomatic moves‖ that the United States had made in Ecuador.
118
 
When Embassy officials involved in the maintenance of these programs looked back over 
the years 1949 to 1957, what they saw emphasized their beliefs in the value of the 
exchange programs. 
 From 1949 to 1957, as the Cold War heated up, the architects of the Foreign 
Leader Program hoped both to convince Ecuadorians and peoples from other countries of 
the Third World that the U.S. capitalist system was superior to the communist alternative, 
and to give them the education and training needed to succeed in this system. By 
targeting specific segments of society—intellectuals, labor, university students and 
educators intellectuals—officials worked to maximize the impact of the training offered. 
Leaders from each segment came to the United States for a short period, and then 
returned to their home nations where they were expected to share what they had learned. 
The Foreign Leader Program represented a continuation of the efforts started during 
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World War Two to increase consent to U.S. policy by the peoples of Latin America, and 
















7. Testing U.S. Hegemony at Punta del Este 
 On 13 March 1961, President John F. Kennedy announced his administration‘s 
new Latin American policy—the Alliance for Progress. Addressing a group of U.S. 
congressmen and Latin American diplomats, Kennedy called on the nations of the 
Americas to join in a vast cooperative effort. Kennedy pledged an increase in economic 
aid from the United States to help Latin American governments implement long-range 
development plans conceived of by these governments. Latin Americans would thus play 
a key role in the Alliance. Once again officials in Washington promised to cooperate 
more fully with their southern neighbors. With the Cold War heating up, the Kennedy 
Administration increasingly relied on a multilateral approach to maintain U.S. hegemony 
in Latin America as evidenced by both the rhetoric of the Alliance, and policymakers‘ 
efforts through the Organization of American States (OAS) to marginalize Fidel Castro‘s 
Cuba. 
Some scholars consider the Alliance for Progress to be a significant break with 
previous U.S. policies toward Latin America. By speaking in ―bold and heady terms of 
billion-dollar aid for a decade of planned economic development and social reform in the 
hemisphere,‖ Kennedy had, according to historians Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onís, 
signaled a ―dramatic and fundamental reorientation‖ of U.S. policy towards Latin 
America.
1
 Ultimately, however, the Alliance for Progress reflected a continuation of U.S. 
concerns with hemispheric security. Despite the insistence on democratic forms of 
                                                 
1
 Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onís, The Alliance that Lost its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for 
Progress. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 5-6. 
248 
 
government contained in the Alliance Charter, the Kennedy Administration recognized 
six military regimes throughout the region.
2
  During his relatively short tenure, President 
Kennedy confronted a number of challenges to U.S. hegemony from the nations of Latin 
America.
3
 The refusal of the governments of Ecuador, along with five of its neighbors, to 
heed Washington‘s request and break formal relations with Cuba is of particular interest 
for this present study. At the Eighth Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in 
1962 at Punta del Este, Uruguay, Secretary of State Dean Rusk was unable to convince 
representatives of these six countries that Castro‘s ties to international Communism 
represented enough of a threat to warrant the expulsion of Cuba from the OAS. 
Concerned primarily with the domestic instability that he felt would result if Ecuador 
sided with the United States, President Carlos Arosemena Monroy refused to play along. 
Yet a little over a year later, facing unrest at home and external pressure from the United 
States, President Arosemena did break relations with Cuba, and U.S. hegemony emerged 
secure.  
 The roots of the Alliance for Progress lie in the final years of the Eisenhower 
Administration. President Eisenhower began rethinking Latin American policy as early as 
1953 under the guidance of his brother and administration officials who urged the 
president to address the growing frustrations of Latin American elites. Events in 1958, 
however, provided the catalyst that sparked real change. That spring, Vice President 
Richard Nixon embarked on a goodwill tour of South America. In preparation for the trip, 
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Secretary of State John Foster Dulles informed Ambassador Christian Ravndal that 
officials at the Department of State ―confidently‖ expected Nixon‘s trip to produce 
―helpful results not only in popular goodwill but also in improved official attitudes and 
actions.‖
4
 The vice president was coming to Latin America, in other words, to ensure its 
peoples that Washington was not ignoring them. In many of the countries that he visited, 
specifically Venezuela, Peru, and Colombia, angry crowds protesting U.S. policies in the 
region greeted Nixon and his party. Most offensive to the protestors was the support of 
Latin American dictators by the Eisenhower Administration.  
 The reception in Ecuador, however, was actually much more cordial than in the 
other countries mentioned above. Images of the Vice President heading a soccer ball in 
Quito and getting a haircut in Guayaquil circulated widely in the United States and in 
Ecuador.
5
 Writing from Washington, Ambassador Chiriboga argued that it was hard to 
quantify the benefits to Ecuador of the warm welcome that Nixon received there. The 
U.S. press, according to the ambassador, commented that only in Ecuador was the vice 
president able to travel freely and to talk with workers and students.
6
 The ambassador 
hoped that the Ecuadorian government could take advantage of this turn of events to 
secure more financial aid from the United States. Following a decade of battles over 
issues such as territorial waters, U.S. policymakers sought to reassert U.S. hegemony in 
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the region, while the Ecuadorian government attempted to maximize benefits for its 
people. 
 Following Nixon‘s tour, the Eisenhower Administration reevaluated its Latin 
America policy. In NSC 5902 and 5902/1, the National Security Council suggested a 
variety of ways that the United States could strengthen its position in the hemisphere. 
Arguing that the long-term security of the United States depended on harmonious 
relations with the nations of Latin America, the authors of NSC 5902 pointed out that the 
attitudes of Latin Americans towards the United States had ―deteriorated somewhat from 
the high point achieved during World War II.‖
7
 During the war, Latin American 
governments pledged their support in defending hemispheric solidarity in the face of 
perceived threats from Fascist forces. With the war over and the Cold War underway, 
however, U.S. officials shifted their focus to containing Communism by rebuilding 
Western Europe and securing U.S. hegemony in the rest of the Third World. Thirteen 
years later, the United States seemed to have forgotten the wartime promises made to 
Latin Americans. Rising anti-Americanism in the region was one result of these events. 
Yet despite misperceptions in the region regarding U.S. policy, the NSC authors 
remained optimistic. Arguing that ―the situation in Latin America is more favorable to 
attainment of U.S. objectives than in other major underdeveloped areas,‖ the report 
outlined ways in which the United States could increase its influence in the region.  
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 Foreshadowing the self-help policies of the Alliance, the National Security 
Council suggested that Washington ―associate U.S. policies with the legitimate 
aspirations of the Latin American peoples and states, and seek to assure that they 
contribute, insofar as possible, to better Latin American attitudes toward the United 
States.‖ Crucial to this effort was the creation of a ―spirit of partnership and equality 
among the American Republics.‖
8
 Educational exchange programs were an integral part 
of this process, and thus in chapter eight we will explore the Fulbright program, which 
policymakers extended to Latin America during these years. Ultimately, NSC 5902 and 
5902/1 marked a shift in focus by the Eisenhower Administration. Policymakers now 
appeared to be taking seriously the problem of underdevelopment in Latin America. This 
new focus did not, however, translate into a vast reconstruction of policy action. 
Eisenhower remained convinced that private investment and the suppression of 
radicalism were still the most effective agents for reform in Latin America.
9
 
 With the victory of Fidel Castro in January 1959, officials in the United States, as 
well as U.S. ambassadors stationed throughout Latin America, became even more 
concerned with the influence of Communism in the hemisphere than they had been 
previously. Relations between Ecuador and the United States have generally been strong, 
and writing from Quito in late 1959, Ambassador Ravndal suggested that, based on the 
past ten years, ―Ecuador shows considerable promise of becoming a showcase of 
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democracy in action among the Latin countries of the hemisphere.‖
10
 During that time, 
two presidents—Galo Plaza and Velasco Ibarra—had finished their constitutional terms, 
and a third, Camilo Ponce Enriquez, was on track to do the same. Camilo Ponce, the first 
Conservative president of Ecuador in over sixty years, continued this political stability. 
Ravndal predicted a ―continued trend toward political maturity and a rising standard of 
living‖ for Ecuador‘s future. Noting its strategic significance given its proximity to the 
Panama Canal, the ambassador argued that Ecuador was a ―very favorable asset for the 
United States in the hemisphere.‖ Despite this, the ambassador warned that a Communist 
threat did exist in Ecuador, and that Communists had made inroads in the educational and 
labor sectors of the country. Taken together, the strategic value of Ecuador, along with 
this susceptibility to Communist influence, meant that U.S. policymakers, according to 
the ambassador, needed to exert ―considerable effort‖ to correct these initial gains.
11
  
 In Washington, Secretary of State Christian Herter was particularly concerned 
about reports that President Velasco Ibarra was contemplating a trip to Cuba. 
Ambassador Chiriboga cautioned Velasco Ibarra—who had recently won the presidency 
for a fourth time—that such a trip would be ―most undesirable.‖
12
 Chiriboga worried that 
as an ―effective orator‖ Velasco Ibarra would probably impress Cuban crowds, and that 
he might accept Cuban guidance in addressing Ecuador‘s needs for social reforms. 
Foreshadowing events to come, Herter suggested that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
for the Western Hemisphere Lester Mallory take advantage of his time in Ecuador to try 
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and convince the president to avoid ―any possible rapprochement‖ with Cuba.
13
 Herter 
instructed Mallory to congratulate Velasco Ibarra on his electoral victory and to reiterate 
to the president that the United States had genuine feelings of friendship towards 
Ecuador. Mallory was then to discuss with the president the efforts of Castro to export 
revolution in the hemisphere through ―active intervention [by] his agents [in] other Latin 
American countries.‖ 
 As sometimes happened, however, U.S. officials in Quito were not as worried as 
their counterparts in Washington about events in Ecuador. Four days after Herter 
instructed Mallory to meet with Velasco Ibarra, Ambassador Ravndal wrote to Herter 
telling him that he was not ―overly concerned‖ about the president visiting Cuba. The 
president, according to Ravndal, had recently called Castro an ―agitator‖ as well as a 
―great danger‖ to Latin America because he sought ―every opportunity to agitate and 
upset constituted Governments [of] South and Central America.‖
14
 Velasco Ibarra had 
experienced his share of political instability during his first three administrations. His 
words thus suggested that he agreed with the assessment of U.S. officials that Castro was 
a destabilizing agent in the hemisphere. Yet officials in Washington rarely trusted 
Velasco Ibarra, and this mistrust would only deepen as the United States moved to 
exclude Castro‘s Cuba from the OAS in their efforts to maintain U.S. hegemony in Latin 
America. 
                                                 
13
 Herter to Ravndal, 9 June 1960. 
14
 Ravndal to Herter, 13 June 1960, Central File 1960-63, Box 1551, RG 59, NACP. 
254 
 
 As early as June 1960, the Kennedy Administration began developing its strategy 
to introduce concerns over Cuba at a future conference of American Foreign Ministers. In 
a circular sent to U.S. Embassies in the American Republics, Undersecretary of State 
Douglas Dillon warned that it was ―imperative‖ for the Foreign Ministers to meet to 
discuss the actions of Castro. The immediate goal of Kennedy and his administration was 
to prevent a ―Castro-Communist‖ takeover of the Dominican Republic once Rafael 
Trujillo was no longer in power.
15
 Dillon thus argued that the Foreign Ministers should 
first meet to deal with the Dominican case. Then, representatives at a second meeting 
could consider the ―danger to continental peace and security that is implicit in [the] 
increasing Cuban identification with [the] Sino-Soviet bloc.‖
16
 Dillon‘s hoped to generate 
consensus throughout the hemisphere that Castro‘s pro-Soviet stance was a ―menace to 
continental peace and security‖ that threatened to ―destroy bonds of inter-American 
solidarity and the principle through which the American States are seeking to improve 
their political, economic and social conditions.‖ In their efforts to maintain U.S. 
hegemony, officials were not about to let Castro‘s Communist model of reform spread 
beyond Cuba, or to compete with the U.S. model.  
 A few days later, Ambassador Ravndal asked Foreign Minister Tobar Donoso 
whether Ecuador would support an inter-American resolution against Communist 
intervention in the hemisphere at an upcoming meeting of the foreign ministers. Tobar 
Donoso replied with a ―categorical yes, adding [that] this had been one of [the] keystone 
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policies of [the] Ponce Administration,‖ and he went on to intimate that his government 
would be willing to introduce such a measure.
17
 The foreign minister believed that such a 
resolution would help to ―strengthen‖ the position of other Latin American governments 
that seemed to ―vacillate‖ on Cuba. Thus, as they worked to garner the support of 
governments throughout the hemisphere, Dillon and others within the Kennedy 
Administration seemed to have secured the consent of the Ecuadorian foreign minister. 
Soon, however, the position of the government of Ecuador began to shift. 
 Ambassador Chiriboga now indicated that his government considered the Cuba 
problem to be primarily a bilateral issue between the United States and Castro.
18
 Drawing 
on their own experiences with unilateral intervention (particularly in connection with the 
border dispute with Peru), Ecuadorian officials were concerned that any move by the 
United States or the OAS against Castro could be interpreted as unwarranted interference 
in the domestic affairs of Cuba.
19
 Protecting against such intervention was a hallmark of 
the inter-American system, and thus the Ecuadorian government, according to Chiriboga, 
would push for conciliation between the United States and Cuba. This was not what 
Secretary of State Herter wanted to hear, and he instructed Ravndal to ―urge‖ Tobar 
Donoso and Velasco Ibarra to ―maintain and not weaken [their] unequivocal and realistic 
position‖ regarding the threat of Soviet intervention.
20
 The Kennedy Administration tried 
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to present the Cuba case as one that affected the security of the entire hemisphere, not 
just the United States, and as one that posed a threat to U.S. hegemony in the region.  
 In August 1960, Velasco Ibarra became the thirty-eighth President of Ecuador. 
Following a ―lengthy‖ discussion with the new president, Ambassador Chiriboga 
reported to Ravndal that Velasco Ibarra was certain that the meeting of the Foreign 
Ministers would generate a ―strong unified stand against Soviet intrusion in American 
affairs.‖ The president was uncertain, however, about what could be done concerning 
Castro specifically since the Cuban revolutionary had ―gained much support‖ from 
elsewhere in Latin America.
21
 Yet according to Ravndal, Chiriboga himself agreed that 
―drying-up this support‖ was one of the first tasks confronting the OAS.  
 A week later, Christian Herter outlined the position that the United States would 
take at the upcoming sixth and seventh meetings of the Foreign Ministers to be held in 
San Jose, Costa Rica.
22
 First and foremost, Herter insisted that the problem with Cuba 
was not simply a matter of U.S.-Cuban relations. He acknowledged that there was a 
bilateral component to the issue, but the secretary argued that, until the OAS could 
eliminate the international communist influences on Castro, officials could not address 
the U.S.-Cuban elements of the problem. For its part, the Velasco Ibarra Administration 
seemed to agree with Herter that the bilateral aspects of the Cuban question were 
somewhat distinct from the threat to inter-American security.
23
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 Since the government of Ecuador continued to promote the goal of conciliation 
between the United States and Cuba. Sub-Secretary Neftali Ponce Miranda from the 
Foreign Ministry proposed, therefore, the establishment of a ―committee of conciliation‖ 
at the San Jose conference. This committee would work to ―bridge [the] gap‖ between the 
United States and Cuba without dealing with the issue of the threat posed to the 
hemisphere by external Communism.
24
 This position continued to frustrate Herter, who, 
writing from San Jose, argued that it was essential to ―take all possible appropriate steps 
to induce additional delegations to view [the] situation realistically and [to] support clear 
condemnation of Soviet intervention and call on Cuba to conform to OAS principles.‖
25
 
The Ecuadorian proposal of conciliation was, according to the secretary, an ―easy way 
out‖ for Castro‘s government since they would not be forced to address their 
collaboration with the Soviet Union and China. Herter thus urged Ravndal to meet with 
Velasco Ibarra or Ambassador Chiriboga and emphasize the ―serious blow‖ that would 
have ―grave repercussions on all fields of future OAS cooperation‖ which would occur if 




 Ultimately, the Kennedy Administration hoped to convince the Latin American 
representatives gathered at San Jose that the United States considered the question of 
whether or not Castro remained in power to be one that the Cuban people needed to 
decide. To help them make up their minds, however, Herter argued that the members of 
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the OAS should make clear to Cubans that ―collaboration with Communist powers is [a] 
cause of serious concern to OAS members not only from [the] standpoint of their security 
but also of [the] achievement of [the] true aims of Latin American peoples.‖
27
 In 
particular, Herter wanted Cubans, and all Latin Americans, to understand that 
collaborating with Communists would jeopardize ―their efforts [to] achieve economic, 
[and] social progress within democratic principles on [the] basis of nonintervention.‖  
 This language of progress through nonintervention was a hallmark of U.S. foreign 
policy in Latin America throughout the period under study here. Following Castro‘s 1959 
victory, this rhetoric reached new levels as the Kennedy Administration attempted to 
convince the governments of Latin America of the serious threat posed to all American 
republics that they saw in Castro‘s allegiance with international Communism. 
Throughout its tenure, the Kennedy Administration seemed convinced that the peoples of 
Latin America underestimated the dangers of Communism, and that only by convincing 
them otherwise could U.S. hegemony be maintained in the face of the Communist 
menace.  
 At the San Jose Conference, a delegation of seven countries—Ecuador, Bolivia, 
Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru and Venezuela—introduced a resolution ―exhorting 
Cuba to maintain its confidence in [the] OAS.‖ To Secretary of State Herter, this 
resolution marked a ―low-water mark‖ in what he saw as a tendency of Latin American 
governments to view the Cuban Revolution as an understandable response to rising 
demands for social reforms, and ultimately, a ―refusal‖ of these governments to face up to 
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the ―utilization [of the] Cuban revolution by [the] Sino-Soviet bloc.‖
28
 In the struggle to 
maintain U.S. hegemony, such tendencies would not go unchecked. The United States 
thus introduced its own resolution condemning the efforts of the ―Sino-Soviet powers‖ to 
―extend their political influence over sovereign American States by political and 
economic subversion, exploiting for their alien purposes the efforts and desires of the 
peoples of America to achieve higher economic and cultural standards of living.‖
29
 
Washington called on Castro to ―repudiate‖ all ties with the Soviets and with China.  
 The seventh meeting of the foreign ministers in San Jose set the stage for a final 
showdown between the United States and Cuba. Herter argued that the resolution to 
strengthen inter-American solidarity in the face of threats from international Communism 
agreed to by the delegates at San Jose represented a ―resounding denunciation of 
Communist intervention [in] this hemisphere, and of Sino-Soviet efforts [to] exploit LA 
revolutions.‖
30
 Still, he noted continued evidence at the conference of an ―undercurrent of 
sympathy for [the] aspirations of [the] Cuban revolution.‖ Policymakers designed the 
Alliance for Progress to counter such sympathies by pledging the U.S. government to 
participate actively in addressing the problems of Latin America. Historically such 
pledges did not always work. Truman‘s Point Four program, which targeted similar 
problems, for example, never got off the ground. Soon the failure of Alliance dollars to 
reach their destinations would cause problems as coups erupted throughout Latin 
America.  
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On 7 November 1961, the Ecuadorian military ousted Velasco Ibarra. This 
marked the end of a thirteen-year period of relative stability in the country.
31
 The 
immediate reaction in Washington was one of concern. Two days after the coup, George 
McGhee from the Department of State sent a memo to the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Inter-American Affairs Robert F. Woodward. McGhee warned that events in Ecuador 
represented the first ―old-style Latin American revolution since the Alliance for Progress 
and Punta del Este,‖ and he saw in Ecuador a possible ―precursor‖ to similar revolutions 
in the region.
 32
 New York Times reporter Tad Szulc agreed with McGhee, arguing that 
Ecuador was an important test case of the Alliance for Progress. Szulc warned that events 
in Ecuador ―illustrate[d] the political dangers of the efforts by Latin American 
Governments to bolster their economies through tough ‗self-help‘ measures.‖
33
 He 
argued that consumer taxes imposed by Velasco Ibarra were actually an attempt to follow 
the ―self-help‖ recommendations of the International Monetary Fund.  
A State Department report titled ―Alliance for Progress Goals Linked with 
Presidential Upsets‖ echoed the views of McGhee and Szulc. Analyzing the situation in 
Ecuador, the authors pointed out that Velasco Ibarra began losing support of conservative 
politicians soon after taking office because the president increased tax enforcement, 
allowed the free exchange rate to rise, which made capital flight more expensive, and 
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talked about land and tax reform.
34
 Added to this, Velasco Ibarra had followed a leftist 
international policy, while also trying to gain ―nationalistic cohesion‖ on the Peru 
boundary dispute. Ecuadorian military officers resisted these policy reforms, and they 
pushed the president to adopt a ―more pro-U.S.‖ foreign policy. Added to this, the 
increased sales tax upset the left who, together with the right, began to attack the Velasco 
Ibarra Administration.
35
 For Szulc, McGhee, and officials at the Department of State, 
then, the military actions in Ecuador were a direct response to the policy 
recommendations of the Alliance that were ostensibly designed to create gradual change, 
not instability. This tendency for the Alliance to bring chaos in its wake was repeated 
again and again throughout Latin America. Ecuador thus emerged as an early test case of 
the Alliance for Progress by forcing officials in Washington to weigh their options in 
reacting to the military coup against Velasco Ibarra.  
On 15 November 1961, Maurice Bernbaum, the U.S. Ambassador to Quito, sent a 
telegram to Washington concerning the upcoming trip of Ecuador‘s Special Ambassador, 
Galo Plaza Lasso. Galo Plaza was carrying a personal message from the new president of 
Ecuador, Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy, for President John F. Kennedy. Congress had 
recently elected Arosemena, the former Vice President under Velasco Ibarra, president 
following the military coup against Velasco Ibarra.
36
 Washington closely monitored this 
transition, and the apparent leftist tendencies of Arosemena concerned many officials. 
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Arosemena‘s decision to send Galo Plaza to address the concerns of U.S. officials was 
thus a pragmatic political maneuver designed to win continued support from the United 
States. According to Bernbaum, Galo Plaza was coming to Washington to ―dissipat[e] 
fears of Communist orientation created by U.S. press comment[s].‖
37
 Headlines 
announcing the coup in the New York Times reported that ―Ecuador Leftist Gains 
Presidency,‖ suggesting that Arosemena was a ―New Force in Quito‖ who was willing to 
―Ask Aid From Any Source.‖
38
 Reporters for Newsweek, Time, The New Republic, and 
U.S. News and World Report also focused on the political leanings of Arosemena, while 
expanding their analysis to other, more personal characteristics. Writers described the 
new president as a ―strong-willed, taciturn introvert‖ and as a man ―with a weakness for 
liquor.‖
39
 This unflattering portrayal of President Arosemena worried Galo Plaza and 
other Ecuadorians who hoped to receive increased aid under Kennedy‘s Alliance for 
Progress. 
 As Galo Plaza worked to convince Kennedy that the Arosemena Administration 
supported the United States, preparations for the Punta del Este conference had already 
begun. In December 1961, the U.S. ambassador to Ecuador, Maurice Bernbaum, 
informed Secretary of State Rusk that Ecuador had yet to name a delegation to the 
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 To Bernbaum, it was clear that the Arosemena Administration had given 
―little serious thought to [its] substantive position‖ at the conference. The ambassador 
believed that Arosemena would ―obviously [just] as soon have [the] meeting forgotten as 
a bad dream, and is reluctant [to] face [the] issue at this point.‖ This reluctance, according 
to Bernbaum, was due to domestic tensions within Ecuador. Foreign Minister Francisco 
Acosta Yépez had informed Bernbaum that Arosemena hoped that the Punta del Este 
conference could be postponed for the ―maximum possible‖ amount of time in order to 
―permit non-Communist elements [to] make preparations for Congressional elections‖ in 
June.
41
 Acosta Yépez went on to say that ―Communists and supporting groups‖ in 
Ecuador held an advantage through their ―superior organization,‖ and that they could 
therefore ―impede meaningful action by Ecuador‖ at the conference.
42
 As we will see, 
domestic concerns continued to influence the Ecuadorian position throughout the 
conference by limiting the ability of Ecuadorian policymakers to support the United 
States.  
 One week after a Cuban delegation arrived in Ecuador to refute public accusations 
by Arosemena that Cubans living in Ecuador were interfering in Ecuadorian domestic 
affairs, the newly appointed Ecuadorian Ambassador to the United States, Dr. Neftali 
Ponce Miranda, met with Kennedy to finalize his appointment.
43
 During the meeting, 
Kennedy raised the issue of the upcoming meeting of the Organization of American 
States in Punta del Este, Uruguay. Officials from the United States wanted member 
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nations to agree to impose economic sanctions against Cuba, and to exclude the country 
from the OAS. With this in mind, Kennedy stated that he desired ―the strongest possible 
resolutions and at the same time hoped for the greatest possible degree of unanimity.‖
44
 
Accordingly, the president questioned Ponce about the degree of support the United 
States could expect from Arosemena, whose reputation as a leftist concerned some in 
Washington. Ponce replied that the domestic political situation in Ecuador ―made it 
difficult for his Government to espouse openly the position which it would like to 
support.‖ Concerned that publicly championing the U.S. proposal would spark strong 
reaction from pro-Castro elements within Ecuadorian society, Ponce urged U.S. officials 
to ―not take this to mean that Ecuador supported Cuba.‖
 45
 Convincing Kennedy and 
others in the administration of this proved difficult.  
 As the president and the ambassador were meeting, a number of influential 
Ecuadorian elites, including Benjamin Carrion, were in Cuba to attend a conference of 
Latin American representatives called by Castro to coincide with the Punta del Este 
Conference.
46
 The goal of the Cuba conference was to reaffirm the right to self-
determination of all American Republics at precisely the same time that the Kennedy 
Administration was pushing for the expulsion of Cuba from the OAS. For his part, 
Carrion had published an article in El Mundo, arguing that the Punta del Este Conference 
represented a form of colonialism similar to the Monroe Doctrine rationale used to attack 
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Colombia in 1903 in order to complete the Panama Canal.
47
 Such articles intensified both 
the domestic pressures against Arosemena, and the overall challenge to U.S. hegemony 
from pro-Castro elites in Latin America. Thus, as the U.S. delegation to the upcoming 
conference prepared to win hemispheric support for their measures against Cuba, the 
government of Ecuador, claiming domestic instability, remained on the fence. 
 Faced with this intransigence, officials in the Kennedy Administration continued 
their multilateral approach. In keeping with the overall theme of cooperation contained in 
the Alliance charter, Kennedy was ―calling upon U.S. people and Congress for greater 
support of [the] OAS than has any [other] President.‖
48
 While the delegates met at Punta 
del Este, Kennedy sent a letter to Arosemena, encouraging the president to support U.S. 
sanctions, and reminding him of the ―intense preoccupation of the people and Congress 
of the United States with the Cuban problem.‖
49
 For his part, Arosemena had chosen a 
team of generally pro-U.S. Ecuadorians to represent his government at the conference, 
appointing Foreign Minister Acosta Yépez, whom Bernbaum described as both anti-
Communist and anti-Castro, as the head. In addition to Acosta Yépez, Jose Ricardo 
Martinez, the Ecuadorian Ambassador to Uruguay who had ―a history of cooperation 
with U.S. officials,‖ Rodrigo Jacome Moscoso, a ―prominent liberal‖ who was ―very 
religious and a strong anti-Communist,‖ and Lucindo Almeida Teran, who was pro-U.S. 
and anti-Communist, represented Ecuador. Bernbaum described two of the remaining 
delegates—Gonzalo Escudero Moscoso, and Leopoldo Benitez Viñueza—as left-leaning 
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politically, but neither was said to be a communist.
50
 As with his decision to send Galo 
Plaza to the United States as his personal representative, President Arosemena worked to 
allay fears in Washington through his selection of these delegates.  
 Foreign Ministry staff instructed the Ecuadorian delegates to adhere to four 
principles in their negotiations at Punta del Este: non-intervention; self-determination; 
representative democracy; and respect for human rights.
51
 While similar to the principles 
promoted by the United States in its relations with the nations of Latin America, U.S. 
actions did not always match the rhetoric. In a series of meetings between Rusk and the 
Ecuadorian delegation, the Secretary of State explained that Kennedy sought ―massive 
support from the OAS, additional legislation that would benefit Ecuador and a 
commodity price stabilization program.‖
52
 The goal was to convince delegates that the 
Alliance for Progress rather than Castroism was the best solution to the social and 
economic problems of Latin America. Rusk argued that there was near unanimous 
agreement on this point, as well as on the incompatibility of communism with full 
membership in the OAS. In response, Acosta Yépez ―emphatically stated‖ that the 
government of Ecuador wanted to maintain the unity of the inter-American system. He 
argued that international communism was the biggest threat to this system, and that the 
surest antidotes to this threat were economic and social progress.
53
 When asked if 
Ecuador would support the suspension of Cuba from the OAS, the foreign minister said 
that there was no provision in the OAS Charter allowing for the expulsion of a state. 
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Nonetheless, Acosta Yépez acknowledged that there was a need to ―neutralize‖ Castro‘s 
government; a government that was, in his words ―incompatible with the democratic 
institutions‖ of the OAS. Diplomatic or economic sanctions against Cuba, according to 
the Foreign Minister, would only make the situation worse by increasing the suffering of 
Cubans. This would in turn strengthen Castro‘s hand since ―in times of crisis, the people 
tended to back their leader when attacked from abroad.‖
54
 Rusk attempted to blunt the 
issue of intervention by emphasizing the multilateral approach of the Kennedy 
Administration, insisting that Kennedy was utilizing the OAS in this matter to a greater 
degree than had any previous president. In an effort to pressure those who were on the 
fence concerning sanctions and the suspension of Cuba, Rusk intimated that the failure of 
the multilateral approach taken by the United States at Punta del Este might push the U.S. 




 To address the hesitation of Ecuador, Rusk suggested that President Kennedy 
send a personal message to President Arosemena informing him that, according to the 
latest information from the conference, ―the governments of the hemisphere are moving 
rapidly toward agreement on what the Conference of Foreign Ministers should do with 
regard to the Cuban question.‖
56
 After outlining the details of the plan—excluding Cuba 
from various organs of the OAS, imposing economic sanctions against Castro‘s 
government, and suspending all trade in arms with Cuba—officials advised Kennedy to 
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close by saying, ―I am confident that you would not want Ecuador to be isolated from the 
large majority of the OAS who are concerned to deal with this threat to the hemisphere.‖  
 In response to this pressure from Kennedy, Arosemena informed Ambassador 
Bernbaum that denying Cuban participation in any part of the inter-American system 
would require changes to the OAS charter. The president also reinforced his earlier stance 
that economic sanctions would be ―useless, unnecessary, and even counterproductive.‖ 
He closed by saying that Ecuadorian support for ―strong measures against Castro‖ would 
result in a civil war in Ecuador, a war that pro-Castro elements would have a ―good 
chance‖ of winning.
57
 Bernbaum reported that during their meeting, Arosemena had been 
―clearly and apparently sincerely‖ concerned over the possibility of civil war. The 
ambassador claimed that rightist parties in Ecuador were ―so concerned over 
Arosemena‘s softness‖ on Castro that they were considering a coup—a position that 




 Both Arosemena and Bernbaum cited widespread unemployment as a critical 
factor in this instability, and the ambassador thus suggested that Washington accelerate 
the consideration of pending loan applications for Ecuador. Evidence of such actions, 
according to Bernbaum, might go a long way in strengthening Arosemena‘s position 
against the left, and ―produce cooperation rather than plots for the Government‘s 
overthrow by the right.‖
59
 In closing, Bernbaum emphasized his belief in the sincerity of 
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the Arosemena Administration, and that positive action on U.S. loans to Ecuador through 
the Alliance for Progress would help secure Arosemena‘s support for the U.S. position at 
Punta del Este. 
 Despite these pressures from Washington, six nations ultimately refused to 
support U.S. sanctions against Cuba—Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, and 
Ecuador. Delegates from the so-called ―soft six‖ also abstained from voting on the 
expulsion of Cuba from the OAS. In an attempt to downplay this blow to U.S. hegemony 
in the region, Rusk suggested that the general theme at the upcoming press conference in 
Washington should emphasize the ―remarkable movement in [the] hemisphere in [the] 
past several months in recognizing [the] dangers of Communist penetration.‖
60
 
Unfortunately for Arosemena, the domestic pressure mobilized against him due to his 
refusal to take a stand against Cuba was not as easy to downplay. In the immediate 
aftermath of Ecuador‘s abstention, The Social Christian Party withdrew its support of the 
president, and forced the resignation of Foreign Minister Acosta Yépez.
61
 Arosemena 
faced attacks from both the right—who were ―extremely critical‖ of abstentions—and the 
left—who argued that the OAS was an instrument of U.S. imperialism.  
 An embattled Arosemena defiantly explained his position at Punta del Este to 
Ambassador Bernbaum. The president insisted that he ―definitely was not going to sell 
Ecuador‘s sovereignty for money, regardless of how much Ecuador needed the money.‖
62
 
He emphasized that Ecuador would ―solve its own problems,‖ but that it would ―very 
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definitely‖ not go over to the ―other side‖ if it failed to obtain what it needed from the 
United States.
63
 Efforts to secure loans for Ecuador in exchange for Arosemena‘s support 
had clearly failed. While these more overt attempts to win Ecuadorian support proved 
unsuccessful, covert operations by the CIA seemed to be succeeding. 
 Less than two months after his inauguration, U.S. pressure to break with Cuba had 
evidently ended Arosemena‘s political honeymoon.
64
 As both the left and the right 
mobilized against him, CIA activities in Ecuador intensified. In his published memoirs, 
former CIA operations officer in Quito, Philip Agee, described in detail his operations in 
Ecuador. In addition to planting pro-U.S. articles in the local press, Agee increased the 
number of direct contacts between CIA-funded Ecuadorians and Arosemena. One such 
operative was Colonel Aurelio Naranjo. On 26 March 1962, a U.S. military official, 
General Bogart, met with Naranjo in Cuenca to inspect the Ecuadorian military groups 
supplied by the United States.
65
 Two days later, the Cuenca military garrison under 
Naranjo‘s command sent a telegram to Arosemena giving the president seventy-two 
hours to break relations with Cuba. According to Agee, this revolt by Naranjo and his 
men was ―clearly a result of the renewed agitation we have been promoting since January 
through the Conservatives and Social Christians.‖
 66
 A series of demonstrations in Quito 
and Guayaquil fueled Naranjo‘s ultimatum, as did local press coverage planted by the 
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CIA. Both the demonstrators and the newspaper reports favored a split with Cuba.
67
 
Thus, faced with pressure from political groups, the military, the national press, and the 
U.S. government, Arosemena officially broke relations with Cuba on 3 April 1963. 
Writing from Quito, Bernbaum suggested that this ―favorable turn of events‖ led him to 
recommend that a ―prompt announcement‖ of a technical loan for Ecuador might 
strengthen Arosemena‘s position ―in dealing with [the] Cuban issue and controlling 
internal disorders which are likely to result.‖
68
 Ultimately, however, this marked the 
beginning of the end for Arosemena‘s tenure. As his political power waned, U.S. ties 
with the Ecuadorian military suggested to some officers that Washington would support a 
military coup against Arosemena.
69
 With U.S. hegemony ultimately reaffirmed by the 
decision of the governments of Latin America to break relations with Castro‘s Cuba, 
despite the delays, the Kennedy Administration now faced another round of military 
coups in the region. The response of policymakers reflected the anti-Communist 
underpinnings of this particular moment in the U.S. Empire. 
 On 11 July 1963, the Ecuadorian military ousted Arosemena. The military had 
originally planned the coup in September, but officers had postponed the uprising until 
President Arosemena‘s behavior on the evening of July 10 provoked the military. 
Speaking at a banquet in honor of Admiral Wilfred McNeil, the president of Grace Line 
Shipping Company, a visibly drunk Arosemena openly criticized the United States.
70
 His 
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comments that he ―liked [the] American public but that [the] American [Government] 
was exploiting Ecuador and Latin America‖ shocked the official guests at the banquet.
71
 
Domestic concerns were also involved in the military‘s decision to overthrow 
Arosemena. The perception of Communist subversion, heightened by stories in the local 
press that the CIA had covertly planted, and the rumored return of the populist Velasco 
Ibarra for the upcoming 1964 elections, both influenced the coup.
72
 As in the earlier coup 
that had brought Arosemena to power, the Ecuadorian military had once again tested 
Washington‘s allegiance to the rhetoric of the Alliance. How would the Kennedy 
Administration respond? 
 Arosemena had been losing favor in the United States since the Punta del Este 
conference. Added to this, those Ecuadorians involved in the coup had connection, either 
direct or indirect, with the United States. The leader, Colonel Marcos Gándara Enríquez, 
and his two most influential supporters, Colonel Aurelio Naranjo and Luis Augustín 
Bowen, were all CIA collaborators.
73
 Naranjo had earlier convinced Arosemena to break 
ties with Cuba. He had thus already proven his loyalty to the United States (Bernbaum 
described the Colonel as a ―firm friend of the United States and a violent anti-
Communist.‖)
74
 Gándara and Mora Bowen were perhaps even more influential within 
Ecuador since both were Senators. In addition, the three members of the Ecuadorian Joint 
                                                 
71
 Bernbaum to Rusk, 11 July 1963, NSFCO: Ecuador, Box 68, General, 1/61-3/62, folder, JFKL. 
72
 Needler, 2. 
73
 Agee, 300. 
74
 Bernbaum to Rusk, 14 July 1963, NSFCO: Ecuador, Box 68, General, 1/61-3/62, folder, JFKL. 
273 
 




 Washington closely monitored the situation in Ecuador. With a favorable 
response from the Ecuadorian public, the military leaders began to establish their 
government.
76
 Combining civilian and military appointees, General Gándara tried to 
―maintain the most cordial relations with the United States.‖ Crucial to this effort was his 
reliance on Galo Plaza in choosing the members of the cabinet.
 77
 With the junta 
established, the military continued its efforts to win U.S. support. Two of its first acts 
were to outlaw the Communist Party of Ecuador, and to arrest many leftists.  
 Only three days after the coup, the CIA reported that ―the junta has met the 
normal requirements for recognition and has promised a return to elective constitutional 
government as soon as possible.‖
78
 Three days later on July 18, officials in Washington 
appeared ready to recognize the junta, waiting only for a public statement ―indicating 
[their] intention [to] return to civilian government via constitutional procedures within 
approximately one year,‖ and the extension of recognition from ―at least several‖ Latin 
American nations.
79
 With these final expectations satisfied, Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
sent a telegram to Ambassador Bernbaum on 26 July 1963 announcing Washington‘s 
decision to extend recognition to the military junta on 31 July 1963.
80
 It had taken twenty 
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days for the Kennedy Administration to recognize the junta, though they were largely 
prepared to do so as early as July 18.  
 Delays by the Arosemena Administration and other Latin American governments 
at Punta del Este tested U.S. hegemony in Latin America during this phase of the Cold 
War. By proposing mediation and initially refusing to exclude Castro from the OAS, 
Arosemena continued his government‘s tradition of championing the right of non-
intervention. Arosemena also sought to buy himself time as political instability in 
Ecuador deepened. Ultimately, however, he failed. Aware of the domestic situation 
facing the president, the Kennedy Administration nonetheless took a hard line in pushing 
for hemispheric consensus concerning the dangers of Castro and international 
Communism. In the end, this position succeeded, and policymakers pushed aside the 
rhetoric of cooperation and support for democracy contained in the Alliance Charter in 
favor of maintaining firm support for U.S. hegemony in Latin America.  
275 
 
8. Student Challenges and the Fulbright Program 
 By 1957, officials in the State Department had expanded the Latin American 
exchange programs pioneered under the Buenos Aires Convention of 1936 to the rest of 
the Third World. In 1957, policymakers established leaders and specialist programs in the 
Middle East and Africa, and by 1958, the number of grants servicing countries outside of 
Latin America had risen dramatically.
1
 In the Leader and Specialist program for 1958, for 
example, 168 American specialists received grants, with fifty-five of those assigned to 
Europe, forty-one to the Near East and Africa, thirty-one to the Far East, and forty-one to 
the American Republics. In addition, the program brought 279 foreign specialists to the 
United States with the support of P.L. 584 and 402 funds during this same period with. 
Sixty-nine of these specialists came from the Near East and South Asia, thirty-nine from 
Africa, seventy-one from the Far East, forty-seven from Europe and fifty-three from the 
American Republics.
2
 From 1948 to 1957, then officials in the United States worked to 
secure U.S. hegemony in third-world nations outside of the Western Hemisphere. 
 As we saw in the previous chapter, however, the year 1958 was a turning point in 
U.S.-Latin American relations. A rising tide of anti-Americanism throughout the region 
threatened to undermine hemispheric solidarity at precisely the same time that the Soviet 
Union seemed to be growing in influence and strength. Following Richard Nixon‘s tour 
of South America that year, this revitalized interest in Latin America of the Eisenhower 
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Administration resulted in a $2 million increase in the Foreign Leader Program budget 
for 1959.
3
 The violent reception Nixon received from university students in Peru, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela prompted a renewed emphasis on universities and students 
under the newly expanded exchange programs. One of the main goals for the programs 
was to make a ―more vigorous political impact‖ on the university campuses, and in the 
secondary schools throughout Latin America through a ―multi-pronged attack‖ on one 
central problem, ―the unfavorable attitudes toward the United States that exist[ed] on 
many Latin American university campuses.‖
4
  
 In explaining the situation, officials in Washington argued that Latin American 
universities were highly autonomous and influential political actors, and that the ―anti-
U.S.‖ sentiments of their students served as a ―major stumbling block to the realization of 
United States objectives.‖ Policymakers believed that much of these negative attitudes 
came from ―inadequate or incorrect knowledge‖ of the peoples, policies, and ideals of the 
United States. They argued that ―poorly informed or mis-informed campus leaders [who] 
unknowingly mislead,‖ and ―professional anti-U.S. campus leaders [who] purposefully 
mislead‖ made the situation worse.
5
 A series of student seminars under the program 
would presumably increase the number of student leaders on Latin American campuses 
who were ―politically inclined and sufficiently well informed to champion friendly 
relations between their countries and the United States.‖ At the same time, the program 
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would send ―carefully selected‖ groups of U.S. students who were ―capable of 
influencing their Latin American student associates toward friendly relations between 
their countries and the United States‖ to Latin America. Officials hoped also to place on 
Latin American campuses ―highly qualified‖ U.S. professors who could ―accurately 
interpret the United States to their faculty colleagues and to their students.‖ Finally, the 
program would offer training in ―educational principles and practices‖ from U.S. 
educators to teachers, or ―mind-molders,‖ from Latin American secondary schools. 
Through a ―concentrated approach aimed at student bodies, faculty members, and the 
university preparatory schools,‖ officials thus hoped to make progress in ―improving the 
understanding of and appreciation for‖ the United States on Latin American campuses.
6
 
 From 1958 to 1963, officials in Washington continued to fine tune the educational 
exchange programs between the United States and the nations of the Third World. The 
Fulbright Program, established in 1948 with the passage of the Fulbright Act, built on the 
models of educational exchange programs first developed under the Buenos Aires 
Convention of 1936 that we have studied here. With the Second World War over, and the 
Cold War in its infancy, U.S. elites led by Senator William J. Fulbright wanted to create a 
program that would promote international peace on a grander scale than had earlier 
exchange efforts. Fulbright and his team accomplished this by finalizing bilateral 
agreements with foreign governments whereby foreign currencies used to purchase 
surplus matériel used to finance the exchanges.
7
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 Initially Senator Fulbright and the other architects of the program focused on the 
nations of Western and Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa. Policymakers considered each 
of these regions to be vital in the battle against Communism.
8
 Earlier, in 1953, the 
Eisenhower Administration had begun to heed calls from Latin American elites to rethink 
their geographic focus. As part of this shift, in 1955 the governments of the United States 
and Chile signed the first Fulbright Agreement with a Latin American nation. 
Agreements with Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Paraguay 
quickly followed. Under the Alliance for Progress, Congress expanded the Fulbright 
Program again with the passage of the Fulbright-Hays Act in 1961.
9
 From 1958 to 1963, 
officials in Washington worked to secure and maintain U.S. hegemony in the Third 
World. The Fulbright Program was a critical part of the effort to expand foreign consent 
to U.S. policies, as rising anti-Americanism seemed to threaten U.S. hegemony in Latin 
America. 
 Almost twenty years after the Buenos Aires Conference, negotiations paving the 
way for a Fulbright Agreement with Ecuador began. In 1955, J. Manuel Espinosa, 
working for the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the Department of State, 
wrote to PAO Walter Bastian in Quito that finalizing an agreement between Ecuador and 
the United States would ―be of tremendous value to both countries.‖
10
 Espinosa singled 
out Ecuador from its neighbors in the region as one of the nations ―most devoted to the 
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cause of education and public health advancement,‖ and a country where U.S. technical 
assistance had already been ―notable in meeting these national needs.‖
11
  
 Following the first round of negotiations, completed by March 1957, PAO 
Lawrence Norrie seemed hopeful about the program, arguing that through ―proper care 
and long-range coordinated planning‖ the Fulbright Program could ―contribute greatly to 
the realization of our country objectives‖ in Ecuador.
12
 Officials finalized and published 
the agreement in the Official Registry of the Ecuadorian five months after signing it.
13
 
While back in Washington, the Board of Foreign Scholarships (BFS), which was 
responsible for approving Fulbright proposals, quickly approved the plan for Ecuador.
14
 




 In the meantime, policymakers concluded Fulbright agreements with the 
remaining six Latin American nations listed above, as well as with several Asian 
nations.
16
 Up until this point, most of the government-sponsored educational exchange 
programs with the nations of Latin America focused on bringing Latin American 
students, teachers and leaders to the United States. Following this trend, for the 1958 to 
1959 fiscal year there were only twelve lectureships available for U.S. scholars to teach 
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in Latin America under the exchange programs we have been studying.
17
 The Fulbright 
program addressed this imbalance by offering an increasing number of grants to U.S. 
scholars to lecture in Latin America—approximately fifty grants for the same 1958 to 
1959 period.
18
 Perhaps because of the comparatively one-sided focus of previous 
programs, however, officials in charge of recruiting U.S. scholars for the new Fulbright 
grants had trouble finding a sufficient number of scholars who could lecture in Spanish. 
With renewed concerns over anti-Americanism in the region, and the belief in the power 
of educational exchange programs to address this problem, the push now was to find U.S. 
professors who were fluent in Spanish to participate in the Fulbright Program. 
 In keeping with the country plans for Ecuador developed by embassy staff over 
the previous decade, Ecuadorian youths remained the primary target of the Fulbright 
Program in Ecuador.
19
 Recognizing that the country was ―going through a period of 
democratization,‖ members of the IEES commission in Ecuador argued that ―the attitudes 
of today‘s youth will be decisive for the future of the country.‖ By focusing on 
disciplines such as social and applied sciences, as well as education, officials planning 
the inaugural year of the Fulbright program in Ecuador asked for four U.S. lecturers in 
English, two in applied sciences and four in ―unspecified‖ categories. They also proposed 
one grant for an Ecuadorian student in the social sciences, and eleven grants for students 
in the ―unspecified‖ category, along with five grants for Ecuadorian teachers. All totaled, 
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the first year of the program in Ecuador included twelve U.S. grantees and seventeen 
grantees from Ecuador, at an estimated total cost of $94,227.
20
  
 The architects of the Fulbright Program addressed immediate problems in 
Ecuador in the hopes of generating future progress. At the request of Ecuadorian 
educators, the English program, for example, aimed to help local teachers develop ―better 
ways and means‖ of teaching English at the university level in order to give Ecuadorian 
students a better chance of securing grants offered by U.S. universities.
21
 This new 
program continued the tradition of emphasizing English language training, which was a 
hallmark of all of the exchange programs and American Schools that we have so far 
explored. In order for grantees to make the most of their time in the United States, ideally 
they could focus on subjects other than English. In keeping as well with the emphasis on 
promoting democracy, the authors of the plan suggested that students and lecturers in the 
social sciences should emphasize ―the appreciation of democratic approaches and 
methods as applied to the solution of social problems.‖ They singled out issues related to 
Ecuadorian juveniles as being some of the most important of these ―social problems.‖ 
According to the authors of the report, ―too great a part of Ecuadoran youth is wasted, 
and does not make its contribution to national life.‖ As a result, the Fulbright committee 
selected Dora Nelly Rodriguez o study social work at Shorter College in Georgia, which 
had already accepted her as a student.
22
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 At the request of professors at Central University in Quito, officials identified 
engineering and food technology as two critical disciplines in the pure and applied 
sciences field. Galo Plaza had praised efforts to reorganize the university‘s school of 
engineering by arguing that this project was important because ―if successful, it [could] 
serve as a pilot project which [would] be used as a model for similar projects in other 
regions of Latin America.‖
23
 As the category with the largest number of grants, 
―unspecified‖ included grants for U.S. students and professors in fields such as 
economics, sociology, city and regional planning, urban and rural sociology, social work 
and welfare agencies, youth recreation and vocational guidance, education and medicine. 
The inherent flexibility in such a wide-ranging category was intentional. Policymakers 
believed that ―every contact made by American professors and students with Ecuadoran 
educational circles [would] contribute toward full understanding of American 
institutions.‖
24
 The goal was to reach as many critical fields as possible.  
 Ecuadorian university students had long been a primary focus of U.S. exchange 
programs, as well as a periodic concern for Ecuadorian leaders when the influential 
Federation of Ecuadorian Students challenged their administrations. Writing from the 
U.S. embassy in Quito, CAO Michael Karnis reported that he and the local Fulbright 
commission felt that ―a change in the general orientation‖ of the student union was 
necessary in order to ―create a climate of opinion favorable to the United States in 
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 Suggesting that the union was ―dominated by extreme leftist 
elements,‖ Karnis hoped that giving students a chance to study in the United States might 
―have an impact on this situation favorable to us‖ that could continue well into the future 
as many of these students would likely become professors themselves. In short, Karnis 
argued, ―the present situation cannot be changed overnight…it will require constant, 




 In selecting Ecuadorian students for the Fulbright Program, Karnis and his staff 
focused on candidates who were ―alert, intelligent and mature in their thinking,‖ who 
would ―serve the Program objectives upon their return to Ecuador.‖
27
 Most of the 
students selected (nine out of ten) were Ecuadorian men between the ages of twenty-three 
and thirty-three who were studying a variety of subjects, including hydraulics, electrical 
engineering, food technology, veterinary medicine, political science, comparative law, 
highway construction, and adult education. The Fulbright Committee also selected two 
U.S. graduate students, plus one alternate, to participate in the inaugural Fulbright 
program in Ecuador.
28
 Pursuing degrees in Social Sciences, Latin American and Spanish 
Literature, and Political Science, each of these students was given a copy of Ecuador: A 
Country of Contrast by Lilo Linke, who was herself a recipient of a Foreign Leader Grant 
in 1956.  
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 Upon their arrival in Quito, each grantee participated in an orientation program 
planned for them by Embassy and members of the local Fulbright Commission who were 
in charge of running the program.
29
 Commission staff considered this orientation to the 
―national life and environment‖ of Ecuador to be an ―essential part‖ of each grantees‘ 
Fulbright experience. As part of the program, each grantee met with the Ecuadorian 
Minister of Education, the rectors of Central University and Catholic University, as well 
as the President of the Casa de la Cultura in Quito. They also met with Ambassador 
Ravndal, PAO Norrie, and CAO Jerry James to discuss the overall objectives of the 
Fulbright Program in Ecuador.
30
 Writing from Washington, Secretary of State Dulles 
applauded the orientation program outlined by James, but he suggested that Embassy 
staff should also include a discussion with the grantees about Ecuadorian customs and 
manners, particularly those customs which were most likely to be ―unconsciously 
violated by foreigners.‖
31
 In the effort to dampen anti-Americanism and promote U.S. 
hegemony, Dulles wanted to ensure that Fulbrighters would not offend their hosts.  
 Overall, the years 1958 to 1960 were a time of development of the Fulbright 
Program with Ecuador. In preparation for the 1961-1962 Fulbright competition, State 
Department officials noted with pleasure the increase in the number of grants under the 
Ecuadorian program.
32
 They complemented the national commission responsible for 
running the program, and praised in particular the efforts to improve English education in 
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Ecuador through the introduction of a new grant for a teacher of English, and 
collaboration with five local normal schools.
33
 Officials at IES commended this 
expansion into the normal schools since ―the general experience‖ of Fulbright programs 
indicated that both the creation of teaching materials and the training of secondary school 
teachers were ―vital elements in the development of a successful English teaching 
program.‖
34
 While the number of grants for the teaching of English increased, however, 
the project in pure and applied sciences was canceled as officials tried instead to use that 
grant money to fund another lecturer in English, public administration, or chemical 
engineering.  
 Fulbright programs throughout Latin America targeted university populations. In 
his report to the Committee on International Exchange of Persons, Trusten Russell from 
the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils said that in each of the countries 
that he visited during the spring of 1958, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, and Puerto Rico, ―the structural reform of the universities was a principal 
topic of discussion.‖
35
 Throughout the region, university rectors were trying to modify 
traditional divisions of universities into autonomous faculties by introducing departments 
―more or less patterned on the example of North American universities.‖ Because these 
rectors often faced resistance from older faculty members, they told Russell that the U.S. 
professors brought to their countries under the Fulbright program should be ―of sufficient 
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maturity, experience and judgment to represent adequately the most significant 
developments and trends in the United States,‖ while also being young, creative and 
eager to teach. Russell also noted that university officials were re-arranging the physical 
spaces of many Latin American campuses in ways similar to U.S. universities. They now 
consolidated in suburban facilities faculties that were once ―scattered‖ throughout 
downtown.
36
 Influencing the physical layouts of universities, as well as their academic 
bureaucracies, became part of the broader aim of stemming anti-Americanism on Latin 
American campuses during this era by encouraging reform along a U.S. model. 
 Of course policymakers wanted people to interpret any influence by the United 
States as cooperative in order to contain Communism. Despite this, the Fulbright 
Program, as with its predecessor the Foreign Leader Program, was not immune to 
political manipulations. While Karnis and his staff in Ecuador had little difficulty 
securing the participation of Central University in the Fulbright Program, the situation in 
Guayaquil was different. Initially, the rector of the University of Guayaquil, Miguel 
Varas Samaniego, had offered his ―enthusiastic collaboration‖ for the implementation of 
the program in his university.
37
 Yet Varas‘s term had expired before officials could 
implement the program, and his successor, Antonio Parra Velasco, immediately 
expressed his ―negative attitude toward the participation of the University of Guayaquil 
in any U.S. educational exchange program.‖ The visit of Trusten Russell mentioned 
above had reportedly eased the situation a bit, and through several personal meetings with 
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the rector, Russell had been able to win Parra Velasco‘s support.
38
 The rector now 
expressed his ―great interest‖ in having his son, Parra Gil, visit the United States.  
 Coincidentally, Norrie had already nominated Parra Gil for a Fulbright grant. Due 
perhaps to previous experiences with politically sensitive nominees, Norrie had 
purposefully neglected to mention that Parra Gil was Parra Velasco‘s son. When, 
however, the son‘s application was turned down by the BFS, who argued that the young 
Ecuadorian needed more ―general background‖ studies before he could begin post-
graduate work in the United States, Norrie wrote to Dulles asking for help.
39
  
 Norrie argued that the embassy, along with the local Fulbright Commission, felt 
that denying Parra Gil a grant would ―jeopardize the whole Fulbright Program in 
Guayaquil…since it is more than probable that it will change the rector‘s attitude.‖
40
 
Norrie and his colleagues felt it was ―essential‖ that if he could not be awarded a 
Fulbright grant, Parra Gil should at least receive a Specialist Grant so that he could visit 
medical centers in the United States. They emphasized that after Parra Velasco‘s term as 
rector was over, he would likely be re-elected in 1961 for a second term. This, combined 
with the fact that he had reportedly gained favor with the students in Guayaquil by 
securing a ―bigger allocation‖ for the university from the National Congress, only 
heightened the importance of maintaining his friendship by awarding his son a grant. 
Having won over Para Velasco, the last thing that Norrie and others at the embassy 
                                                 
38
 Norrie to Dulles, 26 May 1958. 
39
 Norrie to Dulles, 28 April 1958, Central File 1955-59, Box 2110, RG 59, NACP. 
40
 Norrie to Dulles, 26 May 1958. 
288 
 
wanted was to have the rector turn against the United States because policymakers denied 
his son a grant. 
 In another case of political meddling involving the Foreign Leader Program, in 
October 1958, Ambassador Ravndal wrote to Roy Rubottom from the Bureau of Inter-
American Affairs at the Department of State, asking if officials could secure a teaching 
grant for Velasco Ibarra.
41
 As had happened twelve months earlier, rivals of the former 
president once again considered him to be a political threat. This time, they argued that 
Velasco Ibarra was a ―heavy favorite‖ to win the 1960 election—an election that he did 
in fact win. The last time this idea was proposed, officials at the State Department 
discounted the possibility largely due to Velasco Ibarra‘s limited abilities in English. A 
year later, his language skills were now no longer an issue. Reporting that Velasco Ibarra 
had never been to the United States, and that he was said to be ―generally against what he 
does know of us at second-hand,‖ Ravndal felt that students in New Mexico, Florida, or 
at the International House at Columbia would have little difficulty following Velasco 
Ibarra‘s lectures in Spanish.
42
 The ambassador thus ―strongly recommend[ed] that the 
Department assist, in a quiet way, in arranging a teaching or other grant for this very 
important Ecuadorean.‖  
 Back in Washington, Rubottom met with officials from IES and secured 
―informal approval of the idea.‖
43
 Rubottom asked Ravndal to create a formal proposal, 
and he told him that, because Velasco Ibarra was already a presidential candidate for 
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1960, the grant should appear to come from a private institution. If State Department 
officials secured such an invitation, then they would offer Velasco Ibarra a leader grant to 
help remove him from Ecuador during the election cycle. By 1959, preparations to have 
Velasco Ibarra lecture at Yale were ―well advanced‖ when Rubottom informed Ravndal 
that the plans had to be suspended for now. President Ponce felt that, were the project to 
go forward, it would ―be locally interpreted as unfriendly to his Government.‖
44
 Once 
again policymakers halted efforts to remove Velasco Ibarra from the political scene for 
fear of potentially negative repercussions during this era of heightened anti-Americanism.  
 As suggested by the Velasco Ibarra case examined above, and despite the fact that 
we have focused primarily on the Fulbright Program in this chapter, other exchange 
programs that we examined in previous chapters were of course still in operation during 
this period. In fact, in response to the anti-Americanism in the region, officials running 
the Foreign Leader Program began to focus more on the field of law. For 1959, for 
example, Karnis requested permission to use Specialist funds for a travel project for 
twenty-two Ecuadorian law students from Central University, who, he argued, were 
―among the most important target group in Ecuador as far as our country program is 
concerned.‖
45
 According to Karnis, Ecuadorians treated law school as a ―prelude to 
politics,‖ with the current dean of the school serving as the Secretary of the National 
Socialist Party, while the former President of Ecuador, Andres Cordova, was the 
counselor for the sixth-year students. Cordova, a ―loyal friend of the United States,‖ had 
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proposed the trip. He had already secured agreements and financial support from the 
British, French and German embassies to send half of the students to Western Europe. He 
hoped to send the remaining students to the United States where they would spend three 
weeks visiting various university campuses. 
 Karnis explained that these sixth-year students could have a long-term affect on 
their fellow classmates and the student federations as they would be able to vote in 
student elections for up to two years after their graduation. This focus on the law 
extended beyond law students. That same year, Karnis submitted the application of Luis 
Monsalve Pozo, a law professor and Vice-Rector of the University of Cuenca, for a 
foreign leader grant.
46
 In addition to his influence at the university, Monsalve was also 
the President of the Section of Juridical and Social Sciences at the Casa de la Cultura in 
Cuenca. Although Monsalve had in the past ―openly and with great vigor‖ criticized the 
United States in the socioeconomic field, he now reportedly ―evidenced a sincere desire‖ 
to understand the United States better.  
 In addition to Monsalve embassy staff also nominated, Dr. Juan Isaac Lovato 
Vargas, the Dean of the Faculty of Law at Central University. As the Secretary General 
of the Ecuadorian Socialist Party, Lovato had reportedly only recently been ―won over 
after diligent and careful contacts‖ made by the U.S. Embassy.
47
 Perhaps if given the 
chance to study in the United States, these law students and professors could challenge 
the leftist tendencies of their peers in Ecuador identified by some in Quito. Perhaps 
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unsurprising given the battles over territorial waters, the sub-field of international law 
was especially important to the officials running the Foreign Leader Program with 
Ecuador. In this connection, officials nominated Julio Cesar Prado Vallejo, Director of 
the Political and Diplomatic Department of the Foreign Ministry, for a 1959 Leader 
grant.
48
 In addition to his work for the government, Prado was also a professor of 
International Law at Central University, and as such he was interested in studying how 
law schools in the United States were organized. Because of his interests, acting PAO 
Jerry James felt that ―positive benefits‖ would result for Ecuador if the U.S. awarded 
Prado a grant. Together then, the Fulbright Program and the Foreign Leader Program 
worked to combat anti-Americanism in the hemisphere through their emphasis on 
universities and university students from a variety of academic disciplines that were 
considered strategically important in the maintenance of U.S. hegemony. 
 By 1961, more than twenty years had passed since the U.S. government first 
became involved in funding, developing and promoting educational exchanges with the 
nations of Latin America. Since then, approximately 33,000 Latin Americans had visited 
the United States for the purposes of education and training.
49
 In 1960 alone, 4,400 Latin 
Americans and 1,500 U.S. citizens participated in educational and cultural programs, 
which policymakers funded with a budget of $35 million. Beginning in 1955 there was a 
steady rise in dollar funds for these programs, from $1,469,000 for that year, to 
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$3,952,000 for 1959, to $4,732,000 for 1960, and an estimated $6,500,000 for 1961 with 
the remainder of the funding coming from foreign currencies used under P.L. 480.
50
  
 The Alliance for Progress was in many ways a continuation of U.S-Latin 
American policies developed during the final years of the Eisenhower Administration. 
This held true too for the educational exchange programs. Soon after Kennedy‘s 
announcement of his administration‘s Latin America policy, his staff brought all of the 
exchange programs with the nations of Latin America under the Alliance policy 
umbrella. The Foreign Leader Program, for example, became ―an effective instrument in 
helping the Embassy to confront some of the various political, economic, social civic and 
educational problems existing in most of the American Republics.‖
51
 Of course these 
were always targets of the program as broadly defined, and the rhetoric of the Alliance, 
including the insistence on self-help and modernization, did little to alter the actual 
functioning of the program. Staff at the Governmental Affairs Institute, for example, 
continued their efforts to make their segment of the program a ―dynamic and integral part 
of an affirmative U.S. policy of free world leadership.‖
52
  
 The exchange programs with Ecuador under the Alliance for Progress were part 
of a much broader effort to use education to promote U.S. influence in the Third World. 
By 1962, officials working for the Committee on International Exchange of Persons 
Conference Board of Associated Research Councils had nominated U.S. professors for 
federal awards allowing them to lecture and conduct research in sixty-four different 
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 Officials used bilateral Fulbright agreements to conduct exchanges with 
forty-three of those countries, including Ecuador. They provided Grants to the remaining 
twenty-one countries using dollar funds from the Smith-Mundt program.  
 Policymakers designed the programs under the Alliance for Progress to address 
the concept of self help. In Ecuador, this translated into the establishment, among other 
things, of a two-year vocational education program designed to ―help alleviate the critical 
shortage of skilled workers in Ecuador.‖
54
 Once trained, these workers would then carry 
out the development programs envisioned by policymakers in Washington, and pro-U.S. 
elites in Latin America. In addition to this training program, officials also established two 
labor centers in Quito, and one in Guayaquil, as part of their efforts to encourage the 
development of labor unions and practices modeled after unions in the United States. A 
new training center established by the Institutes of Administrative Studies at Central 
University was also in the works as part of a broader effort to address ―the joint problems 
of deficient public and private administrative performance and inadequate identification 
and use of human resources.‖
55
 
 The education of students and technicians was also a crucial component of the 
Alliance. Commenting on the ―abysmally low‖ level of technical knowledge in Latin 
America, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. suggested that ―obviously modernization requires a 
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massive redevelopment with US and OAS help of the Latin American educational 
system.‖
56
 Schlesinger and the other architects of the Alliance saw modernization as 
fitting naturally with the U.S. mission to promote international peace and development 
through the spreading of liberal capitalism and democracy.
57
 Thus while the rhetoric of 
modernization was somewhat new, the Fulbright Program and other educational 
exchange programs under the Alliance for Progress continued the process of expanding 
consent to U.S. hegemony through government-funded programs that we have been 
examining.  
 On 3 July 1961, policymakers revealed the connection between this mission and 
educational exchange in the latest guideline paper on U.S. policy toward Latin America. 
Report authors suggested expanding the use of ―technical assistance‖ and student 
exchange programs in order to ―provide strong informational support for the Alliance for 
Progress, with emphasis on the principle of self-help.‖
58
 Previous efforts to address the 
issue of technical assistance in Latin America, such as the Point Four program, focused 
on the export of technical knowledge to the region by using U.S. experts sent to Latin 
America. The Alliance rhetoric of self-help, however, suggested a more cooperative 
effort. Policymakers used this cooperative approach to stem the tide of anti-Americanism 
in Latin America by portraying the United States as not simply an expert, but rather as a 
nation ready to work with its neighbors to achieve common goals.  
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 As part of this effort, the Kennedy Administration and Congress strengthened the 
Fulbright program in 1961 with the passage of the Fulbright-Hays Act. Under the Act, 
foreign currencies funding Fulbright grants could now be set aside in advance for future 
fiscal years. Officials now used U.S. dollars to fund the awards for the first time. Both of 
these changes, along with the loosening of restrictions on grantees, helped the Fulbright 




 One month after Kennedy announced the Alliance for Progress, a team of 
consultants—including Robert Avery, Professor of Political Science at the University of 
Tennessee, George Erickson, the Chief of the U.S. Geological Party in Chile, Elmer 
Holmgren, the former Director of the Food and Agricultural Division of the International 
Cooperation Administration, Wilson Schmidt, Professor of Economics at George 
Washington University, Frank Tiller, Dean of the School of Engineering at the University 
of Houston, and Charles R. Norbert, Counselor at law in Washington, D.C.—arrived in 
Ecuador to assess the country‘s needs. Divided into twelve chapters dealing with subjects 
ranging from the economy to civil aviation, their three hundred-page report was the type 
of long-range planning that Kennedy wanted. In general, the consultants expressed their 
sincere hopes that the Velasco Ibarra Administration would fulfill its promises under the 
Alliance. They also pointed out the many areas where U.S. training was already 
successfully taking place. In his discussion of administrative reform, for example, Robert 
Avery pointed out that the United States Operations Mission (USOM), a division of the 
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Agency for International Development (AID), had initiated a program of technical 
assistance in public administration in 1958.
60
 A Fulbright professor from the United 
States amplified this effort, Avery continued, by teaching classes in public administration 
at Central University, which offered a variety of courses for both students and public 
employees. In keeping with the cooperative nature of the Alliance, Avery commented 
that the USOM public administration staff had responded to the requests for assistance 
from ―an impressive number of agencies of the Ecuadorian government.‖
61
 Again, 
policymakers hoped that Latin Americans would see Washington as cooperating with 
their governments instead of simply directing them. 
 In the report chapter on education in Ecuador, author Frank Tiller revealed many 
of the shortcomings of previous exchange programs, as well as a number of challenges 
for future programs to address. Agreeing with many of the other officials we have studied 
in this chapter, Tiller felt that Latin American universities should be the number one 
priority of the Alliance for Progress in general, and the Fulbright Program specifically. 
Arguing that ―the present moment offere[d] a singular opportunity for perhaps the most 
important investment that the U.S. c[ould] make—an investment in the brains of Latin 
American intellectuals,‖ Tiller pointed out that the government of Ecuador had recently 
ratified an agreement with Czechoslovakia for the exchange of cacao for pedagogic 
equipment.
62
 Because he saw university students as ―the future leaders of their country‖ 
in whose hands relationships between their government and the rest of the world would 
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develop, Tiller urged officials in Washington to expand the Fulbright Program in 
Ecuador.
63
 Given that the Ecuadorian government had already worked out deals with 
Czechoslovakia, Tiller predicted that the Soviet Union could easily be next. 
 The report findings on Ecuador fit within a broader dialog among U.S. elites 
concerning education in Latin America. While government-funded educational exchange 
programs between the United States and the nations of Latin America had become 
increasingly more sophisticated since their beginnings in the 1930s, within the halls of 
Washington it seemed that few policymakers knew much about the nature of education 
generally, and universities specifically, in Latin America. In their report, ―The Spanish 
American University and the University Students,‖ Carl Fiskow and Taylor Peck from 
USIA attempted to address this deficiency.  
 Reflecting the faith in modernization of the times, Fiskow and Peck argued that if 
given ―sufficient resources,‖ universities in Latin America could collectively become ―a 
more powerful force for freedom, a source of democratic government, a stabilizing social 
element, a vital factor in economic development, and a genuine cultural institution.‖
64
 As 
occurred in the United States and Western Europe, university student populations across 
Latin America had exploded since 1940, rising by approximately 400 percent in twenty 
years. Yet the physical infrastructure of Latin American universities had not kept up. 
Administrators added frustrated incoming students to an already tense situation in which 
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university faculties and national governments tended to compete for the right to be the 
voice of the nation.  
 As Fiskow and Peck explained it, being a university student in Latin America 
meant something special, ―it mean[t] belonging to a powerful, educated pressure group in 
countries where often the majority of the people cannot even read or write, where often 
even the secondary school graduate, ‗bachiller‘ is to be looked up to.‖
65
 Many of these 
students felt a responsibility to address the inequalities they saw in their home countries. 
According to Fiskow and Peck, Latin American students carried within them a cynicism 
that caused them to mistrust their local elites as well as foreign investors in their country. 
Just in case officials in Washington were still unclear as to the potential threat to U.S. 
hegemony posed by the students, the authors elaborated, ―if the political student has little 
faith in the leaders of his country‘s government, he will believe them quite capable of 
being ‗bought out‘ by foreign governments and foreign private enterprises with interests 
in his country.‖ Following Nixon‘s 1958 trip, this analysis had a receptive audience in 
Washington.  
 In terms of U.S. foreign policy, Fiskow and Peck were particularly concerned 
with university students who felt uninspired by the United States ―usually because, 
contradictorily, they consider that on the one hand it is no longer young, adventuresome, 
experimental, and daring, all of which appeal to youth, while on the other they smugly 
regard it as immature.‖ In short, these students seemed to feel that the United States had 
―forgotten its own birth pains and early struggles and no longer identifie[d] itself or 
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sympathize[d] with movements for liberty in other lands, but even attempt[ed] to 
suppress it due to its own investments abroad.‖
66
 As State Department officials 
maneuvered to exclude Cuba from the OAS, rehabilitating the U.S. image on Latin 
American campuses became a central mission. 
 To address this situation, in January 1961, the Executive Secretaries of the 
Fulbright commissions throughout Latin America gathered to discuss the current state of 
the program.
67
 Through detailed examinations of each group of grantees—lecturers and 
researchers, students and teachers—all those who were present developed a fuller sense 
of the strengths and weaknesses of the program as it operated in Latin America. In 
differentiating between the Fulbright Program in Latin America, and its earlier European 
incarnation, presenters told attendees that the program in Europe was designed to give 
scholars and professors ―an opportunity to expose themselves to the traditional 
universities of Europe, whereas in Latin America the grantee was regarded as a ‗working‘ 
grantee expected to ‗contribute‘ rather than learn himself.‖ This distinction between 
absorbing the cultural traditions in Europe and working in Latin America rested in part at 
least on the perceived need for greater change in Latin America than in Europe, and on 
the more immediate perceived threat of Castroism in the hemisphere.  
 The first Fulbrighter came to Ecuador in 1958. Through the early years of the 
Alliance this number increased, with 38 U.S. scholars and teachers going to Ecuador and 
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120 Ecuadorians coming to the United States.
68
 In a survey of U.S. Fulbright grantees 
during the Alliance era, editor Edward T. Purcell gauged the effectiveness of the 
program.
69
 As Purcell pointed out, the program in Latin America at that time was unique 
in that students gathered in Washington to receive specific training before their departure. 
Through a variety of presentations by government officials and scholars, grantees learned 
about U.S. foreign policy, the Alliance for Progress, the role of capitalism in developing 
countries, and the dynamics of social change and political development in Latin America. 
Also on the program were specific issues of concern that we have already mentioned 
here, such as civil rights in the United States, and ―newer‖ topics such as the ―Latin 
American mind and character.‖
70
 Grantees received, in short, lessons designed to make 
them more effective carriers of U.S. knowledge in this effort to maintain U.S. hegemony.  
 Purcell‘s survey posed a series of questions, the most important for our concerns 
here being whether the United States benefited from the exchange. In general, all of the 
respondents who had traveled to Ecuador under the Fulbright Program agreed that the 
Alliance had improved cultural understandings between themselves and the Ecuadorians 
whom they had met. One of the most insightful responses came from Gene E. Bigler II 
who, at the time of publication, was serving as a U.S. Information Agency Officer in 
Lima, Peru. Bigler had a remarkable amount of contact with Ecuadorian officials, 
including Velasco Ibarra, both Carlos Julio Arosemena and his cousin Otto Arosemena 
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(who became president of Ecuador in 1966), and Galo Plaza. According to Bigler, the 
Fulbright Program was succeeding in its efforts to develop cross-cultural understandings.  
 Despite the enthusiasm of many of the individuals responsible for the 
development and execution of the Fulbright Program, however, by 1962 applications for 
lectureships and research grants were down. For the 1962-1963 program year, for 
example, five lecturing awards were available for scholars wishing to lecture in Ecuador. 
Yet the Fulbright Committee received only three applications, compared with ten from 
the year before.
71
 One possible reason for the decline, according to members of the 
Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, was the continued difficulty in 
locating acceptable candidates who could lecture in Spanish in the natural sciences, 
especially when there were plenty of Latin American experts in these fields who faced no 
challenges with the language.
72
  
 By 1963, however, this decline in applications appeared to have been temporary, 
as efforts to recruit Spanish-speaking professors in the applied sciences began to pay off. 
Throughout the region, 2,002 applications were submitted for the 1963-64 program. In 
Ecuador, where officials announced four awards, nine applications were submitted which 
showed a marked increase from the five to three ratio of the previous year.
73
 Thus in 
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Ecuador at least, the Fulbright Program seemed to be developing nicely during the 
Alliance years. 
 From 1958 to 1963, the Fulbright Program, along with the Foreign Leader 
Program and the American schools of Guayaquil and Quito, continued to provide the 
intellectual support for the maintenance of U.S. hegemony in Ecuador and the Third 
World. While Richard Nixon received a warm welcome when he visited Ecuador in 
1958, this contrasted sharply with his experiences in other parts of the region. Yet when it 
came to policy making in Washington, officials drew little distinction between these 
experiences. Policymakers treated student unrest in Ecuador much as they did throughout 
Latin America. By increasing the number of personal contacts between U.S. and 
Ecuadorian experts and students, officials running the Fulbright Program hoped to 
generate further consent to U.S. policies in the Third World from the current and future 




 From 1933 to 1963, policymakers from the United States and Ecuador worked to 
maintain the U.S. Empire in the Third World. This process began with the Roosevelt 
Administration‘s push for hemispheric solidarity during World War Two. By eschewing 
established policies of U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of Latin American nations, 
policymakers hoped to convince their Latin American counterparts that Washington was 
committed to a new era of cooperation. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor intensified 
this effort to secure hemispheric solidarity. Soon after the attack, officials from Ecuador 
and other nations in Latin America offered the use of their territories for the 
establishment of U.S. military bases. These leaders also agreed to supply the primary 
resources found within their territories for the Allied war effort. As the United States 
joined the Allied cause, policymakers had secured the support of Latin American 
governments.  
 As the war began to wind down, officials in the United States and Latin America 
worked to shape the postwar world. With the Truman Doctrine, U.S. policymakers 
shifted their focus from ensuring hemispheric security, to rebuilding Europe as a bulwark 
against the spread of Communism. Negotiations over the return of the Galápagos base 
reveal this shift in focus. Ecuadorian military and political elites were unable to secure 
for Ecuador all of the support—in terms of loans and matériel—that they felt that their 
wartime contributions to hemispheric security deserved. 
 In addition to issues of geo-strategy and economics, the wartime hemispheric 
solidarity also included a concerted effort by policymakers to combat fascist ideologies. 
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Through the funding of American Schools in Latin America, and the educational 
exchange programs begun under the Buenos Aires Convention of 1936, policymakers 
worked to generate consent among Latin Americans to U.S. policies in order to offset 
fascist penetration in the hemisphere. From the beginning, as we saw in the case of the 
American School of Quito, Ecuadorians were active in securing these educational 
opportunities for their children. These were not, in other words, programs forced on 
Ecuador by the United States. By educating Ecuadorian students in classes taught in 
English by teachers using teaching methods developed in the United States, policymakers 
in Washington, and their pro-U.S. allies in Ecuador, hoped to enable these students to 
continue their education in the United States. Through this education, these students 
would hopefully come to view the U.S. system as superior to the competition—a message 
that they would then share with their fellow citizens. 
 As the Cold War progressed, Ecuador entered a period of presidential stability 
that was nearly unprecedented in its history. During the Galo Plaza years, this stability 
was marked as well by economic development as the Ecuadorian banana industry 
flourished. Eager to continue this success by developing the nascent domestic fishing 
industry, Galo Plaza passed a series of Presidential Decrees that altered government 
policy concerning the limits of territorial waters, and the protection of natural resources 
found in these waters. Thus began decades of wrangling with U.S. policymakers who 
consistently refused to abandon the three-mile limit. This was a period of tension in U.S.-
Ecuadorian relations, when policymakers from both countries failed to fully defend their 
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position regarding territorial waters. These tensions, however, never brought a full 
rupture of U.S.-Ecuadorian relations, or of U.S. hegemony in Latin America. 
 While policymakers from Ecuador, the United States, and other coastal nations 
negotiated over the territorial waters issue, officials running the Foreign Leader Program 
worked to ensure the continuation of U.S. hegemony in the future. Building on their 
experiences running earlier exchange programs, policymakers now targeted leaders from 
specific, influential segments of Latin American societies. While the enemy had changed 
from fascists to communists, the overall goal of the Foreign Leader Program was the 
same as the wartime exchange programs—to convince peoples living outside of the 
United States that the capitalist system promoted by Washington was superior to the 
competition. By funding the exchange experiences of leaders from the most influential 
segments of society, policymakers hoped to generate broad consent to U.S. policies. 
 The discontent evident in the territorial waters chapter came to a head during Vice 
President Richard Nixon‘s tour of South America in 1958. Ecuadorians greeted Nixon 
warmly, but elsewhere in the region the reception turned violent. When President 
Kennedy later tried to secure support from OAS member states to expel Cuba from the 
organization, he discovered that six nations, including Ecuador, would not comply. 
Through repeated negotiations, policymakers in the United States eventually managed to 
secure the support they desired, and Castro‘s Cuba was expelled from the OAS. But the 
Punta del Este episode revealed something that had been developing ever since the end of 
the Second World War—no longer could Washington assume that the nations of Latin 
306 
 
America would support U.S. policy. Generating greater consent during the 1960s fell to 
the educational exchange programs, in particular the Fulbright Program. 
 The increased attention to university students and faculties under the Fulbright 
Program was a direct response to the discontent witnessed by Nixon on his tour. Student 
protests in several of the nations visited by Nixon prompted the Eisenhower 
Administration to adjust their Latin American policies, and exchange programs were part 
of this readjustment. Policymakers considered university students to be as particularly 
useful in the efforts to maintain U.S. hegemony because they would presumably exert 
their influence for decades to come. Convincing Latin American students that the United 
States was not the ―Colossus of the North‖ became a central focus of the Fulbright 
Program. By targeting specific faculties and student organizations, policymakers hoped to 
challenge the leftist tendencies that they identified with these groups. The discord 
witnessed by Nixon and representatives at the Punta del Este Conference convinced 
policymakers that they needed to shore up U.S. hegemony in Latin America if they hoped 
to contain Communism. 
 The maintenance of the U.S. Empire in the Third World was hegemonic. In the 
case of Ecuador, policymakers never resorted to the interventions or shows of force that 
fill the existing historiography on U.S.-Latin American relations. Instead, officials from 
Ecuador and the United States worked together to support the U.S. Empire. The chapters 
on diplomacy detail the negotiations among policymakers involved in maintaining U.S. 
hegemony in the face of immediate, and at times short-term, challenges. These challenges 
prompted officials to establish educational exchange programs designed to generate long-
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term consent to U.S. hegemony. In other words, the chapters on diplomacy and education 
work together, and neither can be fully understood without reference to the other.  
 Though consent played a significant role in maintaining U.S. hegemony in 
Ecuador, this does not mean that policymakers from the United States and Ecuador 
always agreed with each other, or that they always secured maximum benefits for their 
country. In the diplomatic cases that we have explored—including the actions of the 
Ecuadorian government regarding the South American Development Company and All 
American Cables, the Galápagos base, the dispute over the legal limits of territorial 
waters, and the exclusion of Cuba from the OAS—neither U.S. policymakers, nor their 
Ecuadorian counterparts were able to force the other to accept their government‘s 
demands. The conclusion of each diplomatic episode explored here involved instead a 
series of compromises. 
 While the government of Ecuador, for example, was unable to extract as much 
from U.S. companies operating within their territory during the 1930s, neither were U.S. 
policymakers able to prevent the altering of the South American Development 
Company‘s contract by the Ecuadorian government. Negotiations over the return of the 
Galápagos base resulted in a similar compromise—the United States lost the right to 
occupy the base, while the Ecuadorian government only received discounted matériel 
instead of the desired $20 million loan. Compromises also ended the territorial waters 
dispute and the battle over Cuba‘s exclusion from the OAS—although in the territorial 
waters case, the solution was only temporary. Through bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations, policymakers in Ecuador and the United States always managed to generate 
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consensus concerning the continuation of U.S. hegemony in the Third World, albeit on 
modified terms. 
 Relations between the United States and Ecuador from 1933 to 1963 thus 
represent a case of routine relations. Too often historians have focused their attention on 
exceptional cases when analyzing the U.S. Empire in the Third World. This tendency has 
obscured our understanding of the consensual hegemony that has supported this empire. 
Ultimately, U.S.-Ecuadorian relations have been successful, if we measure that success 
by the absence of exceptional interventions into the affairs of Ecuador. Only by exploring 
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